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Preface 
For some years the nexus of development and security has been a key 
conceptual and also political issue. The associated debates are wide-
ranging, extending from the basic question of the relationship between 
development and security to the concrete interaction of military and civil 
actors in a given post-conflict situation. The present volume seeks to con-
tribute to this debate by considering various dimensions of the subject.  
I should like to express my sincere thanks to the authors of the essays 
included in this volume for their involvement and very close cooperation 
in the preparation of the manuscripts. I am similarly very grateful to those 
of my colleagues at the German Development Institute – and especially 
Gisela Kuhlmann and Renate Bugdoll – who participated in the compila-
tion of this publication. I should particularly like to mention the editorial 
assistance provided by Nina Kielwein. 
 
 
 
Bonn, January 2006 Stephan Klingebiel 
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New Interfaces between Security and Development 
Stephan Klingebiel 
Introduction 
New foundations 
The relationship between development and security is not a fundamentally 
new conceptual issue. Much the same can be said of the practical inter-
faces between various outward-oriented policies – and above all develop-
ment, foreign and security policies. In the past, too, an aspect which has at 
least implicitly played an essential role has been, for example, the stable 
and peaceful environment that has to exist if development is to be possi-
ble. Earlier debates, however, saw this relationship primarily as abstract 
interdependence.1 In contrast, the current debates, which began in the early 
2000s, focus far more directly on convergence in conceptual  and practical 
policy terms. 
The differences from previous debates extend well beyond practical rele-
vance. The enormous process of change in the concept of security is par-
ticularly important in this context. The idea of security centred on the state 
has, in many respects, given way to an entirely new concept. Security has 
fundamentally evolved in the international debate from a concept which 
focused on the stability of the state to a protective approach related to the 
individual. In this context, basic changes of course have been brought 
about particularly by the debates in the United Nations (e.g. The Respon-
sibility to Protect, high-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and 
the UN Secretary-General’s report In Larger Freedom2. Although the 
conclusions for actual policy have not always been drawn to the same 
degree, there is certainly evidence of initial attempts in this direction. A 
                                                          
1  However, the practical and other aspects of the civil-military relationship in the area of 
humanitarian aid have long been under discussion. This is true of the military side in 
two respects: it sometimes takes on logistical tasks (transport of aid supplies, etc.), and 
it is involved in the security situation in areas receiving aid. The two tasks have resulted 
in there being a long debate on the relationship between humanitarian aid and military 
actors (see, for example, Weiss 2005, 7 ff.). 
2  See: ICISS (2001); UN Secretary-General (2004); UN Secretary-General (2005). 
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clear example of this is the transformation of the former Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), which has explicitly 
abandoned the principle of non-interference (see Klingebiel 2005). The 
United Nations’ decision in December 2005 to establish a Peacebuilding 
Commission (PBC), which will above all seek improved coordination 
among the various actors and integrated strategies in post-conflict situa-
tions, may also serve as a guide for the future.  
It is still hard to appreciate many of the implications of the change in 
thinking and of the new concepts of development and security. This is 
true, for example, of dealings with states which continue to be insuffi-
ciently capable of establishing their (at best, legitimate) monopoly of 
power. This increasingly leads to confrontation with old patterns of 
thought: in what circumstances should, or even must, there be interaction 
or cooperation with groups which, though having instruments of power at 
their disposal, are not legitimized as governments? How can there be deal-
ings with government representatives who may be able to ensure a mo-
nopoly of power for their government, but lack legitimacy? Many debates3  
directly and sometimes indirectly linked to the development-security 
nexus have begun in this sphere. 
"Human security" and "integrated missions": new approaches 
For the conceptual debates "human security" has become a key term.4 A 
constituent element of the concept of human security is the protection of 
people or individuals. The concept thus differs fundamentally from the 
term "national security", where the focus is on the security of the state. 
Protagonists of a narrow understanding of human security place the em-
phasis on threats of violence (civil wars, etc.). Protagonists of a broad 
understanding of human security include in their understanding of the term 
other threats and risks facing people, such as natural disasters and famine. 
No matter whether a narrow or broad view is taken, however, the concept 
of human security may encourage an integrative approach at a general goal 
                                                          
3  To name but a few of the issues currently being debated: states within states, non-state 
armed groups, dealing with traditional authorities, transformation of authoritarian/to-
talitarian systems. A brief overview of some of these debates can be found in Debiel et 
al. (2005). 
4  For this debate see, for example, Human Security Centre (2005) and Krause (2005). 
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level since the understanding of goals is always geared to the protection of 
individuals. 
Development, security and foreign policies have similarly undergone rapid 
change at practical level within the space of a few years. For development 
policy security issues have moved into the direct field of vision; seen as a 
whole, aspects of foreign policy have therefore gained in importance for 
development policy. Conversely, security policy has increasingly to do 
with developing and transition countries and their stability or fragility. 
Challenges to security policy posed by the defence of countries at their 
own frontiers are now deemed far less relevant by a number of members of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
Instead, new dangers and threats5 very largely characterized by their global 
relevance and their disregard for frontiers are being identified.6 This is 
due, among other things, to the threats posed by international terrorism, 
which can hardly be eliminated with traditional defence policy models. 
Against this background a convergence of development and security poli-
cies is taking place, even in the case of individual measures and conflict 
situations. Comprehensive mandates for peace missions in particular have 
given rise to numerous points of contact between civil and military tasks. 
Peace missions today are expected to perform many difficult tasks in the 
development and stabilization of government structures (Kosovo, Afgha-
nistan, etc.). Development policy often and increasingly plays an impor-
tant role in this context. "Integrated missions" occupy an important place 
(Eide et al. 2005). Development policy therefore has to do with a growing 
number of situations in which interfaces with military actors need to be 
established. 
Simultaneity of military and civil tasks in peace missions without adequate 
links between them is unsatisfactory. Simply merging development-policy 
                                                          
5  The High-level Panel (UN Secretary-General 2004) identifies six clusters of threats: (1) 
economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental 
degradation, (2) inter-state conflict, (3) internal conflict, including civil war, genocide 
and other large-scale atrocities, (4) nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weap-
ons, (5) terrorism and (6) transnational organized crime. These threats challenge the 
protection of civilians and call for prevention. The European Security Strategy of 2003 
refers to the following key threats: (i) terrorism, (ii) proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, (iii) regional conflicts, (iv) state failure and (v) organized crime. 
6  For this debate see Kaldor (1999) and Münkler (2003). 
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and military approaches and activities, on the other hand, is neither mean-
ingful nor desirable. What is vital, however, is the identification of situa-
tions and spheres where more closely coordinated and sometimes even 
joint planning, action and monitoring are appropriate and more effective 
(e.g. security sector reforms).  
Although there is now a general consensus on the need for coherent ap-
proaches by the various policies if security challenges and complex peace 
missions are to be dealt with constructively, differences among the various 
actors by no means pale into insignificance. Rather, the specific objectives 
(Are, for example, protective measures intended primarily for the troops 
involved or for the local people?), operations and time horizons (In what 
time dimensions is the "success" of a mission appraised? When should or 
can an external actor leave an area? and so on) differ widely. 
Formally speaking, the official definition of what constitutes official de-
velopment assistance (ODA) also attempts to take account in some re-
spects of the new range of tasks to be performed by development policy. 
In March 2005 the High-level Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Aid 
Agencies of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committees (DAC) 
decided to adapt the then applicable ODA criteria. Now, for example, the 
management of security expenditure through improved civilian oversight 
and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and 
auditing of security expenditure is eligible for ODA.  
Risk: securitization 
The expansion of the development policy agenda to include aspects rele-
vant to security creates new room for manoeuvre. This room for manoeu-
vre with respect to the security policy dimension consists, for example, in 
the exercise of influence on the main obstacles to development in the 
shape of instability, physical uncertainty and violent conflicts. The possi-
ble approaches and potential benefits are, moreover, to be extended and 
improved through influence on other policies and possible interaction and, 
if appropriate, cooperation  with the actors concerned. As Kofi Annan has 
commented in his report "In Larger Freedom":  "Not only are develop-
ment, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each 
other." (UN Secretary-General 2005, 5). 
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It may indeed be legitimately asked in this context what implications this 
may have for development policy. Critical analyses emphasize the poten-
tial danger of development policy being subordinated to a security policy 
agenda dominated by military interests. The central issue for the critical 
debates from a development policy angle is therefore securitization.7  
Conflicts of objectives and the risk of development policy being subordi-
nated to objectives and strategies with a military bias are plausible in many 
areas and verifiable in a number of examples. These conflicts of objectives 
and risks need not, however, form a basic argument against the wisdom of 
a new conceptual understanding of security and development and of a 
change in the interaction between development and security policy.8  
Examples of the securitization risk: 
• The role of the USA’s development policy in connection with its 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan or its policy 
in Iraq is proof of the dangers arising when development actors are 
subordinated to a military approach.9  
• A choice of countries in development policy geared solely or primar-
ily to security or geostrategic thinking would lead to withdrawal from 
countries and areas of activity (poverty reduction and the like) which 
did not have any (immediately) obvious relevance to security. 
The new relationship between development and security policy is not 
bound to result in the subordination and securitization of development 
policy. The international debates on a new understanding of security are 
particularly helping to generate increased geopolitical responsibility for 
ensuring that protection can be demanded and afforded to endangered 
population groups. The UN Secretary-General’s report "In Larger Free-
dom" is clear evidence of this. 
The specific shape taken by political strategies and operational action by 
the actors involved is a decisive factor. Overcoming the present distance 
between development and security policy is often a major prerequisite for 
                                                          
7  See inter alia the contributions by Brock (2004) and Maihold (2005) to the debate in 
Germany, for example. 
8  See, for example, the debate in connection with the European Security Strategy in 
Faust / Messner (2005). 
9  See, for example, Klingebiel / Roehder (2004). 
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more effective long- and short-term action to prevent crises, for construc-
tive conflict management and for coping effectively with post-conflict 
situations. It is therefore crucial for appropriate management of the inter-
faces between the relevant actors to be defined. 
About this volume 
The aim of this volume is to provide an insight into the debate on the con-
ceptual understanding of "development and security" and on the relation-
ship between development and security policy and to contribute to the 
further development of this debate. It seeks to reflect the breadth of views 
in the debate and to reveal its complexity in terms of the levels addressed 
(concepts, practical country policies, individual measures, etc.) and of the 
various actors (international organizations, national actors, non-govern-
mental organizations, etc.).  
The present volume comprises six chapters in addition to the introduction 
(Chapter 1). Mark Duffield, professor at the University of Bristol, has 
been one of the leading authorities on the theoretical debate on "develop-
ment and security" since the 1990s. In his essay (Chapter 2) he takes criti-
cal stock of the link between development and security. His view is that in 
the age of terrorism this debate is resulting in development cooperation 
being geared to "those sub-populations, regions and issues seen as pre-
senting a risk to homeland security." 
Neclâ Tschirgi, former Vice-President of the International Peace Acad-
emy (New York) and director of its research programme "The Security-
Development Nexus", argues in Chapter 3 that the debate on the security-
development nexus has become an unsatisfactory mantra. She sees the 
conceptual debate as still being too vague in many respects: it should be 
made clearer where the conceptual links between development and secu-
rity actually lie. She also calls for far more field-based research efforts to 
improve the empirical foundations of the debate. 
Clive Robinson’s study for the Association of World Council of Churches 
related Development Organisations in Europe (APRODEV) on the con-
vergence and divergence of the European Union’s security and develop-
ment policies forms the basis of Chapter 4. In his essay he summarizes the 
European debate, closely examining the understanding of security in the 
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European context and considering what this understanding means for the 
principles underlying and the instruments of EU action. 
Jakkie Cilliers, Director of the Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria), 
concentrates on post-conflict challenges with an eye to new interfaces 
between security and development (Chapter 5). He develops a phase model, 
in which the weighting of the security and development dimensions varies 
as a function of stability and instability. 
Ann M. Fitz-Gerald of the Centre for Managing Security in Transitional 
Societies (Cranfield University, UK Defence Academy) (Chapter 6) con-
siders specific concepts of political management for coping with the de-
velopment-security nexus, referring inter alia to experience of "joined-up 
government" in the UK and Canada. 
Finally, Stephan Klingebiel, division head at the German Development 
Institute (Bonn), considers the debate particularly from a German perspec-
tive (Chapter 7). He reveals a number of interfaces between development 
and security policy, especially in the approach to Africa. It becomes clear 
in this context that the contribution sought politically in support of the 
African peace and security architecture is essentially accompanied by 
closer dovetailing of the policies. 
Future agenda 
The various essays cannot, of course, paint a complete picture of the con-
ceptual and politico-strategic issues, but they do provide an insight into the 
many dimensions of the subject. They demonstrate that (i) the debate on 
the relationship between security and development must be advanced in 
theoretical terms and (ii) also developed further with a view to establishing 
political strategies and (iii) practical joined-up approaches. 
• In theoretical terms the causal links between security and develop-
ment have yet to be adequately explained. The debate on human secu-
rity has, however, produced greater clarity in the terminology and, 
above all, the various premises (individual vs state security). How-
ever, the precise interrelationship and the specific chains of causal 
links have yet to be fully analysed. This is also evident from the de-
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bates that call for "security" to be given priority over "development" 
in certain phases, the motto being "security first".10  
• As regards models of joined-up strategies and approaches, little ex-
perience has so far been gained and appraised. Many of the studies 
hitherto conducted have been primarily descriptive. The extent to 
which integrative policy approaches have actually generated added 
value is more a matter of conjecture than proof. 
• Much the same is true of practical measures and operations. Devel-
opment-oriented peace missions and other approaches geared to inte-
gration still form a comparatively new experimental field. The impli-
cations that differences between military and civil organizational cul-
tures have for interaction have, for example, an extremely important 
bearing on operational action.11 The available studies on these ap-
proaches and their effects and added value compared to earlier ap-
proaches are correspondingly deficient. 
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Human security: linking development and security in an 
age of terror 
Mark Duffield 
Summary 
Human security is commonly understood as prioritising the security of 
people, especially their welfare, safety and well-being, rather than that of 
states. Instead of examining human security as a measurable or specific 
condition, however, the focus here is how human security as a technology 
of governance facilitates the way that populations living within the territo-
ries of ineffective states are understood, differentiated and acted upon by 
aid institutions emanating from effective ones. In order to do this, devel-
opment is first defined biopolitically, that is, as a security technology re-
lated to promoting the life of populations that, compared to the inhabitants 
of developed societies, are essentially "non-insured". Of special interest in 
this paper is how human security as a relation of governance has continued 
to evolve in relation to the war on terrorism. At the close of the 1990s, 
human security encapsulated a vision of integrating existing aid networks 
into a coordinated, international system of intervention able to comple-
ment the efforts of ineffective states in securing their citizens and econo-
mies. Compared to this more universalistic notion of human security, in 
which development and security were regarded as "different but equal", 
the war on terrorism has deepened the interconnection between develop-
ment and security. In particular, it is refocusing aid resources on those sub-
populations, regions and issues seen as presenting a risk to homeland secu-
rity. While some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are concerned 
over growing threats to independence, for others new possibilities and 
opportunities for state/non-state interaction have emerged. 
Mark Duffield 
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1 Introduction 
The concept of human security is emblematic of the changed relations and 
governmental technologies that shape the post-Cold War security terrain.1 
While definitions vary, it addresses a world in which the threat of catas-
trophic nuclear war between leading states has been replaced by a concern 
for the well-being of people living within ineffective ones. Their ability to 
enjoy complete, safe and fulfilled lives – their human security – has 
moved from the shadows of domestic affairs onto the international politi-
cal agenda. Failure to achieve human security risks disillusionment and 
civil conflict among groups, communities and peoples; it threatens states 
from inside as it were and hence global order itself. Human security em-
bodies a notion of security that goes beyond conventional concerns with 
military capacity and the defence of borders. Human security approaches 
usually treat an expanded range of social and developmental variables as 
being able to constitute an international security threat. Poverty, popula-
tion displacement, HIV/AIDS, environmental breakdown and social exclu-
sion, for example, all bear directly on human and hence global security. 
The concept of human security has achieved striking prominence in the 
post-Cold War period. The term has gained widespread currency and, over 
the past few years in particular, has attracted a growing institutional inter-
est. There has been a proliferation of government, practitioner and aca-
demic networks,2 university centres, courses and research initiatives3, 
publications4, official reports5 and international commissions that draw 
                                                          
1  The research for this article was made possible by an Economic and Social Research 
Council, UK (ESRC) grant (RES-22-25-0035) within its New Security Challenges Pro-
gramme. 
2 Noteworthy examples include "The Human Security Network" launched in 1999 at a 
foreign ministerial level and involving the governments of Austria, Canada, Chile, 
Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thai-
land and, as an observer status, South Africa (http://www.humansecuritynetwork. org). 
Also, the UNESCO Forum on Human Security (http://www.unesco.org/ securipax/) and 
the Human Security News Association bringing together freelance journalists and web-
builders (http://www.humansecurity.org.uk). The Development Studies Association also 
has a Conflict and Human Security study group (http://www.devstud.org.uk/studygroups/ 
conflict.htm). 
3 The universities of Harvard, Oxford and Tufts, for example, have established major 
institutes, centres or programs dedicated to human security. 
4 For an extensive bibliography see Paris (2001). 
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directly on ideas around human security. Established in 2001, for example, 
was the independent International Commission on Human Security co-
chaired by Professor Amartya Sen and the former UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees, Sadako Ogata.6 In the same year, a separate International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty sponsored by the Ca-
nadian government suggested that human security is, 
"increasingly providing a conceptual framework for international ac-
tion […] there is growing recognition world-wide that the protection of 
human security, including human rights and human dignity, must be 
one of the fundamental objectives of modern international institutions" 
(ICISS 2001, 6). 
The rise of human security is usually portrayed as resulting from a grow-
ing humanism within the international system that draws on increasingly 
accepted norms and conventions associated with the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions, the founding of the International 
Criminal Court, and so on (ibid). In the words of Astri Suhrke, human 
security "evokes ‘progressive values’" (quoted by Mack 2002, 3). Rather 
than examining human security from a humanistic perspective, this essay 
regards human security as a principle of formation. That is, as producing 
the "humans" requiring securing and, at the same time, calling forth the 
state/non-state networks of aid, subjectivity and political practice neces-
sary for that undertaking. Rather than rehearse the conceptual disputes 
surrounding the definition of human security (see Paris 2001; King / 
Murray 2001), the concern here is with human security as a relation of 
governance. Rather than focussing on human security as a specific condi-
tion or measurable state of existence, the emphasis is on human security as 
a technology that empowers international institutions and actors to indi-
viduate, group and act upon Southern populations. 
In exploring the human security as a technology of international govern-
ance, the paper is concerned with the interrelationship between the war on 
terrorism and human security. This takes note of the disquiet felt within 
                                                                                                                         
5 Key official reports include Boutros-Ghali (1992); UNDP (1994); OECD (1998); ICISS 
(2001); Collier et al. (2003); CHS (2003). The Canadian based Centre for Human Secu-
rity (http://www.ligi.uba.ca) is in the process of producing an annual Human Security 
Report, modelled on UNDP’s Human Development Report. The first report was due for 
publication in Autumn 2004. 
6 See http://www.humansecurity-chs.org. 
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many aid agencies over the purported negative effects of the war on terror-
ism on humanitarian and development assistance (BOND 2003; CHS 
2003; Oxfam 2003; Christian Aid 2004). It can be argued that the 1990s 
relation of governance encapsulated by human security has undergone a 
number of important changes. While human security represents the fusion 
of development and security, the critics argue that the balance has tipped 
against development and in favour of a "harder" version of security which 
prioritises homeland livelihood systems and infrastructures. This incarna-
tion of security threatens to absorb development with, among other things, 
pressures to reprioritise development criteria in relation to supporting 
intervention, reconstructing crisis states and, in order to stem terrorist 
recruitment, protecting livelihoods and promoting opportunity within 
strategically important areas of instability. For its critics, the war on terror-
ism has reversed the progress made during the 1990s in promoting a uni-
versalistic human rights agenda and refocusing aid on poverty reduction. 
However, before rushing to declare a "new Cold War" (ibid), the paper 
will explore the governmental components of human security beginning 
with a brief examination of biopolitics. 
2 Biopolitics and human security 
Foucault’s conception of biopolitics is, at first glance, not wholly applica-
ble to the typical site of human security, that is, populations defined by 
"underdevelopment" (Foucault 2003, 239–264; Foucault 1998, 135–159; 
Foucault 1991b). What is being discussed in Foucault’s work is a biopoli-
tics of metropolitan or "developed" society. While it is possible to usefully 
extend his insights to development practice, the seminal difference be-
tween developed and underdeveloped populations in biopolitical terms 
must be first explored.7 This was graphically illustrated in the great Asian 
tsunami disaster at the end of 2004. Although the human cost and physical 
                                                          
7 Foucault did not directly consider biopolitics in relation to colonial and developmental 
regimes. Moreover, a number of influential writers have invoked him in this context 
without using the concept, for example, Said (1995), Escobar (1995), and Crush (1995). 
For an analysis of biopolitics in relation to colonialism see Stoler (1995), and for devel-
opment see Brigg (2002). Dillon and Reid (2000) and Dillon (2004) are extremely use-
ful in laying out the biopolitical problematic and drawing out its global implications. 
This essay, however, specifically explores development as a biopolitics associated with 
a self-reproducing species-life. 
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destruction was of an entirely different order, within 24 hours the world’s 
leading reinsurance companies had estimated that their losses would be 
half the 14 billion £ incurred during the hurricanes that hit Florida in sum-
mer of the same year. The reason being, "fewer people in the area’s af-
fected by the huge sea surges are insured" (Harding / Wray 2004). This 
distinction between an "insured" and a "non-insured" population broadly 
understood is suggestive of how development and underdevelopment can 
be distinguished biopolitically. Populations defined by "development" 
exist in relation to massified and pluralistic welfare regimes that, in addi-
tion private insurance cover, include comprehensive state-based or regu-
lated safety-nets covering health care, education, employment protection 
and pensions. In contrast, those classed as "underdeveloped" are distin-
guished by the absence of such massified life-support mechanisms; they 
are, essentially, non-insured. 
This absence however, has historically been compensated by a counter-
vailing presence. Since the eighteenth century a recurrent feature of the 
defining encounter between the agents of "modernity" and the incumbents 
of "tradition" has been for the former to regard the latter as essentially 
self-reproducing in terms of their basic welfare, economic and social re-
quirements. The savage or natural man of the Enlightenment, for example, 
is an epitome of self-reliance. Self-reproduction, and the natural resilience 
that this imparts, has long been axiomatic for people understood through 
the register of tradition, simplicity, backwardness and race.8 This perva-
sive assumption is illustrated, for example, in the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) futurology of global welfare regimes. In the former Soviet 
Union, where modernisation has already atomised households, extended 
welfare safety-nets are required. In less developed countries, however, the 
extended family and community "operates relatively well as an informal 
social security scheme obviating the need for the urgent introduction of 
large-scale public pensions" (quoted by Deacon et al. 1997, 64). From this 
perspective, development is a set of compensatory and ameliorative tech-
nologies concerned with maintaining equilibrium among populations un-
derstood as self-reproducing. 
According to Foucault, the emergence of biopolitics marks the passage 
from the classical to the modern age. Its appearance is located in the dif-
                                                          
8 For the nineteenth century see Cowen / Shenton (1995). 
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ference between the ancient right of the sovereign to take life or let live 
and a new power "to foster life or disallow it to the point of death" 
(Foucault 1998, 138). Beginning in the seventeenth century, this new 
power over life evolved in two basic forms. The first was a disciplinary 
and individualising power, focusing on the human-as-machine and associ-
ated with the emergence of the great institutions of medicine, education, 
punishment, the military, and so on (Foucault 1991a). From the middle of 
the eighteenth century, however, a different but complementary power 
over life emerges. This newer form is not associated with the human-as-
machine, it is an aggregating or massifying power concerned with the 
human-as-species. Rather than individualising, it is a regulatory power 
that operates at the collective level of population (Foucault 2003, 243). 
Regulatory biopolitics functions differently from institutionally-based 
disciplinary power. The multiple social, economic and political factors that 
aggregate to characterise a population appear at the level of the individual 
as chance, unpredictable and contingent events. Rather than acting on the 
individual per se, a regulatory biopolitics seeks to intervene at the level of 
the collective where apparently random events reveal themselves as popu-
lation trends, constants and probabilities. Biopolitics utilises forecasts, 
statistical estimates and overall measures "to intervene at the level at 
which these general phenomena are determined" (ibid). Based upon cen-
trally directed hygienic campaigns and educational programmes, the 
emergence of public health from curative medicine is an early example of 
a regulatory biopower. 
Biopolitics is a security mechanism that works through regulatory inter-
ventions that seek to establish equilibrium, maintain an average or com-
pensate for variations at the level of population. Security in this context 
relates to improving the collective resilience of a given population against 
the contingent and uncertain nature of its existence.9 Moreover, achieving 
such outcomes required complex systems of state-based coordination and 
centralisation less important for the functioning of a more localised, insti-
tution-based disciplinary power. Such a disciplinary power, however, 
                                                          
9 In Society Must be Defended (Foucault 2003, 253–261), Foucault expands this biopolit-
ical analysis of security to include the emergence of state racism during the nineteenth 
century and the subsequent development of Nazism. The later being a paroxysmal ex-
pression of biopolitics involving extreme forms of both disciplinary and regulatory 
power.   
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especially its ability to regiment a populace, was an essential prerequisite 
of the industrial revolution and the spread of the factory system. A regula-
tory biopolitics appears in the context of a related mass phenomenon of 
capitalism: the emergence of an industrial species-life that, through dis-
possession and dependence on wage-labour, had lost the resilience of an 
earlier agrarian self-sufficiency.10 By end of the nineteenth century, com-
pensating insurance-based technologies began to emerge with state-
encouraged individual savings schemes for housing, sickness and pensions 
(Foucault 2003, 251). During the twentieth century, state-based insurance 
schemes began to expand. It was following World War II, however, that 
social-democratic states introduced comprehensive and massified welfare 
regimes that used national insurance and tax receipts to support a "cradle 
to grave" system of health care, educational provision, unemployment 
benefit and pensions. 
The "non-insured", that is, self-reliant nature of an "underdeveloped" 
population does not mean that a regulatory biopolitics is absent. To the 
contrary, such a biopolitics emerges, grows alongside and complements 
that of mass society. Those various disciplinary and regulatory interven-
tions that constitute the linked technologies of humanitarian relief and 
development – or, to be more specific, protection and betterment – consti-
tute an historic biopolitics of self-reliant species-life. Relief and develop-
ment (here jointly referred to as "development") function to maintain the 
dynamic equilibrium of a self-reproducing or underdeveloped population. 
Since the nineteenth century the recurrent security task of development has 
been to reconcile the disruptive effects of progress on indigenous peoples, 
such as, commercial exploitation, impoverishment and unchecked urbani-
sation, with the need for societal order (Cowen / Shenton 1995). From this 
perspective, the interconnection between development and security can be 
seen as a recurrent and episodic strategisation of power in which securing 
self-reliant species-life and maintaining its cohesion is essential for the 
defence of mass society and international order (Duffield 2005). 
This brief overview of biopolitics provides a base from which to approach 
human security as a international security technology operating at the level 
of non-insured or self-reliant population. To appreciate the specific bio-
political character of human security it is necessary to examine in more 
                                                          
10 For a related discussion see Arendt (1998). 
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depth its institutional origins. If, as is commonly argued, human security 
represents the merging of development and security (King / Murray 2001), 
it remains to explore each of these component parts in turn. 
3 Developing humans 
Within the various assumptions and practices that constitute "develop-
ment" it is possible to recognise a biopolitics of life operating at the inter-
national level. That is, those varied economic, educational, health and 
political interventions aimed at improving the resilience and well-being of 
people whose existence is defined by the contingencies of "underdevelop-
ment". While development programmes contain individualising discipli-
nary elements, typically in the form of projects, they also seek to 
strengthen the resilience of collectivities and populations. Towards this 
end, development draws widely on regulatory mechanisms, risk manage-
ment techniques and compensatory programmes that act at the aggregate 
level of economic and social life. In particular, development is a biopoliti-
cal security mechanism associated with populations understood as essen-
tially self-reproducing in relation to their basic social and welfare needs. 
The type of development that constitutes the present foundation of human 
security is more accurately defined as "sustainable development". A popu-
lar definition is that of the 1987 World Commission on Environment and 
Development: sustainable development is a "development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs" (quoted by Adams 1993, 208). In bringing 
together the domains of development and the environment, the idea of 
sustainable development grew to become the developmental leitmotif of 
the 1980s. Despite being widely criticised for its lack of conceptual rigour, 
the phrase quickly entered the rhetoric of politicians, UN agencies and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
Under the banner of sustainable development, formal development prac-
tice embraced a human, people-centred focus that not only prioritised the 
development of people ahead of states, it also decoupled human develop-
ment from any direct or mechanical connection with economic growth. 
The move towards sustainable development was a move away from an 
earlier dominance of state-led modernisation strategies based on the pri-
macy of economic growth and assumptions that the underdeveloped world 
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would, after passing through various stages, eventually resemble the de-
veloped. Rather than economic growth per se, a broader approach to de-
velopment emerged based on aggregate improvements in health, educa-
tion, employment and social inclusion as an essential precursor for the 
realisation of market opportunity. The United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), for example, launched its annual Human Development 
Report in 1990, dedicating it to "ending the mismeasure of human pro-
gress by economic growth alone" (UNDP 1996, iii). The introduction of 
the Human Development Index, in particular, with its composite measure 
of population welfare that includes per capita income, life expectancy and 
educational attainment, was seen as part of the "paradigm shift" towards 
the emerging consensus that "development progress – both nationally and 
internationally – must be people-centred, equitably distributed and envi-
ronmentally and socially sustainable" (ibid). 
Sustainable development defines the type of "development" that is secu-
ritised in human security. In promoting diversity and choice, sustainable 
development is a biopolitics of life. It is concerned with relations and 
institutions able to act in a regulatory manner on populations as a whole to 
maintain their equilibrium. This includes, for example, educational meas-
ures aimed at enabling the non-insured to understand the contingencies of 
their existence and to manage better, and compensate for, the risks in-
volved. In bringing together previously unconnected environmental and 
developmental actors, as a biopolitical assemblage, sustainable develop-
ment created the possibility for new forms of coordination and centralisa-
tion. As an assemblage it brought in non-state actors and multilateral 
agencies and saw mandates change as well as new ways of interacting 
emerge. In short, sustainable development forged new means of coordina-
tion and centralisation that have the human being rather than the state as 
the referent object of development. 
4 Discovering internal war 
How conflict has been understood in the post-Cold War period is central to 
understanding the concept of "security" within human security. It defines 
the nature of the threat that a developmental biopolitics defends popula-
tions against. Reflecting the move from states to people already rehearsed 
in sustainable development, conflict similarly moves its locus from wars 
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between states to conflicts within them. As with sustainable development, 
population is also the terrain on which such conflicts are fought. This is 
both in terms of livelihood systems and social networks being the object of 
attack and attrition as well as providing sites of resistance and counter-
attack. Both development and security within human security take life as 
the referent object. 
A new international consensus on the changed nature of war emerged in 
the early 1990s. Not only had hopes of a new era of post-Cold War peace 
been confounded by the persistence of conflict in many developing coun-
tries, the very nature of conflict was said to have altered. It became ac-
cepted that today’s wars, unlike the past, were increasingly "within States 
rather than between States". These wars were "often of a religious or 
ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and cruelty" largely 
directed against civilians (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 7). Emerging at the same 
time as the idea of human security, this "changing nature of conflict" re-
frain has since become an established truth recycled ad nauseam in policy 
documents, academic works and the media. It holds that these new wars, 
unlike the past, are largely civil conflicts in which warring parties not only 
show no restraint regarding human life and cultural institutions but also 
deliberately target essential infrastructures and livelihood systems for 
criminal gain (International Alert 1999; Collier 2000; DFID et al. 2003). 
While the accuracy of this "changing nature of conflict" motif is question-
able,11 it is essential for establishing the problematic of human security. 
The changing nature of conflict theme sees organised violence as "devel-
opment in reverse" (Collier 2000, ix). Conflict destroys development be-
cause, as argued above, development is portrayed as a biopolitical condi-
tion of socio-economic homeostasis. By wrecking infrastructures and 
livelihood systems, tipping them into disequilibrium and increasing the 
risk of enduring cycles of violence and displacement, conflict becomes 
redefined as a terminal threat to sustainable development, that is, a self-
reliant species-life. 
                                                          
11 Several independent datasets, for example, suggest that, rather than being unusual, 
internal or civil wars have formed the majority of all post-World War II conflicts (Mack 
2002, 15–20). Also see, Monty Marshall, http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/globcon2. 
htm. 
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However, by strengthening coping mechanisms and subsistence strategies, 
sustainable development is also seen as a bulwark against the dangerous 
enticements and alternative rewards that illegitimate indigenous leaders 
can present to impoverished and alienated peoples (Carnegie Commission 
1997, ix). It is not just poverty, however, that draws people towards ag-
gressive leaders but, crucially, a sense of resentment derived from exclu-
sion. It is the belief "among millions of people within society that they 
have ‘no stake in the system’"; indeed, the more acute the sense of griev-
ance [...] the more likely it is that a large number of people will be suscep-
tible to the siren voices of extremists, and believe they have more to gain 
from war than peace” (Saferworld 1999, 69). It is a sense of alienation 
and the legitimate desire for change among the non-insured that the tech-
nologies of sustainable development seek to harness and empower in order 
to improve the self-management of contingency and risk. 
During the 1990s, the proposition that poor countries have a higher risk of 
falling into conflict than rich ones (because the resulting social exclusion 
can be exploited by violent and criminal leaders) coalesced into a policy 
consensus (see Collier 2000). If sustainable development brought the issue 
of collective self-reproduction centre-stage, the rediscovery of internal war 
during the 1990s problematised the nature of the state in the developing 
world. Weak and failing states existing in zones of crisis can be captured 
by unsuitable rulers. The perception of these rulers as the illegitimate 
enemies of development, together with concerns that disaffected people 
are liable to be drawn to them, establishes an interventionist dynamic. A 
range of conflict resolution and social reconstruction strategies emerge 
from this dynamic that are geared for the sovereign separation of such 
leaders from the led while acting governmentally on collectivities and 
populations to strengthen their resilience and civility (OECD/DAC 1997). 
The distinct institutional dimensions attaching to the development and 
security inflections of human security will now be examined. 
5 An emerging technology of international biopolitical  
 order 
As an organising concept, human security emerged in the mid 1990s and 
began to develop considerable institutional depth. Two early documents of 
enduring influence to human security are UN Secretary General Boutros-
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Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 42–43), and the 
UNDP’s Human Development Report (UNDP 1994). With respect to the 
security dimension of human security, the Agenda for Peace was one of 
the first systematic elaborations of the idea that the post-Cold War period 
was defined by threats to people’s well-being rather than inter-state con-
flict. In what is now a well-established human security approach, the 
Agenda argues that the referent object of security is the individual rather 
than the underdeveloped state and that this broadens the definition of secu-
rity to include wider environmental, health, demographic, economic and 
political issues (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 42–43). Boutros-Ghali calls for these 
new disruptive potentialities to be addressed through an extensive interna-
tional division of labour that includes not only developed states but also 
UN agencies, NGOs and civil society groups working within "an inte-
grated approach to human security” (ibid, 44). 
If the Agenda has shaped the security dimension of human security, the 
UNDP’s Human Development Report has had equivalent influence with 
regard to the development dimension. The UNDP presents human security 
as being constituted by "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear". 
That is, safety from chronic threats such as hunger and disease, together 
with protection from damaging disruptions "in the patterns of daily life" 
(UNDP 1994, 23). The UNDP divides life’s contingencies into seven 
interconnected areas of security: economic, food, health, environment, 
personal, community and political. While critics have argued that this list 
is descriptive and lacks an explanation for how these areas are related, the 
UNDP’s initiative has, nonetheless, been influential. King and Murray, for 
example, have described the project as a "unifying event” in terms of 
launching human security as an assemblage that fused security and devel-
opment (King / Murray 2001, 589). The UNDP has stimulated others to 
suggest more rigorous ways of measuring human security through new and 
cross-cutting datasets (ibid; Mack 2002) as well as encouraging more 
inclusive definitions (Thomas 2001). 
More recently, two events have defined how human security as a biopoliti-
cal assemblage has taken shape. The first was the publication at the end of 
2001 of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty’s report The Responsibility to Protect. The second event was the 
2003 release of the Commission of Human Security’s Human Security 
Now. These two reports reflect, in a practical sense, how, until recently, 
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the governance networks of human security were being constructed in two 
complementary but different ways. The Responsibility to Protect sees 
human security at the heart of a redefinition of the nature of sovereignty in 
respect of the state and the international community. It moves the earlier 
juridically-based idea of "humanitarian intervention" as requiring authori-
sation under the UN charter, onto the terrain of moral duty (Warner 2003). 
Evident in The Responsibility to Protect is the fact that, while implying an 
universal ethic, human security (like human rights) has been re-inscribed 
within the juridico-political architecture of the nation-state. The proposi-
tion that human security prioritises people rather than states is more accu-
rately understood in terms of effective states prioritising populations living 
within ineffective ones.12 This distinction between effective and ineffec-
tive states on the terrain of population is central to The Responsibility to 
Protect.  In an interconnected and globalised world "in which security 
depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities” the existence of 
failed states who either harbour those that are dangerous to others, or are 
only able to maintain order "by means of gross human rights violations, 
can constitute a risk to people everywhere”. Indeed, there is no longer 
such a thing "as a humanitarian catastrophe occurring ‘in a faraway 
country of which we know little’" (ICISS 2001, 5). When a state is unable 
or unwilling to ensure the human security of its citizens, the Commission 
argues "the principle of non-interference yields to the international re-
sponsibility to protect” (ibid, ix). It is striking that while the security of 
people rather than the state is prioritised, in practical terms, the Commis-
sion remains wedded to reinstating the state: 
"a cohesive and peaceful international system is far more likely to be 
achieved through the cooperation of effective states confident in their 
place in the world, than in an environment of fragile, collapsed, frag-
menting or generally chaotic state entities" (ibid, 8). 
Human Security Now, unlike The Responsibility to Protect, largely takes 
the moral case for intervention for granted. The report relates to develop-
ment and is more concerned with the "consolidation" of global popula-
                                                          
12 A wide range of labels exists to distinguish between effective and ineffective states. 
"Failing", "weak" or "crisis" states are usually described in terms of weak institutions 
and infrastructure, absent or inadequate public services, non-recognition of human 
rights and predilections to conflict (Maass / Mepham 2004). 
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tions. In this respect, Human Security Now is more in keeping with the 
UNDP, not least in holding a similar holistic and interdependent view of 
human security. Its division of the contingencies of population, however, 
is more dynamic and integrated with conflict and its effects (also see Mack 
2002). It signals for special consideration, for example, human security in 
relation to conflict and post-conflict recovery; the protection of people on 
the move; economic insecurity; basic health needs; and non-inflammatory 
education. 
The Commission defines human security as the protection of the vital core 
of human life through "protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that 
are the essence of life” (CHS 2003, 3). Rather than presenting a particu-
larly new definition, or set of innovative ideas for the measurement of 
human security the emphasis within Human Security Now is to encourage 
the complex and extensive forms of coordination and centralisation neces-
sary for the biopolitical regulation of non-insured populations. Important 
here is ensuring protection through the building of a comprehensive inter-
national infrastructure that shields self-reliance from menacing threats. 
This requires working institutions at every level of society, including po-
lice systems, the environment, health care, education, social safety nets, 
diplomatic engagements and conflict early warning systems (ibid, 132). In 
achieving this ambitious aim, it is noted that there already exist numerous 
loose networks of actors including UN agencies, NGOs, civil society 
groups, and private companies that are currently operating such agendas 
independently of each other. Rather than inventing something new, the 
main task is to bring these numerous separate initiatives into a coherent 
global strategy: 
"To overcome persistent inequality and insecurities, the efforts, prac-
tices and successes of all these groups should be linking in national, re-
gional and global alliances. The goal of these alliances could be to cre-
ate a kind of horizontal, cross-border source of legitimacy that com-
plements that of traditional vertical and compartmentalised structures 
of institutions and states" (ibid, 142). 
Human Security Now argues for a biopolitics of self-reliant species-life 
based upon international forms of coordination and centralisation largely 
formed from the integration of existing aid networks, programmes and 
datasets. It sees such regulatory networks as collectively having the ability 
and legitimacy to strengthen the capacity of ineffective states and promote 
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non-insured species-life. This is an ambitious and expansive view of hu-
man security as a centralising biopolitics of international security, based 
within effective states, and aiming to promote self-reliance among non-
insured populations.13 
Taken together, The Responsibility to Protect and Human Security Now 
present two interconnected trajectories to human security’s institutional 
framework. The security component of human security is largely con-
cerned with a responsibility to protect, based on the distinction between 
effective and ineffective states (Wheeler 2000). Primacy is given to the 
dangers of the uncontrolled circulatory effects of crisis territories, for 
example, the ability of humanitarian disaster, instability and poverty to 
create displacement and migration, promote illicit transborder economies 
and provide support for terrorist networks, have revealed that all countries 
and regions are radically interdependent and interconnected. Regarding aid 
dispensation, this is a "vertical" formula linking domestic and the foreign 
agendas. In contrast, while accepting the risks of global circulation, human 
security’s development inflection is more concerned with local consolida-
tion: improving the resilience of non-insured populations through better 
aid coordination and improved public/private and state/non-state coopera-
tion (Chen et al 2003). As a practical formula for sharing the world with 
others, this is a "horizontal" model linking developed and underdeveloped 
worlds. Development and security interconnect, interrogate and comple-
ment each other. During the 1990s, however, policy discourse portrayed 
the relationship between development and security as one of "different but 
equal". For example, as in the UN’s Strategic Framework for Afghanistan 
when under Taliban authority (UN 1998). Post 9/11 developments, how-
ever, have problematised this conception of international biopolitical or-
der. In consolidating the trend of the 1990s, effective states are rephrasing 
developmental concerns in terms of the risks of disruptive international 
circulation. Where necessary and possible, this includes a new emphasis 
on engaging with crisis states including regime change and/or the recon-
                                                          
13 Similarly ambitious visions of human security have recently been echoed in the Euro-
pean context: "An effective human security approach requires coordination between in-
telligence, foreign policy, trade policy, development policy and security policy initia-
tives of the [European] member states, of the [European] Commission and the [Euro-
pean] Council, and of other multilateral actors, including the United Nations, the World 
Bank, the IMF and regional institutions" (SGESC 2004, 17). 
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struction of the "sovereign frontier” (Harrison 2004) through strengthen-
ing their capacity to secure the economies and people that come with terri-
tory. This changing discourse has had important ramifications for NGOs. 
Agencies have adapted to the altered political landscape with varying 
entrepreneurial success. While the issue of neutrality has been a concern 
for some, for others new opportunities have appeared. 
6 The new global danger 
"Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you 
are with us, or you are with the terrorists" (President Bush, 18 Septem-
ber 2001). 
The war on terrorism has had an acute impact upon human security as a 
centralising technology of international biopolitical order. The predomi-
nance of homeland security concerns means that issues of illicit and un-
controlled circulation – of people, weapons, commodities, money, ideolo-
gies, and so on – emanating from, and flowing through, the world’s crisis 
zones, now influence the consolidating biopolitical function of develop-
ment. Security considerations are increasingly evident in arguments to 
increase the proportion of development resources directed to measures, 
regions and sub-populations deemed critical in relation to the dangers of 
radical international interdependence. 
While greater interconnection is often celebrated, during the 1990s it was 
increasingly argued that "globalisation" can cut both ways. An interde-
pendent world also has more uncertainties and hence increased risk (Beck 
1992), including the ability of inequalities visited on the South to "boo-
merang" on the North (George 1992). While globalisation and "network 
society" have generated undreamt flows of wealth, they have also widened 
old disparities and encouraged new forms of exclusion, all of which can 
foment illicit, criminal and destabilising forms of global flows and move-
ment (Castells 1998). As President Bush’s National Security Strategy sees 
it, the fruits of liberal-democracy are under threat from a new global dan-
ger. In today’s radically interconnected world, in which borders are in-
creasingly porous, enemies are no longer the massed armies of opposing 
state encampments but their opposite: transnational global terrorist net-
works "organised to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of 
modern technologies against us” (Bush 2002, v). Securing freedom neces-
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sitates stopping the spread of terrorist networks through closing home 
bases, preventing new sanctuaries from forming, and stemming the prolif-
eration of weapons, funds and recruits. 
In achieving security, securing failed and fragile states has been identified 
as pivotal. Whereas ineffective states were treated with relative neglect 
during the 1990s (Newburg 1999) they are now the subject to renewed 
policy interest. While crisis state are sill regarded in terms of the criminal-
ity, breakdown and chaos associated with a sovereign void, that void is 
now regarded as vulnerable to colonisation by political extremism able to 
propagate on the fragmentation, poverty and alienation among the non-
insured populations encountered. A recent speech by Hilary Benn, the 
Secretary of State for International Development, suggested that  "one of 
the main reasons why it is proving so hard to achieve Millennium Devel-
opment Goals is the concentration of the poorest in crisis states” (Benn 
2004, 2). The Department for International Development (DFID) is work-
ing with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of De-
fence and the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit to improve Britain’s ability 
to respond by devising an integrated approach that "combines development 
programmes with diplomatic engagement and security interventions. The 
common goal is reducing the risk of state crises” (ibid, 3). With respect to 
the UN, 2005 is the year that it will respond to Kofi Annan’s High Level 
Panel on how to address state failure under the UN Charter and thus dis-
courage the unilateralism of recent years. According to Benn, this is a 
chance for the UN to identify state crises and work with the World Bank 
and other agencies in order to act "decisively when human security is at 
risk” (ibid, 4).  
The newfound concern over failed states indicates that the war on terror is 
not simply a military campaign. It is a multidimensional conflict that also 
engages with questions of poverty, development and internal conflict. The 
National Security Strategy, together with the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC 2003) and the European 
Union (EU) (Solana 2003), all highlight development assistance as a stra-
tegic tool in the war against terrorism. The Development Assistance 
Committee’s Lens on Terrorism report, for example, illustrates that while 
the regional containment of the effects of poverty and conflict remains 
important, current policy has broadened to address issues of leakage and 
interpenetration. Insurgent populations, shadow economies and violent 
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networks are the new global danger in a world "of increasingly open bor-
ders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly 
linked” (ibid, 5). In an echo of the 1990s "the poor are attracted to violent 
leaders" argument, the Lens on Terrorism sees terrorist insurgency as 
stemming from a sense of anger arising from exclusion, injustice and help-
lessness. In this situation, terrorist leaders, who may themselves be moti-
vated by grievances and resentment, "feed on these factors and exploit 
them, gathering support for their organisations” (OECD/DAC 2003, 11). 
The package of developmental measures designed for offsetting alienation 
and promoting self-reliance involves a complex set of biopolitical inter-
ventions with the ultimate goal of building  "the capacity of communities 
to resist extreme religious and political ideologies based on violence” 
(ibid, 8). Education and job opportunities become key, reflecting the con-
cern that the new global danger no longer necessarily lies with the abject 
poor, who are fixed in their misery: instead, it pulses from those mobile 
sub-populations capable of bridging and circulating between the dichoto-
mies of North/South; modern/traditional; and national/international.  
7 Aid agencies and the rephrasing of development 
Some advocates of human security are keen to assert the complementari-
ties and even indivisibility of homeland and borderland security. The au-
thors of  A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, for example, suggest that 
Europe’s military forces "need to be able to address the real security 
needs of people in situations of severe insecurity in order to make the 
world a safer place for Europeans” (SGESC 2004, 7). The "whole point of 
a human security approach”, the authors argue, "is that Europeans cannot 
be secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity” (ibid, 10). 
Similarly, to assert the inextricable link between security and development 
has become something of a cliché: no development without security and 
no security without development. Many NGOs and aid agencies however, 
stress that there are also tensions in trying to harness development as a tool 
of homeland security. Arguments based on "enlightened self-interest" 
often gloss over real tensions between domestically-oriented security pri-
orities and Southern-oriented development priorities. The worry is that 
"their" security and development are becoming important only insofar as 
they are a means towards "ours". Areas where the causal links are less 
apparent are liable to fall by the wayside. As the Commission for Human 
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Security argues, current approaches to conflict "focus on coercive, short-
term strategies aimed at stopping attacks by cutting off financial, political 
or military support and apprehending possible perpetrators", rather than 
"addressing the underlying causes related to inequality, exclusion and 
marginalisation, and aggression by states as well as people” (CHS 2003, 
23–24). The focus on circulation as opposed to consolidation, with its 
threats to institutional independence arising from politically directed aid, is 
of concern to many UN agencies, NGOs and aid organisations.  
For a number of critics, the politicisation of development has invited com-
parisons with the Cold War. The reappearance has been noted, for exam-
ple, of the use of overseas aid, including arms sales and trade concessions, 
as a reward political allegiance (Christian Aid 2004; also see Cosgrave 
2004; BOND 2003; CHS 2003). What Christian Aid has dubbed "the new 
Cold War" it sees "terrorism replacing communism as the bogey” 
(Cosgrave 2004, 15). However, while having a rhetorical force, the anal-
ogy is misleading. During the Cold War, erstwhile Third World states 
were part of competing superpower geopolitical alliances. While coopera-
tive borderland states, especially strategically located ones, are currently 
being reappraised in assistance terms, the alliance is essentially biopoliti-
cal. Instead of being ranged outwards militarily, as it were, towards other 
states and political blocs, it is directed inwards towards securing territory 
and, importantly, policing the flows and contingencies of economy and 
population. While the war on terrorism has renewed international interest 
in promoting effective states, these transitional entities are being recon-
structed around the control of core biopolitical functions in the interests of 
global security. 
Poverty reduction remains axiomatic to development assistance. The threat 
of global terrorism, however, has highlighted the importance of transi-
tional populations living in volatile and strategic regions. Their frustration 
and alienation, although not causing terrorism, proves a fertile breeding 
ground for recruitment. While reducing absolute income poverty remains 
important, "approaches to inequality and exclusion should be given in-
creased priority” (OECD/DAC 2003, 8). This is not the universalistic 
poverty focus that has gained ground since the 1980s in the shape of sus-
tainable development. Poverty reduction here is concerned with delineat-
ing the poorest members of society and bettering their position. As the 
NGO members of the Global Security and Development Network have 
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argued in a joint statement to DAC, despite flagging the importance of 
poverty reduction, the Lens on Terrorism can be interpreted as "the redi-
rection of aid away from poverty reduction and towards a counter-
terrorism and security agenda" (BOND 2003, 1; also see Christian Aid 
2004; Woods 2004). 
For many aid agencies, the war on terrorism has reversed the progress 
made during the 1990s in affirming human rights. In particular, the threat 
of terrorism has given states the opportunity to derogate from existing 
human rights treaties on the grounds of security (Cosgrave 2004). Not only 
has the practice of detention without trial reappeared in countries such as 
the USA and Great Britain, many members of the global "coalition of the 
willing" have used existing legislation or passed new national security 
laws which, critics argue, have used terrorism as pretext for repressing 
legitimate internal opposition. Human rights organisations have raised 
such concerns, for example, in relation to India, China, Thailand, Pakistan, 
Nepal, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, South Africa, Nigeria, 
Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania (ibid, 27–35). This repressive climate has 
had a widespread negative impact on those aid agencies working in rela-
tion to civil society and its empowering to express legitimate concerns and 
frustrations. As reflected in the proscribing of organisations in the 2000 
Terrorism Act (Fekete 2001), many groups struggling for self-determi-
nation and against the use of arbitrary power have been outlawed. 
The reversal of human rights is also matched by the curtailment of what 
aid agencies call "humanitarian space" (FIFC 2004). During the 1990s, the 
military doctrine among leading states was to support civilian humanitar-
ian agencies and to only become directly involved in humanitarian activi-
ties as a last resort. Since Kosovo, and especially Afghanistan, this situa-
tion has changed (Donini et al. 2004). Humanitarian assistance, especially 
in relation to crisis states, has increasingly been coloured by political con-
siderations. In Afghanistan as well as Iraq, humanitarian assistance, devel-
opment and social reconstruction have been redrafted as a legitimating 
support for transitional state entities and their transformation into show-
case examples of regional stability. This places tremendous responsibili-
ties upon cooperating aid agencies and draws them directly into an ex-
posed political process. At the same time, due to widespread insecurity 
and insurgency violence, the military has moved beyond protection and 
become directly involved in activities it labels as "humanitarian". This 
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includes repairing essential infrastructure and delivering supplies. As some 
NGOs argue, however, such undertakings "are more properly described as 
military intervention in pursuit of a political goal” (Christian Aid 2004, 
23). 
At the operational level, the most obvious casualty has been the neutrality 
of aid organisations. In many respects, the war on terrorism is weakening 
what, in the past, has been an important strength of NGOs: a non-govern-
mental legitimacy and authority derived from the liminal space between 
national supporters and constituencies, and the communities and civil 
society actors with who they work. Non-governmental organisations are 
aware that, from the perspective of many local populations, they have 
become indistinguishable from occupying forces or the allies of intrusive 
governments (Vaux 2004). Whether or not the perceived proximity be-
tween NGOs and an expansive Western sovereignty is real or imagined, 
the perception itself is damaging and destabilising. The bombing of the 
Baghdad headquarters of the UN and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) in August 2003 are graphic illustrations of the new 
situation that aid agencies find themselves in. Many have begun to ask 
whether the benefits that aid workers bring is "now outweighed by the 
price that they are being asked to pay” (Foley 2004). Through the am-
bushing of convoys, rocketing of premises and the booby-trapping of ve-
hicles, over 40 aid workers have been murdered in Afghanistan in the past 
year alone. Currently, whole swathes of Afghanistan and Iraq are no-go 
areas for NGOs. Many, especially European agencies have already left 
Iraq because, as the murder of the head of Care International, Margaret 
Hassan, has shown, the level of insecurity is now unacceptable. 
8 Conclusion: the changing security terrain 
As reflected in the sense of crisis among many non-governmental aid 
agencies, the war on terrorism has brought to a head a longer-term shift. 
That is, from being outside the state during the 1960s and 1970s, NGOs 
have progressively become adjuncts and implementing partners of policies 
and interventionary strategies emanating from effective states, especially 
within crisis zones. Once the champions of "grass-roots" solidarity as 
against "top down" official development, some agencies fear they have 
become uncritical accomplices of Western foreign policy. Coming to 
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terms with the new security environment including reappraising relations 
with donor governments, transitional authorities and the armed forces, has 
acquired significant urgency. A difficulty here however, is that although 
an interconnection between NGOs and western states contradict the NGO 
ethos of independence, many organisations were either supportive or com-
plicit with the initial deepening of state/non-state linkages during the 
1990s. NGOs that now endorse the "new Cold War" position, for example, 
themselves encouraged moves for greater coherence between aid and poli-
tics in the past (IDC 1999). The issue then was not that aid and politics 
were incompatible; it was that in many crisis states, including Rwanda in 
1994, there was a lack of political interest and involvement by donor gov-
ernments (Macrae / Leader 2000). NGOs, for example, were an active part 
of the 1998 Strategic Framework for Afghanistan. This was an exploratory 
UN programme based on the explicit attempt to integrate aid and politics 
(Duffield et al. 2002). At this stage, the coherence agenda promised to 
better channel development resources towards poverty alleviation among 
non-insured population. Today, however, as states have become more 
actively involved, it is feared that this shared agenda is likely to see devel-
opment subsumed under foreign policy objectives (Woods 2004). While 
many NGOs were driven by the growing acceptance of a responsibility to 
protect during the 1990s, as that responsibility has matured into the war on 
terrorism, some are having second thoughts. 
As a centralising technology of international governance, the vision of 
human security that began to hit its stride towards the end of the 1990s 
involved the biopolitical securing of non-insured populations through 
bringing together the existing practices, institutions and networks of sus-
tainable development. It envisaged a horizontal and coordinated system of 
cross-border interventions, indeed – a new, multileveled planetary infra-
structure – able to complement, or temporarily replace, the efforts of inef-
fective states. The war on terrorism has problematised this particular gov-
ernmental formula of human security. Rather than prioritising the security 
of people living within the territories of ineffective states (which human 
security does) the security of "homeland" populations and infrastructures 
has moved to the fore. In a radically interdependent world, defending 
metropolitan livelihood systems and essential infrastructures, in short, its 
way of life, is premised upon securing the "borderland" of crisis and inef-
fective states. Compared to earlier more universalistic notions of human 
security, a sharper focus on sub-populations and strategic territories distin-
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guished by their potential to circulate and interconnect has gained ground 
in policy discourse. This narrowing in order to then broaden through the 
reform and reprioritisation of development administration, together with 
the implicit loyalty test this manoeuvre embodies, has caused a sense of 
unease among many historically independent NGOs. At the same time, 
however, the new security terrain has also created fresh opportunities for 
others. 
In stressing the fragility of international borders and the growing intercon-
nectedness of livelihood systems and economic dependencies across 
homeland and borderland populations (Blair 2001), the war on terrorism 
has deepened the interconnection between development and security and, 
in the interests of better policing global circulation, created new possibili-
ties for coordination and centralisation. OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), for example, has suggested that the new players in the 
war on terrorism include "financial analysts, bankers, arms control and 
bio-chemical experts, educators, communications specialists, development 
planners and religious leaders” (OECD/DAC 2003, 10). The collapse 
within political imagination of the national/international dichotomy also 
makes it possible to envisage a further deepening of coherence between 
aid and politics. For example, between the domestic or "home" functions 
of sovereign government and it’s international or "foreign" departments. 
New datasets, the merging of existing ones, together with hybrid means of 
surveillance and bridging institutional forms, conjures the possibility of 
being able to interconnect and act on populations on a planetary scale  
(I-CAMS 2005). That is, as local to local informational connections be-
tween insured homeland and non-insured borderland populations, infra-
structures and economies. Competing with the aid-based vision of cross-
border alliances of existing support networks, as envisioned in Human 
Security Now, new possibilities for centralisation are emerging. For exam-
ple, in relation to better integrating the policing of international migration 
with the search for domestic social cohesion, especially among ethnically 
divided communities, and new intrusive technologies to reconstruct and 
manage fragile states (see Strategy Unit 2005). However, does this pros-
pect of being able to act upon homeland and borderland populations as a 
complex, interconnected whole herald a new vision of human security, or 
does it signal a global biopolitical tyranny? 
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Security and development policies: untangling the  
relationship 
Neclâ Tschirgi 
Summary 
Only some 15 years ago it was unusual for policy makers to talk of devel-
opment and security policies in the same breath. Today the reverse is true: 
national policy makers talk of the 3-Ds (Diplomacy, Development, and 
Defense), the 4-Ds (including Democratization), and "joined-up govern-
ment approaches” as if they are inseparable. Similarly, the United Nations, 
the European Union and the African Union, among others, all profess the 
necessity for integrated security and development policies. Yet, behind the 
current security-development nexus proposition, there are multiple layers 
of confusion, contradictions and policy dilemmas. Based on ongoing re-
search undertaken by the Security-Development Nexus Program at the 
International Peace Academy (IPA), this paper seeks to bring greater clar-
ity to current debates on the linkages between security and development 
policies in an increasingly interdependent but fractured global system. 
The paper starts by identifying the multiple levels at which the policy 
debate takes place: local, national, regional and global. It argues that mov-
ing indiscriminately between these levels has created tremendous concep-
tual as well as policy confusion. Similarly, because both development and 
security are extremely broad and elusive concepts, the call for integrating 
them often leads to a policy enigma: What should be integrated with what?  
Furthermore, it is readily assumed that the security-development linkage 
applies equally to various conflict contexts and to different conflict phases 
– albeit in somewhat different configurations. Finally, there is a tendency 
to make policy recommendations as if the policy community were an apo-
litical monolith – rather than the diverse mix of national, regional, gov-
ernmental and non-governmental actors with their own interests and 
agenda. 
Recent research examining the linkages between distinct issue areas such 
as poverty, demography, globalization, human rights and environment has 
begun to provide important clues about how these factors combine to ex-
acerbate or reduce risks of violent conflicts as well as political and crimi-
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nal violence. Similarly, comparative country-level research demonstrates 
the specificity of each conflict context while assessing the appropriateness 
of current approaches to linking security and development in essentially 
distinct policy and political environments. It is anticipated that these re-
search results will contribute to a new generation of policies and programs 
that go beyond the rhetorical call for integrating security and development 
policies. 
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"We acknowledge that peace and security, development and human 
rights are the pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations 
for collective security and well-being. We recognize that development, 
peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually rein-
forcing.” (UN 2005a). 
"In the twenty-first century, all States and their collective institutions 
must advance the cause of larger freedom – by ensuring freedom from 
want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. In an increas-
ingly interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, secu-
rity and human rights must go hand in hand. There will be no develop-
ment without security and no security without development. And both 
development and security also depend on respect for human rights and 
the rule of law." (UN 2005b) [emphasis added] 
"The Goals [Millennium Development Goals, MDGs] not only reflect 
global justice and human rights—they are also vital to international 
and national security and stability, as emphasized by the High Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. Achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals should therefore be placed centrally in interna-
tional efforts to end violent conflict, instability and terrorism." (Sachs 
2005, 6). 
"Conflict and deprivation are interconnected. Deprivation has many 
causal links to violence, although these have to be carefully examined. 
Conversely, wars kill people, destroy trust among them, increase pov-
erty and crime, and slow down the economy. Addressing such insecuri-
ties effectively demands an integrated approach.” (CHS 2003) 
1 Introduction 
The necessity of linking security and development has become a policy 
mantra. From the United Nations to the African Union, from the US Na-
tional Security Strategy of September 2002 to Canada’s 2005 International 
Policy Statement, from academic institutions to operational non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), there are vigorous calls for integrat-
ing security and development perspectives and policies. On one level, this 
is a welcome development – especially after the deliberate bifurcation of 
development and security policies during the Cold War. On another level, 
the ready consensus among policymakers and advocates alike about the 
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interdependence between security and development has served to obscure 
the difficulties involved in aligning security and development policies. 
There are four major impediments to designing security and development 
policies that are compatible, mutually reinforcing and beneficial. The first 
is conceptual. The current policy debate is taking place at multiple levels: 
local, national, regional and global. For example, throughout the 1990s, 
many who advocated for integrated security and development policies 
focused their attention primarily at the human level. Moving away from 
macro or aggregate conceptions of security and development, they focused 
on the micro level – calling for an integrated approach to human security, 
human development and human rights (Commission on Human Security 
2003; UNDP 1994). 
Others had a narrower, more functional approach. Carving out particular 
policy areas such as peacemaking, peacekeeping or post-conflict peace-
building, various UN documents of the 1990s, for example, sought to 
identify how the UN’s security and development roles and responsibilities 
could be better aligned (UN 1992; UN 1994; UN 2000). Similarly, indi-
vidual donor governments or multilateral institutions such as the OECD's 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) began to call for coordinated 
and coherent donor approaches to promote conflict prevention, peacekeep-
ing, peacebuilding and state building in conflict-affected countries (OECD 
2001). 
Still others adopted a global/systemic view of the linkages between secu-
rity and development concerns. This approach gained greater currency 
after 9/11 – especially among Western governments. Several recent UN 
reports have elevated the debate to the highest international level, arguing 
that there can be no international peace or security without development, 
and no development without security (UN 2004; Sachs 2005; UN 2005a; 
UN 2005b). 
While these initiatives agree that security and development are interlinked 
and should be promoted simultaneously, their starting points are quite 
different and thus lead to divergent policy recommendations. The appro-
priation of the same terminology for distinct goals at very different levels 
of policy intervention has led to considerable confusion. Human security is 
a worthwhile policy goal, but it does not necessarily lead to national de-
velopment or international security. Nor is the reverse true. Nonetheless, 
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they are equally desirable and potentially mutually reinforcing goals. The 
security-development nexus does not apply automatically across policy 
arenas (prevention, statebuilding, peacebuilding) or across levels of policy 
implementation (e.g. global, national, human). The current policy debates 
on security and development move indiscriminately from the local to the 
global, from conflict prevention to peacebuilding, from humanitarian ac-
tion to terrorism – creating tremendous conceptual as well as policy confu-
sion. 
Compounding the confusion resulting from the conflation of human, na-
tional and international concerns, there are other impediments to more 
effective integration of security and development policies. A second ob-
stacle to multi-dimensional and interlinked approaches to security and 
development derives from the fact that both development and security are 
extremely broad and elusive concepts. Currently, development encom-
passes many dimensions from human rights to environmental sustainabil-
ity, from economic growth to governance. Similarly, security has been 
expanded to go beyond state-centric conceptions of security to human 
security and includes a range of military as well as non-military threats 
that recognize no borders. This naturally leads to a policy enigma: What 
should be integrated with what? At what level? To what purpose? 
Third, it is readily assumed that the security-development linkage applies 
equally to various contexts and to different phases of conflict – albeit in 
somewhat different configurations. As a result, the policy prescriptions are 
more process-oriented rather than content-driven. Following the relevant 
exhortation for integrated approaches to security and development, the 
policy guidelines often revert back to generic imperatives for "coherence", 
"coordination", "harmonization", "alignment", "participation", "owner-
ship", and "sustainability". However, these are hardly sufficient to formu-
late overlapping or linked-up policies across a vast policy arena. To move 
beyond such vacuous prescriptions, security and development conditions 
in a given context have to be accurately diagnosed in order to identify the 
appropriate package of policy responses. 
Finally, and greatly fueling the conceptual confusion identified above, 
there is a tendency to make policy recommendations as if the policy com-
munity were an apolitical monolith rather than the diverse mix of national, 
regional, governmental and non-governmental actors with different inter-
ests and agendas. Linking security and development is a profoundly politi-
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cal project – differentially affecting the vital interests of external policy 
actors as well as their intended beneficiaries. In the 1990s when the "secu-
rity-development nexus" proposition came to the fore, there was growing 
commitment to multilateral approaches to reducing violent conflicts and 
promoting peacebuilding in conflict-torn, conflict-prone and post-conflict 
countries. The integrated policies promoted by the United Nations or the 
"linked-up" policies adopted by key donor countries applied primarily to 
conflicts that did not affect the vital interests of powerful external actors. 
In politically difficult cases like Kashmir, North Korea or Chechnya, there 
was little insistence on integrated policies; in other cases like Bosnia, 
Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the sequencing of 
security and development approaches decidedly reflected the vital interests 
of key players. After 9/11, and the series of terrorist incidents in Bali, 
Madrid, Istanbul, London and other venues that followed, it is virtually 
impossible to consider security concerns in any part of the world without 
the shadow of global terrorism. Thus, in advocating for effective and inte-
grated security and development policies, it is necessary to ask: Whose 
security is at stake? Whose development is affected? Whose agenda has 
precedence? 
Despite the above shortcomings, policy discourse and policy development 
proceeded steadily throughout the 1990s albeit without clear prescriptions 
on how to link security and development in real time and real places. With 
the strong re-affirmation of the security-development linkage at the 2005 
World Summit, the time is ripe to take a critical look at the body of evolv-
ing knowledge on the security-development nexus which is essential to 
start identifying the ingredients for more effective policies at multiple 
levels (UN 2005b). This paper provides a brief overview of the evolution 
of international policies at the nexus of security and development before 
turning to a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness and relevance of 
those policies based on emerging research findings. 
2 Taking stock: evolution of security-development 
 policies 
Like most social phenomena, the security-development nexus is not en-
tirely new. That socio-economic well being and physical security are in-
terdependent is almost a tautology. 
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At a human level, where the interdependence between physical and socio-
economic well being is experienced most directly, the security-develop-
ment nexus is self-evident. However, the term "human security" gained 
currency only in the early 1990s with the publication of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report of 1994. 
The Report offered a dual definition of human security: "It means, first, 
safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And 
second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the 
patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” 
(UNDP 1994). The report identified seven elements that comprise human 
security: (1) economic security; (2) food security; (3) health security; (4) 
environmental security; (5) personal security; (6) community security; and 
(7) political security (UNDP 1994, 23). In line with the new human secu-
rity agenda, several governmental and non-governmental actors began to 
champion a range of issues that were neither part of traditional develop-
ment nor conventional security.1 The campaigns to ban anti-personnel 
landmines, to regulate small arms and light weapons, and to establish an 
international criminal court were part of the emerging international con-
sensus around major issues that threatened human security and militated 
against human development (Tschirgi 2004). 
The World Bank’s consultations with 60,000 people in 60 countries at the 
turn of the Millennium provided a poignant view from the field. The study, 
titled Voices of the Poor, concluded that the poor view well-being holisti-
cally and consider security – alongside physical and material well-being, 
social relations and freedom of choice and action – as essential to their 
lives. Yet, the consultations also demonstrated that their lives were often 
marred by insecurity, with both domestic and societal violence continually 
threatening their well-being (World Bank 2005b). 
Despite these stark realities, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
which were unanimously adopted by world leaders to address poverty and 
human development, made no reference to conflict or human security. 
More recently, the connections between the MDGs and conflict have 
                                                          
1  There is extensive academic and policy literature on the concept of human security. For 
more information, see the extensive work of the Commission on Human Security under 
http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/. 
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gained increasing attention.2 This was greatly facilitated by the impressive 
work of the Commission on Human Security, which noted:  
"People's security around the world is interlinked – as today's global 
flows of goods, services, finance, people and images highlight. Political 
liberalization and democratization opens new opportunities but also 
new fault lines, such as political and economic instabilities and con-
flicts within states. More than 800,000 people a year lose their lives to 
violence. About 2.8 billion suffer from poverty, ill health, illiteracy and 
other maladies. Conflict and deprivation are interconnected. Depriva-
tion has many causal links to violence, although these have to be care-
fully examined. Conversely, wars kill people, destroy trust among them, 
increase poverty and crime, and slow down the economy. Addressing 
such insecurities effectively demands an integrated approach.” (CHS 
2003) 
The Commission advocated a two-track approach to promoting human secu-
rity: protection and empowerment. It urged the following actions: a) pro-
tecting people in violent conflict; b) protecting people from the prolifera-
tion of arms; c) supporting the security of people on the move; d) estab-
lishing human security transition funds for post-conflict situations; e) en-
couraging fair trade and markets to benefit the extreme poor; f) working to 
provide minimum living standards everywhere; g) according higher prior-
ity to ensuring universal access to basic health care; h) developing an 
efficient and equitable global system for patent rights; i) empowering all 
people with universal basic education; j) clarifying the need for a global 
human identity while respecting the freedom of individuals to have diverse 
identities and affiliations (CHS 2003). 
Although a growing number of studies forcefully confirmed the interde-
pendence of security and development at the human level, appropriate 
policies to address them through international action have been extremely 
slow in coming mainly because human security and human development 
have traditionally been considered as exclusive responsibilities of sover-
eign states. The concept "responsibility to protect” which was adopted at 
the 2005 World Summit is a new and radical development whose applica-
tion by the international community remains to be tested (UN 2005a). 
                                                          
2  See for example IPA (2005), Stewart (2003), World Bank (2005a). 
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Moving to a macro level, the interdependence between security and devel-
opment is equally clear. The collapse of empires after World War I and its 
profound repercussions throughout the world, the Great Depression, the 
rise of totalitarian states, World War II and post war de-colonization are 
compelling evidence of the linkages between socio-economic crises, po-
litical instability and wars at the global level. The United Nations and the 
Bretton Woods Institutions were explicitly created in order to address the 
twin problems of peace and security, on the one hand, and socio-economic 
development on the other. However, even before these institutions became 
fully operational, the Cold War erupted and quickly distorted international 
priorities. Bypassing the United Nations, the two power blocs created their 
own separate security institutions to manage the East-West conflict. As the 
number of states proliferated following de-colonization, each power bloc 
began to provide security assistance to countries in its own sphere of influ-
ence. 
Meanwhile, a parallel bilateral and multilateral system of development 
assistance was established to promote socio-economic development in the 
developing and newly emerging countries. International development 
strategies, policies and instruments quickly became handmaidens of the 
security policies of dominant powers. Foreign aid, including Official De-
velopment Assistance (ODA), was designed to support friendly regimes, 
to prevent others from defecting to the competing Cold War bloc, and to 
serve as a global mechanism to maintain international order while promot-
ing economic growth in developing and the newly-emerging countries.3 
Initially focused narrowly on economic growth, international development 
assistance gradually expanded to embrace other issue areas including the 
environment, gender, human rights, and governance. Yet, the international 
aid industry carefully avoided peace, security and conflict issues. Devel-
opment actors worked in conflict and around conflict but they carefully 
avoided working on conflict (Goodhand / Atkinson 2001). Indeed, 
throughout the Cold War, conflict referred primarily to the East-West 
power struggle and inter-state wars which fell within the domain of secu-
                                                          
3  The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were precursors of official development 
assistance, and had extremely strategic goals. It was not coincidental that the subtitle of 
W.W. Rostow’s seminal book on development, The Stages of Economic Growth, was A 
Non-Communist Manifesto. 
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rity actors and institutions. At the international level, there was a fairly 
clear divide between development policies (covering primarily domestic 
socio-economic issues) and security policies (dealing with inter-state po-
litical and military affairs). 
With the end of the Cold War, the artificial divide between these realms 
gradually disappeared under the weight of globalization, new information 
and communication technologies, the spill-over of domestic problems such 
as refugees, pandemics, environmental pressures to the regional and the 
global arena. Many domestic problems could not be confined within a 
single country. Regional and global pressures were no longer a one-way 
street. Thus, the borders between states, issue areas and policy realms 
began to be blurred. 
At the United Nations, the release of An Agenda for Peace (UN 1992) and 
An Agenda for Development (1994), set the stage for a more holistic look 
at the violent conflicts in the developing countries (UN 1992; UN 1994). 
The OECD Development Assistance Committee followed suit by issuing 
The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (OECD 1997 and 
2001). In 2001, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan released his report on 
Prevention of Armed Conflict (UN 2001). These documents represented an 
effort to return to the original vision of the UN’s founders by calling for 
integrated approaches to socio-economic, human rights, humanitarian, 
security and developmental strategies and approaches which had been de-
railed by the Cold War. The normative developments throughout the 
1990s were quite impressive.4 The United Nations became the arena to 
create international norms, to establish new priorities and to set collective 
agendas. These were reflected in the various international summits that 
took place in the 1990s; they also influenced the agenda of the Security 
Council.  Human rights abuses, protection of civilians in war, small arms, 
gender and peace, children and armed conflict, and Human Immunodefi-
ciency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) be-
came legitimate issues for the Council’s consideration (Malone 2004). 
Meanwhile, on the ground, humanitarian workers, peacemakers, peace-
keepers and development agencies responded to civil wars, ethnic conflicts 
and failed states with the various tools and instruments at their disposal. 
                                                          
4  For a review of these developments see Tschirgi (2003). 
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The number of United Nations peacekeeping missions increased rapidly 
throughout the 1990s.5 The new UN peace operations were different from 
traditional peacekeeping missions in that they were often deployed in 
contexts where there was little peace to keep; they also involved a combi-
nation of military and civilian tasks including civilian policing, disarma-
ment, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), protection of refugees and 
internally-displaced people. Significantly, the UN undertook direct ad-
ministration of Kosovo and East Timor in the absence of a sovereign gov-
ernment in these territories and assumed wide ranging responsibilities for 
security as well as development.6 
As normative and operational pressures tore down traditional boundaries, 
there were concerted efforts to overcome the compartmentalization of the 
security and development institutions of the Cold War era. In the 1990s, 
there were several waves of bureaucratic reforms in the United Nations 
which included the creation of the Office for the Coordination of Humani-
tarian Affairs (OCHA), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Although the new de-
partments had separate mandates and functioned in isolation from the 
UN’s development agencies, various mechanisms were established to 
encourage inter-departmental and inter-agency cooperation (Griffin 2003). 
There was a corresponding revision of institutional structures within indi-
vidual governments and inter-governmental organizations. New units were 
created to deal with conflict resolution, conflict prevention and peace-
building. New inter-governmental and non-governmental networks were 
founded. Various countries began to develop "joined up" government 
approaches, aligning their foreign, security and development policies and 
programs in order to respond  more effectively to intra-state conflicts.7 
Coming in the wake of the Cold War, the primary motivation for these 
policy innovations was recognition of the perverse consequences of that 
                                                          
5  For more information on the UN’s peacekeeping operations and other peace and political 
missions in the 1990s, see the UN’s website: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/index.asp. 
6  For a fuller understanding of the UN’s role in transitional administrations see Chester-
man (2004). 
7  For a quick review of selected innovations in this area see Fitz-Gerald (2004) or Fitz-
Gerald in the present volume. 
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era for many newly-emerging and developing countries. It could no longer 
be ignored that these countries had not only failed to benefit significantly 
from the intricate web of international development assistance over the last 
fifty years; they were also extremely vulnerable to human insecurity, po-
litical instability and violent conflict. Thus, policy integration was seen as 
an imperative to respond to the needs of a wide range of target countries. 
The OECD/DAC, the European Union, the United Nations, donor gov-
ernments and even the World Bank committed themselves to better har-
monization of their policies towards target countries – whether these were 
transitional states, conflict-affected countries, or politically fragile states 
facing humanitarian crises or grave developmental challenges. In each 
case, the policy prescription was the same: integrated, multi-dimensional 
policies across the traditional security-development spectrum. With the 
appropriate injunction to "do no harm," external actors saw their role pri-
marily as humanitarian in nature. The human or national vulnerabilities 
afflicting the aid recipients were not considered as serious threats to the 
security of the aid donors or the global system as a whole. Indeed, 
throughout the 1990s, the preferred vehicle for international policy inter-
ventions was multilateral – often under the umbrella of the United Nations. 
With the re-emergence of threats to the security of Western countries after 
9/11, the security-development equation has gained a different dimension. 
Today, "fragile states", "pandemics", "civil wars", "terrorism" and "pov-
erty" are seen as direct threats to the well-being and security of Western 
countries – and by extension to international peace and security. This shift 
quickly became evident in the post 9/11 domestic and foreign policies of 
many Western governments as well as the policies of the collective mili-
tary, political, economic and security institutions in which they participate. 
Instead of acting as arms-length policy makers in a multilateral arena, they 
have become primary stakeholders (and "stickholders")8 in the security-
development calculus. Inevitably, the threat perceptions of powerful mem-
bers of the international community have come to affect the global secu-
rity environment. Indeed, the UN Secretary General commissioned the 
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change precisely because of 
the growing chasm in the international community about divergent threat 
perceptions, and the international consequences of member countries pur-
                                                          
8  I am grateful to Martin Khor of the Third World Forum for this powerful metaphor. 
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suing narrowly-cast national interests at the expense of collective security 
(UN 2004). The intense debates and negotiations leading up to the 2005 
World Summit at the UN in September often came down to a basic clash 
between competing priorities for security versus development pursued by 
various groupings of member states – demonstrating the huge gap between 
the need for integrated global policies and state-centered politics. 
3 Emerging research findings and policy implications 
The outcome of the 2005 World Summit has temporarily patched up the 
difficulties and deep-rooted cleavages that have come to characterize the 
post 9/11 era. Meanwhile, the dragging reform process at the UN provides 
a useful context within which to review the important, albeit tenuous, 
policy innovations that were undertaken in the last 10–15 years. During 
this same period, an impressive body of academic and policy literature has 
accumulated which focuses on the interdependence between security and 
development. This paper draws upon that body of literature as well as 
emerging findings from a multi-disciplinary research program undertaken 
by the International Peace Academy (IPA) in New York entitled the Secu-
rity-Development Nexus.9 IPA’s research program has begun to yield em-
pirically grounded insights about how security and development interplay 
across issue areas and within individual countries. Ongoing research ex-
amining the linkages between distinct issue areas such as poverty, demog-
raphy, globalization, human rights and environment provide important 
clues about how these factors combine to exacerbate or reduce risks of 
violent conflicts as well as political and criminal violence. Similarly, com-
parative country-level studies demonstrate the specificity of each conflict 
context while testing the appropriateness of current approaches to linking 
security and development in essentially distinct policy and political envi-
ronments.10 
                                                          
9  For more information on the program, please see under Research Programs at the IPA: 
http://www.ipacademy.org. 
10  This paper was prepared before the research program has been completed and the 
results from the various research tracks have been consolidated and synthesized in order 
to extract concrete policy lessons. Several forthcoming edited volumes (cited below) 
will contain final research results and policy recommendations. 
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To overcome the shortcomings raised in the introduction, this paper takes 
a narrow approach to the security-development nexus. First, its analysis is 
primarily at the country-level since both human and international concerns 
come together at the national level. Second, it basically focuses on policies 
at the international level since this is where much of the policy innova-
tions have taken place. Lastly, the paper is particularly interested in the 
linkages between security and development from a conflict prevention 
perspective. In contemporary civil conflicts, there is no unilinear contin-
uum from peace to war to peace; thus, there is no sequential approach to 
linking security and development. Nonetheless, there is a wide range of 
interventions across the security-development spectrum that are more 
appropriate for distinct phases of the conflict cycle. In the last decade, 
there has been growing understanding of the interplay between security 
and development conditions and policies in post-conflict peacebuilding.11 
Linking security and development policies for conflict prevention, how-
ever, still remains a largely unexplored terrain. 
4 Setting the scene: challenges on the ground and policy 
interventions 
The period since the end of the Cold War brought opportunities as well as 
new threats for developing countries. Globalization, market liberalization, 
democratization, and more recently, the global war on terror have greatly 
impacted domestic conditions in developing countries – alternately creating 
added pressures or providing potential safety valves. Similarly, the spill-
over effects of regional developments, including the cross-border move-
ment of trade, people and financial transactions have had far-reaching but 
mixed impacts. These have played out in very different ways in various 
countries and regions. Almost one third of all developing countries are 
considered to be at risk of violent conflict or in a state of chronic instabil-
ity.12 In other words, the correlation between lack of security and underde-
velopment is well-established. While researchers can not readily identify 
the direction of causality, the complex web of risk factors and patterns of 
                                                          
11  For a review of the state of the art in post-conflict peacebuilding see Tschirgi (2004). 
12  Datasets on wars, violent conflicts and violent conflict differ greatly based on their 
primary focus and methodology. See for example Marshall / Gurr (2005) and the re-
cently-released Human Security Report (HSC 2005). 
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vulnerability is sufficiently clear. A wide range of externally generated 
pressures, low levels of economic growth, low human development indica-
tors, chronic political instability, ineffective or illegitimate political institu-
tions, highly conflictual modes of political mobilization, and high inci-
dence of sporadic or regionalized violent conflict mix in different measure 
to create insecurity and retard development (World Bank 2004; CIFP; 
CGD 2004; Marshall / Gurr 2005). 
The end of the Cold War did not only expose the vulnerability of many 
developing countries to interlocking socio-economic crises, political insta-
bility, physical insecurity and violent conflict. It also led to the waning of  
the injunction against external intervention in the domestic affairs of sov-
ereign states. From poverty alleviation to human rights protection, from 
security sector reform to democracy promotion, external actors began to 
play important roles across a range of policy areas.13 The sheer number 
and range of foreign actors engaged in the development and security prob-
lems of developing countries have grown exponentially. There are private 
sector subcontractors implementing police reform in Jamaica; international 
non-governmental organizations involved in prison reform in Malawi; a 
joint national/international special criminal court in Sierra Leone, peace-
keepers providing basic services in Liberia, and the United Nations admin-
istering the entire territory of Kosovo. What do these activities add up to 
and what are their impacts in terms of addressing the combined security 
and development concerns of various developing countries?  
Emerging findings from ongoing research can be grouped into five differ-
ent categories: insights related to the actual mix of sectoral policies and 
their relevance for different types of conflict contexts; institutional chal-
lenges; operational issues; funding issues and donor roles; and the political 
dimensions of policy coherence across the security-development spectrum. 
                                                          
13  As Donini argues: "In many ways, it is the intervention itself that should be seen as the 
new defining element in the post–bipolar world, rather than conflict, which of course 
existed throughout the previous era whether in the form of wars by proxy or in resis-
tance to superpower hegemony. Thus, recent years have witnessed a kind of double lift-
ing of inhibitions that had been largely suppressed by the Cold War’s rules of the game: 
the inhibition to wage war and the inhibition to intervene" (Duffield 2001, 31). 
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Policy Mix 
Research on discrete issue areas such as poverty, globalization, demogra-
phy, environment, human rights amply demonstrates the cross-cutting 
nature of the pressures faced by developing countries.14 The vicissitudes of 
the global market place, slow or negative economic growth in marginal-
ized regions of the world, high levels of unemployment, urbanization, the 
youth bulge, poverty and pandemics, the easy transport of drugs, arms and 
finances across borders, poor governance, and weak institutions of rule of 
law tend to reinforce each other and provide a fertile ground for conflict. 
What is evident from these thematic studies is that the patterns of vulner-
ability (or "risk factors”) are not country specific; instead, they are the 
outcome of broader social-economic-political forces beyond the control of 
governments and states that are particularly at risk. 
Yet, at the macro policy level, each of these problems is still dealt with in 
a compartmentalized and fragmented way. On the big policy issues (trade, 
debt, migration, employment, international financial flows, global social 
justice, direct foreign investment, energy, global warming, or disarma-
ment) there is little evidence of a radical transformation of the security-
development linkages or a corresponding re-allocation of resources or 
policy priorities. Even in the most prominent area of policy intervention – 
poverty alleviation – the current focus on the MDGs basically rests upon 
implementing earlier commitments (Sachs 2005). Thus, the security-
development linkage seems to operate safely within the established pa-
rameters of the current international system. The incremental, but ulti-
mately limited, policy adjustments in official development assistance, 
humanitarian aid, poverty alleviation, debt relief, disease control, sanctions 
and peacekeeping fall far short of addressing structural risk factors that lie 
at the source of physical insecurity, societal vulnerability and violent con-
flicts in the developing countries. In short, there is continued disconnect 
between the policy rhetoric for integrated security-development ap-
proaches at the international level and policy realities at the sectoral level. 
The major exception to this trend is international policies toward terrorism – 
                                                          
14  These insights are based on a series of commissioned studies on demography, environ-
ment, human rights, poverty, globalization and physical insecurity. They will be part of 
a forthcoming IPA edited volume tentatively entitled Security and Development: Criti-
cal Connections (Tschirgi / Mancini s.a.). 
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which in turn have begun to penetrate other policy areas. As noted previ-
ously, the impact of 9/11 on the evolution of international security and 
development policies merits special attention which is only beginning to 
be understood.15 
Turning to policy integration at the country-level: Notwithstanding claims 
of enhanced policy coherence across issue areas, comparative research 
from the field demonstrates that international policy interventions also fall 
short of integrated approaches to addressing the range of security and 
development problems in concrete contexts.16 This is equally true for na-
tional policies. Instead, research from country case studies consistently 
reveals serious tensions and inconsistencies resulting from the pursuit of 
multiple agendas. These are rarely acknowledged or effectively managed 
by national governments or their external supporters (ibid). For example, 
at the country level, achieving the MDGs, promoting economic develop-
ment, enhancing social cohesion, executing an anti-terrorism campaign 
and ensuring regime stability are often identified as policy priorities al-
though these are not necessarily mutually compatible goals. Meanwhile, 
socio-economic policies dealing with discrete issue areas remain segre-
gated and fragmented, with unemployment, population growth, health, 
internal or external migration, diaspora remittances, food security, crimi-
nality and economic development proceeding on basically separate tracks 
– and these are regularly supported by external agencies through sector-
specific assistance programs (ibid). 
If development policies at the country level are far from integrated, their 
integration with security policies appears to be even more problematic. 
The evidence from country-case studies suggests that national security 
institutions focus narrowly on traditional threats to state security rather 
than the wider range of threats covered under human security. Despite 
claims to the contrary, there are few examples of proactive or preventive 
strategies to deal with structural or proximate sources of conflict through 
linked-up socio-economic or environmental policies (ibid). It is only re-
cently that selected governments and key development donors have started 
                                                          
15  For a discussion of the impact of 9/11 see Tschirgi (2003). 
16  These insights are drawn from country case studies on Yemen, Guyana, Kyrgyzstan, 
Guinea-Bissau, Bolivia, Somalia, Tajikistan which will be included in the above-
mentioned IPA volume, alongside the thematic studies (Tschirgi / Mancini s.a.).  
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to view standard tools like the MDGs or national Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy Papers (PRSPs) from a security perspective (World Bank 2005a). 
Similarly, notwithstanding growing external pressure to include human 
rights and democratization criteria into aid packages, their implementation 
on the ground is shaped by national security interests of the donor and the 
recipient governments. In this context, 9/11 offers an important benchmark 
for assessing the relative significance of security vs. development policies 
for both internal and external actors. Research from several geo-
strategically vital countries like Yemen, Somalia, Tajikistan and Kyr-
gyzstan reveals significant policy reversals in pre and post 9/11 environ-
ments.17 
Evidence from both sectoral and country case studies suggests that policy 
coherence is still at a high level of abstraction. Moreover, it often occurs 
primarily at the rhetorical level at donor capitals or the headquarters of 
regional or international organizations rather than in the national policies 
of the developing countries themselves or the country-specific program-
ming of donor countries. As development assistance has come to play an 
expanded role in conflict contexts, there are growing calls for conflict-
sensitive approaches to development. However, it is difficult to demon-
strate that conflict sensitivity has been mainstreamed into development 
assistance. More often than not, development actors tend to focus either on 
acute problem areas – such as child soldiers, disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the return of displaced 
populations – or on new programming areas such as security sector reform 
or rule of law which are not part of traditional development or security 
assistance programs, and are often implemented as stand-alone programs.18 
The gaps, contradictions and dilemmas that exist across policy areas at the 
national level are replicated even within a single policy area. For example, 
research on rule of law programs reveals that there are distinct tensions 
between law enforcement and human rights agendas. Similarly, there are 
dilemmas between rule of law approaches supporting market liberalization 
                                                          
17  See the country case studies in the forthcoming IPA edited volume (Tschirgi / Mancini 
s.a.). 
18  For references on conflict-sensitive development see Tschirgi (2004). 
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vs. equitable development.19 Yet, few mechanisms exist through which 
such tensions can be resolved at the country level. More often than not, 
policies are translated into discrete projects and programs with their own 
objectives – quite divorced from a broader security or development strat-
egy. 
Paradoxically, despite the heightened pressure on donor agencies to apply 
well-established ODA criteria for aid effectiveness in "good performers", 
donors are increasingly supporting conflict countries through a range of 
aid instruments. The current euphemisms for such engagement include 
"Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS)," "difficult partnerships,"and 
"fragile states."20 On one level, these labels represent a serious effort to 
group countries into categories for more appropriate policy interventions. 
On the other hand, these categories themselves tend to create their own 
policy blinders. For example, "state-building" in fragile states has now 
become a mini policy industry with various donors designing and imple-
menting programs on constitution making, support to multi-party politics, 
transparency and anti-corruption programs as well as anti-crime and anti-
terrorism measures. A closer look at selected programs, however, reveals 
that they are quite narrowly conceived and are often shaped by donor 
capacities rather than recipient country needs.21 
In short, the overwhelming evidence emerging from thematic, program 
level and country case studies is the absence of strategic, integrated na-
tional or international policies to address complex and interlocking socio-
economic, environmental, political and security problems. Instead, interna-
tional actors are now providing a multitude of discrete programs, projects 
                                                          
19  Research commissioned under the Rule of Law project at IPA’s Security-Nexus Pro-
gram promises to yield a better understanding of the impact of rule of law programming 
in conflict prevention, peace operations and post-conflict peacebuilding. These studies 
will be published in a volume tentatively called Rule of Law and Conflict Management: 
Toward Security, Development and Human Rights, (Hurwitz / Huang s.a.). 
20  For further discussion of this point see Picciotto (2005). 
21  Donor approaches to security sector reform are the subject of a parallel IPA research 
project; its findings of will be collected in an edited volume titled Arresting Insecurity. 
Also see the paper by Peake / Studdard (2005). On Rule of Law programming see the 
forthcoming IPA edited volume tentatively called Rule of Law and Conflict Manage-
ment: Toward Security, Development and Human Rights (Hurwitz / Huang s.a.). There 
is a wealth of evaluation studies on other programming areas which confirm the overall 
conclusion. 
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and aid packages across the vast security-development spectrum but with-
out any coherent policy framework. In the last few years, this conclusion 
was amply demonstrated in post-conflict contexts.22 With the growing 
policy interest in conflict prevention, emerging research findings from 
countries at risk of conflict confirm the magnitude of the gap between 
policy rhetoric and reality.   
Institutional Challenges 
One of the most persistent findings from policy research is the absence of 
effective institutional interface between external and domestic actors 
across a range of policy areas. Traditionally, external actors dealt directly 
with national governments and authorities in their own sectoral areas. As 
the range of sectors and issue areas for collaboration have expanded and 
new external actors, including international NGOs have become involved 
in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the multiplicity of national and 
international actors has led to fragmentation and dissipation of effort. This 
has created two contradictory problems. On the one hand, national gov-
ernments generally lack the capacity or the appropriate systems to deal 
effectively with a growing range of external actors, each with its own 
mandate and requirements. On the other hand, there is understandable 
resistance to being confronted with a donor community which comes in 
with a unified agenda. As an observer from a conflict-torn country has 
noted, the prospect of a "donor cartel" poses a serious concern to national 
governments (de Leon 2004). 
Another consistent finding from thematic as well as country research is the 
continued disconnect between various international agencies with different 
mandates. Although the linkages between health, environment, poverty, 
population, environment, housing and crime are increasingly better under-
stood at both the policy and operational levels, international institutions 
dealing with these problems are highly fragmented and often operate in 
isolation from each other. There have been some efforts by "vanguard 
professionals" in each sector to reach out to other sectoral areas. For ex-
                                                          
22  The "strategy deficit" in post-conflict peacebuilding is well-established in the literature. 
It was empirically confirmed by the multi-country peacebuilding evaluations undertaken 
by the Utstein-4 countries, UK, Germany, Norway and the Netherlands. For a summary 
report see Smith (2003). 
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ample, UN agencies working on property, land and housing now find their 
issues of growing interest to agencies working on rule of law.23  Similarly, 
demographers and security experts are beginning to work together on 
demographic and security trends while civilian policing is now linked to 
peacekeeping; however, the institutional linkages across issue areas is at 
best informal. A decade after Alvaro de Soto and del Castillo’s incisive 
critique of the disconnect between the operations of the UN and the Inter-
national Financial Institutions (IFIs) in El Salvador, macro level mecha-
nisms for better coordination among external actors, such as the multi-
donor trust funds and consultative mechanisms at the country level, are 
still far from commonly utilized – especially for conflict prevention (de 
Soto 1994). 
Operational and Implementation Issues 
Compounding the shortcomings at the policy and institutional levels, re-
search at the nexus of security and development consistently draws atten-
tion to failures of policy implementation. Almost invariably, there exists a 
huge gap between policy makers and policy implementers, between head-
quarters and field operations. This is particularly evident in programming 
areas like security sector reform. The carefully-defined and packaged 
policies and programs rarely translate into effective programs on the 
ground.24 
Sectoral and country-based research confirms that there is extremely weak 
knowledge management within organizations, inadequate mechanisms to 
incorporate lessons learned, and little institutional memory in terms of the 
range of new programs and projects that are implemented in various coun-
tries. As donors have become involved in hands-on programming (some-
times through private sector consulting firms) on such sensitive issue areas 
as the security sector, human rights, democratization, civil society promo-
tion, the absence of consistent and rigorous planning methodology and 
management capacity is increasingly becoming more apparent (ibid).   
                                                          
23  Please see the IPA Policy Report entitled "Land, Property, Housing and Conflict Manage-
ment: Identifying Policy Options for Rule of Law Programming" (Hurwitz / Studdard / 
Williams 2005). 
24  The aforementioned IPA edited volumes on Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law 
will address implementation issues in greater detail. 
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At the country or field level, cooperation frameworks between program 
implementers, national authorities and donors are far from effective.25 As a 
result, there are numerous unconnected programs and projects in such 
different sectors as gender equity, human rights training, police reform, 
election monitoring and poverty alleviation. Multi-disciplinary task forces 
across projects or programs (e.g. with expertise in conflict, legal affairs, 
management, financing, budgeting and human resources) or a common 
understanding of the linkages among program areas (e.g. justice, security 
sector, public finance) are simply not part of the design of externally-
supported initiatives. The complicated relationship between project im-
plementers, their external funders, national governments and beneficiaries 
has exacerbated the perennial challenges of transparency and accountabil-
ity between donors and recipients. 
Donor Roles and Funding 
External actors regularly pay lip service to the importance of "local owner-
ship" although the policy instruments for more effective alignment of 
donor and recipient strategies, instruments, frameworks, programs lag far 
behind. Research indicates that many policy and planning instruments 
promoted by external actors such as the PRSPs, the MDGs, the United 
Nations Development Assistance Framework and Common Country As-
sessments (UNDAF / CCAs) are not only sectoral in nature; they are rarely 
the primary policy tools employed by national governments.26 
There are strong policy exhortations for more effective collaboration 
among donors, more efficient use of international resources and greater 
accountability. However, it is extremely difficult to trace donor funding 
within countries, across various sectors, and especially across governments 
and other international actors. Researchers examining external engagement 
in individual countries discover a multitude of actors, programs, projects 
which rarely add up to a comprehensive sectoral or country program. 
Currently, there is no national or international repository of funding by 
donors, sectors or recipient countries. Researchers find it difficult to gain a 
composite picture of who is doing what in which countries with what level 
                                                          
25  For an insightful examination of this problem see Rose (2005).  
26  See the forthcoming IPA volume tentatively titled Security and Development: Critical 
Connections (Tschirgi / Mancini s.a.); also see Rose (2005). 
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of financial support. For example, a concerted search for donor invest-
ments in security sector reform over the last 10 years has yielded only 
fragmented information. This is only partly due to the fact that various 
security sector reform activities undertaken by donors do not qualify under 
ODA criteria and are thus not tracked by OECD/DAC. Even those activi-
ties that fall under the DAC criteria are listed under so many different 
categories that it is not easy to gain an accurate picture.27 
The Political Context 
Perhaps the single most important conclusion that emerges from thematic 
as well as country-based research on the links between security and devel-
opment policies is the centrality of politics – both for problem identifica-
tion and policy response. Neither sectoral policies, nor national and inter-
national responses can be understood without an accurate understanding of 
the political dynamics at the country and international levels. 
Despite the existence of historical and structural legacies which greatly 
affect a country’s security and development conditions, policy options as 
well as policy outcomes are not pre-determined. The key variable between 
structural problems and policy outcomes in countries at risk of conflict 
seems to be the nature of the country’s political processes, dynamic and 
institutions. The political "ecology" of security and development is highly 
context-specific and defies universal prescriptions. Shying away from 
overt involvement in politics, donors have increasingly sought to influence 
national politics through "good governance" programming.  More recently, 
under the impact of 9/11, the focus has shifted to statebuilding. Yet, coun-
try-based findings question both the effectiveness of governance pro-
gramming and the more recent interest in state building. There is accumu-
lating evidence from countries like Somalia and Guinea-Bissau that the 
donor focus on strengthening formal institutions of the state at the central 
level (constitutions, elections, courts, military, police, parliaments, minis-
tries) might be at the expense of national processes of political accommo-
dation, dialogue and priority setting.28 As the scope of official develop-
ment assistance expands to highly sensitive political issue areas (including 
security sector reform, rule of law, democratization, human rights) the 
                                                          
27  See, for example, Mancini (2005). 
28  See the country case studies in the forthcoming IPA volume (Tschirgi / Mancini s.a.). 
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perennial question of sovereignty emerges as a key challenge. The fact that 
domestic conflicts are increasingly "internationalized" as a result of the 
active involvement of donors has far reaching implications for a society’s 
ability to address its problems through locally-sustainable political proc-
esses. 
Ultimately, there is no escaping the fact that external engagement in con-
flict prone, conflict torn and post conflict countries is inevitably political 
in nature. The absence of a grand international strategy linking the multi-
ple goals pursued in such contexts does not diminish the political role of 
external bilateral and multilateral actors. Rather, it confirms the limitations 
of current approaches to conflict prevention, state building and peacebuild-
ing by external actors. Not only are security and development policies 
beset by serious problems of coherence, coordination and consistency. In 
reality, it is difficult to speak of the existence of "international policies" 
that are equal or appropriate to the multi-faceted security and developmen-
tal threats facing many developing countries in the early years of the 21st 
century. Instead, the current policy declarations on the security-develop-
ment nexus serve to reveal the great chasm between global vulnerabilities 
that cut across human, national and international levels and the structural 
shortcomings of an international system that is shaped by the national 
interests of its member states. 
5 Conclusion 
The emerging research findings summarized above provide evidence-
based support to the growing dissatisfaction with the policy mantra for 
integrated security and development strategies for conflict prevention, 
conflict management and post-conflict peacebuilding. They also point to 
three current gaps which need to be addressed: the gap between knowl-
edge and policy; between policy and practice; and between policies and 
politics. In each of these areas there is considerable room for further work. 
Under the research-policy gap, the priority should be for more rigorous, 
field-based research that tracks the interrelated security and development 
challenges confronting countries at risk of conflict. Such research needs to 
be informed by an overall understanding of structural risk factors while 
closely tracing the political context in which national and international 
policies are made. The dynamic interaction between security and devel-
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opment conditions in different contexts cannot be overemphasized. For 
example, the impact of the global war on terror on the development and 
security priorities of individual countries and regions requires urgent atten-
tion since it has created a new political environment for policy interven-
tions. 
Under the policy-practice gap, there is need for a large body of independ-
ent, systematic, longitudinal and cumulative evaluation studies to begin 
documenting and assessing the implementation of security and develop-
ment policies on the ground. Agency-based "best practices units", lessons 
learned exercises, and evaluation studies fall short of providing a sound 
basis upon which to assess international policies. Instead, based on ongo-
ing research in various institutions, a consortium of policy research think 
tanks would be well-placed to undertake evaluation studies across various 
countries, sectors and issue areas. 
Finally, under the policy-politics gap, the current reactive approaches to 
violent conflicts cannot be sustained. For developing countries, structural 
vulnerabilities are not destiny; there are multiple policy options at local, 
national, regional and international levels that are not explored or pursued 
by governments and international institutions because of overriding politi-
cal considerations based on narrowly-cast self interest. Preventive strate-
gies at the nexus of security and development are imperative to avert struc-
tural vulnerabilities from becoming violent conflicts that know no borders. 
The post Cold War, post 9/11 era offers the opportunity for enlightened 
national interest and collective security to converge in important ways to 
address development and security challenges in radically new ways. After 
60 years of certain enmities and alliances, we are currently witnessing an 
interregnum in the international system. It remains to be seen whether the 
state-centric politics of the 20th century can be sufficiently transformed to 
respond to the multi-faceted threats of the 21st century. 
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Whose security? Integration and integrity in EU policies 
for security and development1 
Clive Robinson 
Summary 
The end of the Cold War refocused the European Union’s (EU) attention 
both on its "near neighbourhood" and on the needs of the world’s poorest 
people. In view of the growing trend towards inclusion of "first-world" 
security criteria in development policies, a discussion paper Whose secu-
rity?, summarised here, was commissioned by Association of World Coun-
cil of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe (APRODEV) 
to identify priority issues for advocacy on EU policies towards develop-
ment and security.  
There are signs that donors want to change the conditions of aid to respond 
to the threat of global terrorism, but poor people suffer disproportionately 
from insecurity and development policy needs to be clear about whose 
security is the priority. The absence of global justice is a fundamental 
challenge. The paper explores the relationship between human develop-
ment, human security and human rights as well as the need for improved 
women’s participation in peacebuilding and security. 
The European Security Strategy, seen as a response to the unilateralist 
character of US strategy, takes a comprehensive, multilateralist approach, 
recognising that threats cannot be tackled by purely military means. De-
velopment assistance is seen as one of the instruments at the EU’s dis-
posal. This approach is supported by a "human security doctrine for 
Europe", under which "human security response forces", paid from the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, would operate. The 
EU’s development policy statement of 2000 is being revised with a view 
to including the complementarity of security and development. APRODEV 
believes that development and human rights should be seen as end goals 
                                                          
1  An assessment prepared for the Association of World Council of Churches related 
Development Organisations in Europe (APRODEV) by Clive Robinson, revised August 
2005. 
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and not simply as instruments to the achievement of other aims of EU 
external relations policy. 
The European Commission aims to rationalise the profusion of aid budg-
ets, reducing them from 90 to just six new instruments. The parameters of 
some of these instruments would make it more difficult to monitor EU 
spending on poverty reduction. In the draft Financial Perspectives for 
2007–2013, the largest instrument, meant to deliver the Union’s contribu-
tion to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), is set to take a falling 
share of spending, relative to more security-focused instruments. The 
share allocated to the Development Cooperation and Economic Coopera-
tion instrument (DCECI) should increase at least proportionately with the 
overall increase in external relations funding. The EU needs an instrument 
dedicated to the pursuit of poverty eradication in developing countries.  
The proposed Stability instrument, smaller in size than DCECI, was 
planned to support post-conflict reconstruction, including peacekeeping 
operations of third countries. APRODEV agencies feel that short-term 
military stabilisation may be necessary, perhaps with a stronger mandate 
from the United Nations (UN) or the African Union (AU), but that it 
should be financed by the CFSP, separately from development expendi-
ture. A ring-fenced Stability instrument might produce greater clarity in 
protecting development expenditure through the DCECI. The Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC) recently classified six new areas of 
quasi-military aid as official development assistance (ODA). APRODEV 
members may want to ensure that there is "no further erosion" and explore 
the "roll-back" of eligibility in the case of some existing items. 
While subscribing to policy coherence, APRODEV agencies believe in a 
division of labour and mandates. Integrity (of tasks, of budgets) is a value 
that APRODEV agencies would apply to the EU’s work for poverty reduc-
tion. EU citizens are entitled to a clear picture of how much the Union is 
spending on poor people and the MDGs. The distinct contribution of de-
velopment assistance is to improve the livelihoods of poor people with the 
ultimate objective of eradicating poverty. 
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1 Introduction 
The end of the Cold War signalled three trends which were to affect the 
evolution of the European Union’s development assistance policy. The 
delinking of aid from strategic Cold War considerations allowed donors 
during the 1990s to refocus attention on the needs of the world’s poorest 
people, culminating in the adoption in 2000 of the MDGs. The second 
trend, specific to the Union, was the refocus of its aid on its "near 
neighbourhood" of countries. As a result, between 1990 and 2000 Euro-
pean Community (EC) aid to low-income countries fell from 76 % to less 
than 40 %. The third trend, common like the first to all OECD donors, is 
the growing inclusion of "first-world" security criteria in development 
policies and instruments. 
To begin an assessment of these trends at EU level, the three Brussels-
based networks of faith-based development and humanitarian aid organisa-
tions, APRODEV, CIDSE (Coopération Internationale pour le Développe-
ment et la Solidarité) and Caritas Europa, organised a workshop in No-
vember 2004 (see APRODEV / CIDSE / Caritas Europa 2004). APRODEV 
commissioned the discussion paper summarised here in order to take for-
ward the outputs from the workshop and to identify priority issues for its 
advocacy positions on EU policies towards development and security. A 
ten-day consultancy was commissioned in April 2005, based on desk re-
search and semi-structured interviews with a small number of staff in 
selected APRODEV and related agencies. 
2 Security and development: where we are now 
Poor people suffer disproportionately from insecurity. Casualties from 
international terrorism between 1998 and 2004 were nearly 28,000 in 
Africa and Asia, compared with 5,000 in North America and Western 
Europe (DFID 2005). Yet terrorism accounts for only a tiny share of vio-
lence-related deaths. War and interpersonal violence account for much 
more. The international community needs to be clear about "whose insecu-
rity?" is the priority. There are signs that the donor community wants to 
change the shape and conditions of aid in order to respond to the threat of 
"global terrorism".  
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APRODEV agencies detect a similar trend among politicians to link secu-
rity and development in ways that make it hard to distinguish the logics 
and activities of the two sectors. There has been an inflationary use of the 
term "humanitarian" to describe military interventions, with the language, 
the aid and the budgets of development appropriated for political purposes. 
The Directors of the three German church-based development agencies, in 
a 2003 statement, considered,  
"the justification that threats must be averted as problematic, politically 
as well as ethically. The absence of global justice is a fundamental 
challenge to us, because it has for a long time been violating the lives of 
billions of people day-by-day, and not because it has for a short time 
also been linked to the horrifying terrorist use of force. It is not fear 
that makes us act, but the conviction that another world is necessary 
and possible" (Misereor / Brot für die Welt / EED 2003). 
The record of "humanitarian" interventions has been to stop extreme vio-
lence in some cases, produce new conflicts in others but not to resolve 
substantially the underlying causes. One basis for intervention, much dis-
cussed since events in Rwanda and the Balkans, is the norm of a collective 
responsibility to protect: sovereign states have a duty to protect their own 
citizens. When they fail to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the 
broader community of states, ultimately through enforcement action. This 
is a classic response to symptoms rather than causes. Moreover, the pro-
tection of citizens of other countries through such a doctrine is different 
from an extended right of self-defence of one’s own citizens, as claimed 
by the US security strategy.  
A stronger mandate for peace enforcement actions sanctioned by the UN 
Security Council in situations like Darfur and Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) has some support among APRODEV agencies, provided 
that it is not misleadingly described as "humanitarian". Their view is that 
military interventions can never bring lasting peace; they can at best make 
the guns fall silent. By virtue of its Charter and the experience of its Secu-
rity Council, the UN has held peacemaking and development in creative 
tension since its inception. Many UN peace missions involve humanitar-
ian, political and military elements. There is a "need to ensure that the 
long-term perspectives of transition and development are embedded from 
the outset of a mission" (Eide et al. 2005). 
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This has not always been the case. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) concept of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) has been inter-
preted as civil support measures to military operations, to gain acceptance, 
support and intelligence from the local population. However, the experi-
ence of the UN and humanitarian aid of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) has led to the development of codes and guidelines governing the 
independence of humanitarian action.2 The Red Cross insists that, "Meas-
ures are humanitarian if they meet the principles of neutrality, impartiality 
and independence. Aid measures that do not are not humanitarian, re-
gardless of any well-meaning intentions and their effectiveness." These 
principles are important for the security of beneficiaries as well as that of 
aid workers. Humanitarian aid must also be subject to civil coordination. 
3 Human security, human development and human 
rights 
The extended concept known as human security emerged when United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published its Human Devel-
opment Report on this theme in 1994. This advocated a greater emphasis 
on people’s security than on territorial security. A Commission on Human 
Security appointed by the UN, which reported in 2003, defined human 
security as, "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that en-
hance human freedoms and human fulfilment" (CHS 2003). 
How does the concept of human security relate to human development and 
human rights? The report Human security now (2003) draws on the ex-
perience of its co-editor Amartya Sen to explain. Human development 
shifted the focus of development attention away from economic growth to 
the quality and richness of human lives. Human development has a buoy-
ant quality, as it is concerned with progress and augmentation: "Human 
security supplements the expansionist perspective of human development 
by paying attention to ‘downside risks’." 
                                                          
2 Humanitarian aid NGOs regard themselves as bound by the Code of Conduct for The 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief 
(1994) that can be found on http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct and/or by SCHR 
(2002, revised 2004).  
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Human rights begin as ethical claims on behalf of every human being. 
Even where they are not legalised, the affirmation of human rights (and 
related activities of advocacy and monitoring of abuse) can be effective 
through the politicisation of ethical commitments. As human security 
likewise demands ethical force and political recognition, it can be seen as 
an important class of human rights. It may help to show the complemen-
tarity between the three concepts diagrammatically. 
The human security perspective keeps the full range of human deprivation 
in view. It is larger than state security: the primacy of human rights distin-
guishes human security from traditional state-based approaches. The faith-
based agencies see something beyond human security. The preferential 
option for the poor and powerless combined with the hope for a more just 
Chart 1: Human rights, human development and human security as  
 complementary concepts 
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and peaceful world are the cornerstone of their approach. Church-based 
development cooperation cannot be subsumed to an idea of security fo-
cused on preserving and protecting the way of life of people in the north. 
Peace cannot be restored "from above". Achieving a fair balance of inter-
ests is political and must be done principally by the society affected. For 
peace to be sustainable, it must grow "from below". 
4 Gender, childhood and security 
Any concept of security (even the human security approach) is insufficient 
unless it differentiates between the type and scale of insecurity affecting 
men and women, young and old. Whose security is at stake, when and 
where? World Health Organization’s (WHO) 2002 report World report on 
violence and health estimated that in 2000 1,659,000 people died as a 
result of violence: 49.1 % from suicide, 31.3 % from homicide and 18.6 % 
from war-related violence. The different forms of violence affect men and 
women, young and old, differently. The great majority of deaths from 
violence (91.1 %) occurred in low- to middle-income countries. Almost 
half the women who die owing to homicide are killed by their current or 
former partner, making the home the most dangerous place for women 
worldwide. The WHO report also notes that one third of girls experience 
their first sexual encounter in a forced or coercive way. Issues of bodily 
integrity that women identify as crucial to their intimate security (repro-
ductive rights and violence in the family) lead to fear which limits 
women’s access to resources and basic activities (WHO 2002). 
The existing climate of impunity for violence in the family feeds the cul-
ture of impunity towards violence more generally. It reinforces the belief 
that violence wins, that domination succeeds, whether at home or in wars. 
In warfare women are seen as a symbol of the nation, which has to be 
defended. Rape and other forms of sexual violence have become a weapon 
of war. The increased incidence of sexual and gender-based violence 
needs to be made a key international issue, as called for in 2000 in UN 
Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1325 on women, peace and security 
(UNSC 2004). Even the deployment of UN and other peacekeepers, usu-
ally large numbers of unattached men with money to spare, may create 
new security concerns for women and children and increase the potential 
for exploitation, abuse, prostitution and trafficking. There is a need to 
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integrate gender perspectives into peacekeeping operations, increasing the 
numbers of women peacekeepers, and to implement adequate and gender-
sensitive training and a clear sexual code of conduct for deployed person-
nel.3  
Children suffer disproportionately from lack of security. Poverty, dis-
placement, separation from family and lack of rights put children at risk of 
exploitation and abuse. The harm suffered by child soldiers is severe. 
There is the risk of being maimed or killed in combat, the risk of contract-
ing HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) for girls 
forced into sexual slavery, but also the long-term emotional and social 
impact of witnessing and being involved in acts of violence from an early 
age. 
Strategies adopted by external actors in crisis or post-war regions must 
take account of culture-specific factors affecting the social status of men, 
women and children: 
• Violence against women, whether perpetrated at home or in public, 
must be addressed through legislative and policy reforms supported 
by public education. 
• Male domination of the security sector ("militarised masculinity") and 
male responsibility for condoning and extending violence against 
women must be acknowledged and actions put in place to address and 
overcome its root causes. 
• Women’s equal participation with men should include putting women 
in positions of authority in peace talks, addressing gender perspectives 
in peace agreements, recruiting and promoting women in security in-
stitutions (including peacekeeping forces), consulting women’s peace 
movements, and addressing violations of the human rights of women 
and children in conflict. Donors should ensure that in these activities 
they meet the standards of UNSC resolution 1325 and develop new 
and more adequate instruments. 
• The use of children as soldiers must be addressed through legislative 
reform. 
                                                          
3 A "Gender resource package for peacekeeping operations" can be found at the website 
of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations; online: http://www.un. 
org/Depts/dpko/lessons/. 
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• The Treaty of Amsterdam (Article 3.2) entrusted the European Com-
munity with the task of promoting equality between men and women 
and seeking to eliminate inequality in all its actions. This principle 
should be extended to all activities implemented under the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
5 European security strategy 
In parallel with the changes in the nature of global security over the past 
fifteen years, the European Union has enlarged and deepened its coopera-
tion. Under the treaty establishing the new constitution, the external poli-
cies of the Union would include three "Community" areas (trade, devel-
opment and economic cooperation, humanitarian aid) and two "intergov-
ernmental" areas: the CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP).4 
In a recent dynamic evolution of EU external relations policy, the Euro-
pean Defence Agency, the European Security Strategy (ESS), a new rela-
tionship with NATO, a European planning headquarters and the first 
CSDP missions all emerged during 2003 and 2004. Some in the EU wel-
come the ESS, agreed in December 2003, as an holistic and comprehen-
sive understanding of security and as a response to what is seen as the 
unilateralism of the US security strategy. "No single country is able to 
tackle today’s complex problems on its own," it maintains. "None of these 
threats are purely military nor can any be tackled by purely military 
means. Each requires a mixture of instruments" (European Council 2003). 
To some in APRODEV, the Strategy is based on the prerogative of north-
ern/EU politics to define security threats and fails to recognise the need for 
fundamental policy change by the EU. 
Within three months of the adoption of the ESS, Western Europe sustained 
its worst terrorist attack, the Madrid bombings. This led to tougher lan-
guage, the acceleration of measures already under way for improved coor-
dination of domestic security and a Council declaration on combating 
terrorism (European Council 2004). This contains further references to the 
                                                          
4 In the intergovernmental areas, it is the member states, acting in the Council normally 
by unanimity, who have authority, not the Commission and Parliament. 
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use of policy dialogue and aid instruments with third countries in pursuit 
of terror. 
Policy development is supported by the evolution of the EU’s defence 
capabilities. Europe has 1.8 million persons under arms and spends 180 
billion euros per year on defence. The European Defence Agency (EDA), 
set up in 2004, is tasked with, "strengthening Europe’s industrial potential 
[in] strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities," 
and promoting, "an internationally competitive European defence equip-
ment market. "5 These objectives seem hard to reconcile with the pledge in 
a recent Commission communication on coherence that, "The EU will 
strengthen the control of its arms exports, with the aim of avoiding that 
EU-manufactured weaponry be used against civilian populations or ag-
gravate existing tensions or conflicts in developing countries"  (European 
Commission 2005c). The General Affairs Council should commission 
independent studies of the extent to which European arms exports and EC 
funding of armaments research contribute to fuelling of conflict outside 
the Union. 
6 A human security doctrine for Europe 
The human security concept outlined in paragraph 3 has been modified to 
justify EU security interventions through the report of the Barcelona study 
group on Europe’s security capabilities (European Union 2004). The con-
vener of the study group, Professor Mary Kaldor, has argued that whether 
EU security policy is good or bad for development depends on the type of 
policy the EU adopts: a US-style defensive build-up or a contribution to 
global security (Kaldor / Glasius s.a.). She claims that there are "two EUs’: 
a tension between ‘Europe as a peace project’ and ‘Europe as a super-
power in the making". The study group’s policy proposals centre on a 
"human security response force" of 15,000 personnel (one third to be 
civilian) as a standing contribution to UN operations. 
Kaldor and Glasius conclude that, "The development community’s best 
option is to embrace coherence, and try to influence the security agenda in 
                                                          
5 See report of the General Affairs and External Relations (GAER) Council meeting of 17 
November 2003; online: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/gac/ date/171103. 
htm. 
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the direction of human security." They add that spending on the civilian 
component should be increased and paid for out of the CFSP budget and 
that in the long run member states should allocate part of their defence 
budgets to the CFSP. If the civilian component is paid for by the CFSP, 
this has implications for command and control. Perhaps it is logical to 
place police, legal and some administrative and civil protection staff under 
CFSP command but this should not extend to aid workers, who should be 
under civilian management, as recognised by the Red Cross and the UN. 
While many in APRODEV are comfortable with the broader human secu-
rity concept preached by the UN, reaction to the "doctrine for Europe" 
proposals has been more critical, seeing them as reinforcing the EU’s 
short-term interests and narrowing the scope for reforms to promote hu-
man security in diverse policy areas, such as trade, agriculture and external 
relations.6 This is the kind of EU policy coherence long advocated by 
APRODEV (Madeley 1999). Interviewees were interested in the security 
of a global citizenship, not simply the security of EU citizens. Similarities 
and differences between the various security "doctrines" (US national 
security strategy, ESS, a human security doctrine for Europe and a faith-
based approach to human security) are shown, albeit simplified, in chart 2. 
7 Development policy statement 
One other part of the policy framework under review this year is the de-
velopment policy statement. In November 2000 the Council and the 
Commission adopted a joint statement on EU development policy whose 
central principle is, "Community development policy is grounded on the 
principle of sustainable, equitable and participatory human and social 
development […] The main objective of Community development policy 
must be to reduce and, eventually, to eradicate poverty." The Commission 
has launched a review of the policy statement, publishing a consultation 
paper in January 2005 and a new draft statement in July. The consultation 
paper warned that,  
                                                          
6 See Geraldine McDonald in APRODEV / CIDSE / Caritas Europa (2004). 
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"The increase in political conditionality and the diversion of develop-
ment resources for other, legitimate, security type concerns need to be 
avoided,” and the draft statement adds, "Development is crucial for 
collective and individual long-term security: they are complementary 
agendas and neither is subordinate to the other" (European Commis-
sion 2005d). 
APRODEV has taken the position that development can contribute to 
security through addressing the root causes of conflict, including poverty 
and inequality, but only if the specific objectives of development policy 
are respected. Development and human rights should be seen as end goals 
and not simply as instruments to the achievement of other aims of EU 
external relations policy. 
8 Conditionality in EU aid agreements 
The Madrid Declaration linked aid and trade agreements with third coun-
tries to their willingness to cooperate on security. This policy was put to 
the test in February 2005 during the five-year review of the Cotonou 
Agreement with the 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific (AKP) countries. 
The fight against proliferation of WMD will become an essential element 
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of the Agreement; the EU undertook to provide ACP states with additional 
resources apart from the European Development Fund to carry this out. 
For the fight against terrorism a new article on cooperation has been 
added. This new insistence on "security conditionality" has the potential to 
open the door to the use of development funds for security purposes and 
increases the need to monitor closely how funds are spent. If the question 
were posed another way ("Should aid to poor people be denied if their 
governments don’t agree on counter-terrorism?"), APRODEV agencies 
would say no. In a possible example of "acceptable conditionality", one 
member state government has recently separated security considerations 
from the use of development budgets for poverty reduction: "Aid pro-
grammes should be linked to performance against poverty reduction and 
not to performance against global security goals" (DFID 2005). Interrup-
tion of aid should be a consequence only of financial mismanagement, 
human rights violation or departure from poverty reduction objectives. 
9 Financial perspectives 2007–2013 
With negotiations taking place around the Union’s spending plans for the 
next seven-year period (the Financial Perspectives), the Commission has 
taken the opportunity to rationalise the profusion of aid budgets, proposing 
to reduce them from 90 to just six new legal instruments. These are the 
Pre-accession instrument (PAI), the European Neighbourhood and Part-
nership instrument (ENPI), the Development Cooperation and Economic 
Cooperation instrument (DCECI), the Stability instrument, humanitarian 
aid and macro-finance. After the two accessions planned for 2007, the PAI 
will be available to two candidate and four potential candidate countries. 
The ENPI will be available to 17 countries to the east and south of the 
Union which are not expected to accede but with which the Union seeks 
neighbourly relations. The Commission’s proposed distribution among 
instruments is shown in chart 3. 
The largest instrument, meant to deliver the Union’s contribution to the 
Millennium Development Goals, is set to take a lower share of spending, 
relative to more security-focused instruments, in the years up to 2013. 
Although all figures are projected to increase from year to year, the in-
creases for pre-accession and neighbourhood (largely middle-income) 
countries and for stability are greater and are at the expense of the share of 
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aid allocated to Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation 
(DCEC), the budget which includes aid to most low-income countries. 
DCEC would suffer a drop in share from 56 % to 49 % over the seven 
years. The parameters of the instruments are not designed to follow the 
criteria set by the Development Assistance Committee of OECD for offi-
cial development assistance (ODA), making it impossible to track what 
share of external relations spending is allocated to poverty reduction. If the 
EU is serious in its commitment to long-term development and the attain-
ment of the MDGs, the share allocated to DCEC should increase at least 
proportionately with the overall increase in the external relations envelope 
instead of the decreasing share envisaged by the Commission. 
10 Development cooperation and economic cooperation  
 instrument 
The conception of the DCEC instrument reveals some intrinsic problems 
(European Commission 2004a). It includes a mixture of objectives, geo-
graphic scope and themes in the same instrument. It is based on two arti-
cles of the Treaty covering development cooperation (179) and economic 
cooperation (181a). It embraces a number of large regions where EC aid is 
delivered but is also applicable to OECD countries, including economic 
cooperation without poverty criteria. Its coverage has a negative or "de-
fault" definition: all countries not eligible for assistance under the PAI or 
the ENPI. There is no clear dividing line between activities eligible for 
funding from the DCECI and the Stability instrument. 
In budgetary terms, there is no protected space for the fight against pov-
erty. What is needed is a dedicated instrument for poverty eradication in 
developing countries based on Article 179 only and with the eradication of 
poverty as its single over-arching objective. The DCECI proposal does not 
include an overall objective. Although the institutions have insisted that 
the MDGs must be at the core of Community development policy, the 
DCECI proposal does not count them as an objective and mentions them 
only once, in a non-legally binding recital. 
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11 Stability instrument (SI) 
Despite the exponential growth planned for its budget, the new Stability 
instrument (European Commission 2004b) would still be much smaller in 
size than the DCECI. It has been devised to "build on the approach pio-
neered under the Cotonou Agreement" and the existing EC Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism. The EU approval in 2004 of a 250 million € grant to the Afri-
can Peace Facility responded to an African Union request for help in 
strengthening its regional peacekeeping capability. However, it was also 
controversial because member states funded it by shaving 1.5 % off the 
development allocation of each African country in the European Devel-
opment Fund. 
The Stability instrument was originally planned to combine ODA-eligible 
and ODA-ineligible funding. Its aims are to respond to crises in order to 
re-establish the conditions for regular aid (from DCECI, ENPI or PAI), 
and to cooperate in confronting global and regional trans-border chal-
lenges, technological threats and weapons proliferation. It was envisaged 
to include the "development of peacekeeping and peace support capacity 
in partnership with international, regional and sub-regional organisa-
tions"; there are now signs that the DAC-ineligible items (peacekeeping, 
nuclear safety and non-proliferation) may be removed. 
In order to ground this enquiry in practical challenges, APRODEV inter-
viewees were asked what should be done to end the suffering in Darfur 
and the DRC. The consensus was that short-term military stabilisation was 
necessary, perhaps with a stronger mandate from the UN or the AU, and 
that the EU was right to play its part, but that its support should be com-
pletely separate from development expenditure. Otherwise, "we confuse 
aid with European security interests. It blurs the lines. " Defence budgets 
should pay. This is easier to implement at national level than at EU level. 
To say that the CFSP should pay fails to recognise that the EU does not 
control its own defence forces and that the CFSP has only a small adminis-
trative budget. If member states were to design a European stabilisation 
fund to share the costs of actions involving troops or police from member 
states, this would be the most appropriate source for the financing of third 
party peacekeeping operations. 
The Commission’s real justification for a Stability instrument is where 
such actions need to be delivered in "response to crisis situations" (ibid). 
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It is not the nature of the activity but its delivery in a context of crisis that 
underpins the instrument. It might be easier to protect poverty eradication 
spending from repeated raids for crisis purposes if a DAC-eligible and 
ring-fenced Stability instrument is adopted. A ring-fenced "crisis" instru-
ment could produce more clarity from a development perspective. At the 
same time, the SI needs to be governed by the development policy state-
ment and should explicitly mention the objective of poverty eradication. 
12 What counts as ODA: the DAC criteria 
In March 2005 the DAC reported the outcome of the latest round of dis-
cussions about whether new areas of aid could be classed as ODA 
(OECD/DAC 2005). There was agreement to extend eligibility to the six 
items in the box below. The DAC already excludes from ODA the supply 
or financing of military equipment or services and use of military person-
nel to control civil disobedience. In March the DAC discussed two other 
items – training the military in non-military matters, such as human rights, 
and extending the coverage of peacekeeping activities. These were not 
considered appropriate for ODA (unlike the six new items, they currently 
involve large sums, mostly from defence budgets) but the DAC agreed to 
revisit them in 2007. 
Box 1: Conflict prevention and peacebuilding: what counts as ODA? 
1 Management of security expenditure through improved civilian oversight 
and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and audit-
ing of security expenditure. 
2 Enhancing civil society’s role in the security system to help ensure that it is 
managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountabil-
ity, transparency and good governance. 
3 Security system reform to improve democratic governance and civilian 
control. 
4 Supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of child soldiers. 
5 Controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of small arms and 
light weapons. 
6 Civilian activities for peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution. 
Source: OECD/DAC 2005 
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Reactions to these inclusions vary. Number 6 is uncontroversial. 4 and 5, 
as examples of DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration), 
could be seen as classic cases of "turning swords into ploughshares". With 
the first three, it could be argued that the security services should be de-
mocratically controlled in the first place, without the need for ODA sup-
port: why is management more acceptable as ODA than security force 
activity on the ground? "No further erosion" might be a guiding principle 
but there may also be a case to explore the "roll-back" of eligibility for 
quasi-military expenditures already allowed. One answer to the problem of 
how to ensure that EU development funds are not diverted to non-
development purposes might be to require that a minimum percentage of 
EU external assistance be accounted for by ODA. 
13 Conflict prevention7 
Throughout this enquiry, there were frequent references to the efforts of 
EU institutions and NGOs to promote crisis prevention. In 2001 the EU 
Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts was adopted in Goth-
enburg. Country Strategy Papers (CSP) were identified as key tools for 
improving crisis prevention. (The SI, on the other hand, is not about pre-
vention but about post-conflict reconstruction.) A list of crisis and conflict 
indicators (check-list of root causes of conflict) was drawn up, to be sys-
tematically used in the drafting of CSP and performing early warning and 
monitoring functions. 
APRODEV agencies familiar with Darfur underlined the need for political 
efforts. Constructive engagement with the parties, addressing wealth-
sharing, technical help to find solutions, time and space were needed to 
allow Darfurians to address the problems through their own mechanisms; 
such was the lesson of the eventual resolution of the conflict in southern 
Sudan. This political track, and non-violent economic alternatives, needed 
to be followed as well as military intervention to stop the violence, which 
had received more attention. More "Darfurs" could be avoided with cost-
efficient preventive actions, but non-military forms of involvement had 
disappeared from public discourse. This approach was "down-to-earth" 
                                                          
7 "Crisis prevention" is preferred to "conflict prevention" by German NGOs because 
conflict can be managed positively to avoid violence (VENRO 2003). 
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and related to local initiatives, a far cry from the EU aspiration to be a 
"global actor". 
Women can be key change agents in crisis prevention through social net-
works across conflict lines. Their unique experience in peacebuilding 
brings added value; it is not simply a question of women’s vulnerability. 
The churches have a special vocation to work for reconciliation and dimin-
ish Muslim/Christian tensions. The churches have not yet systematically 
brought together all the experiences they have had of grassroots crisis 
prevention.8 And, in the ten years since the Rwandan genocide, the ecu-
menical movement has not had a forum or process to discuss the dynamics 
underlying violence: what do our spiritual foundations tell us, where do 
just war and just peace approaches stand in an age of non-statal conflict?9 
14 Conclusions 
This study has shown a number of practical steps the EU can take while 
adopting its new financial instruments and agreeing its Financial Perspec-
tives for 2007–2013. The EU needs a financing instrument clearly dedi-
cated to the support of its poverty eradication and development coopera-
tion objective, and not diluted by overlap with its stability fund or by eco-
nomic cooperation with richer countries. This should replace the current 
DCECI proposal. A ring-fenced Stability instrument might produce greater 
clarity in protecting development expenditure through the DCECI. To 
maintain the EU’s commitment to the Millennium Development Goals, the 
share of external relations funds allocated to DAC-eligible development 
cooperation should increase at least proportionately with the overall in-
crease in the external relations envelope. EU conflict prevention and crisis 
management activities should begin not with military options but with 
intensified political efforts towards constructive engagement with the 
parties, offering mediation and technical assistance, especially at local 
level. 
                                                          
8 The VENRO report includes a case study from EED on promoting democracy through 
non-government actors in Kenya (VENRO 2003). Other case studies appear in 
APRODEV (2001). 
9 For a start on this, see Anna T. Höglund: "Gender and war – a theological and ethical 
approach", in: APRODEV (2001). 
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A development-oriented approach to security can also be enshrined in the 
policies of the wider donor community including the EU. While it is rea-
sonable to put declaratory counter-terror clauses in international agree-
ments, aid programmes should be linked to performance against poverty 
reduction and not to performance against global security goals. There 
should be "no further erosion" of the civilian character of official devel-
opment assistance through inclusion of quasi-military expenditures. The 
DAC should review whether some existing items of this nature should be 
excluded from eligibility. Donors need to avoid the distorting effect on 
social cohesion of financing the strengthening of third country armed 
forces as such. Only specific peacemaking objectives should be considered 
for support. In peacebuilding and reconstruction, care should be taken that 
civil society actors, especially women, are consulted from the first plan-
ning exercises onwards. There is a need to consult with women who have 
experienced rape in conflict to ask them what further steps policy-makers 
should take to address the use of rape as a weapon. 
The churches for their part could do more to fulfil their vocation for con-
structive peacemaking. They could make a systematic effort to bring to-
gether (for use with policy-makers) the experiences of ecumenical agen-
cies in grassroots conflict prevention. APRODEV and the World Council 
of Churches (WCC) are well placed to promote reflections on the objec-
tives and values of civil development and the relationship of development 
agencies to beneficiaries, civil society, governments and security institu-
tions. The ecumenical movement could explore the spiritual and theologi-
cal sources for human security and convene a forum or process to discuss 
the dynamics underlying violence in an age of non-statal conflict. There is 
a need for all the world’s religions to consult and issue prophetic guidance 
on the changing types of conflict which mainly target civilians. 
Discussions with APRODEV member agencies show that they are com-
fortable with: 
• dialogue between the development and security communities. We 
have to relate to the military but this does not necessarily imply shar-
ing their goals and so would not normally be described as civil-
military cooperation. 
• the principle that the EU should support (for example) African Union 
peacekeeping forces as a last resort and when authorised by the UN. 
This should be financed from the CFSP or defence budgets. The an-
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swer is not to take resources from development. Global resources for 
development are around 60 billion US $ a year while global defence 
budgets amount to 900 billion US $. 
• policy coherence, which APRODEV has long advocated. But this 
does not mean that development policy should concede resources to 
non-developmental policies or instruments. The figures quoted on 
page 84 unfortunately suggest that this is what the Commission in-
tends. 
While subscribing to coherence, APRODEV agencies believe that there 
should be a division of labour and mandates. Integration and synthesis are 
important, but a lesson we can learn from gender analysis is that disaggre-
gation and analysis are also important.10 Integrity (of tasks, of budgets) is a 
value that APRODEV agencies would apply to the EU’s work for poverty 
reduction.11 EU citizens are entitled to a clear picture of how much the 
Union is spending on poor people and the MDGs. The distinct contribution 
of development assistance is to tackle the longer-term, underlying causes 
of global insecurity linked to poverty and inequality. 
                                                          
10 The recent UN report on integrated missions observes, "Only that which needs to be 
integrated should be integrated, and "asymmetric" models of integration may provide 
for deeper integration of some sectors than others"  (Eide et al. 2005). 
11 Integrity is a value recognised in the draft constitution’s external action provisions: "a 
high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to safeguard 
its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity." (Article III-292 
para 2) (European Union 2004b). 
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New interfaces between security and development 
Jakkie Cilliers 
Summary 
Post-conflict reconstruction is understood as a complex system that pro-
vides for simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term programmes to 
prevent disputes from escalating, avoid a relapse into violent conflict and 
to build and consolidate sustainable peace. Post-conflict reconstruction is 
ultimately aimed at addressing the root causes of a conflict and to lay the 
foundations for social justice and sustainable peace. Post-conflict recon-
struction systems proceed through three broad phases, namely the emer-
gency phase, the transition phase and the development phase; however, 
they should not be understood as absolute, fixed, time-bound or having 
clear boundaries. Post-conflict reconstruction systems have five dimen-
sions: (1) security; (2) political transition, governance and participation; 
(3) socio-economic development; (4) human rights, justice and reconcilia-
tion; and (5) coordination, management and resource mobilisation. These 
five dimensions need to be programmed simultaneously, collectively and 
cumulatively to develop momentum to sustainable peace. 
While there are processes, phases and issues that can be said to be com-
mon to most countries emerging from conflict, one should recognise the 
uniqueness of each conflict system, in terms of its own particular socio-
economic and political history, the root causes and immediate conse-
quences of the conflict an the specific configuration of the actors that 
populate the system.  Further, as most intra-state conflicts in Africa are 
interlinked within regional conflict systems, country specific post-conflict 
reconstruction systems need to seek synergy with neighbouring systems to 
ensure coherence across regional conflict systems.   
The nexus between development, peace and security have become a cen-
tral focus of post-conflict reconstruction thinking and practice over the last 
decade. The key policy tension in the post-conflict setting appears to be 
between economic efficiency and political stability. While the need and 
benefits of improved coherence is widely accepted, there seems to be no 
consensus on who should coordinate, what should be coordinated and how 
coordination should be undertaken. 
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1 Introduction 
During 2004 and 2005 the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) supported 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Governance, 
Peace and Security Programme in the development of what is now known 
as the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework.1 Although 
not yet fully integrated into the African Union, that framework sets out an 
African agenda for post-conflict reconstruction and an effort to ensure that 
peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict 
reconstruction systems in Africa are directed towards a common objective. 
This presentation is entirely based on the African Post-Conflict Recon-
struction Policy Framework of NEPAD. 
Obviously, each country’s transition from conflict to peace should be 
informed by its own particular circumstances. Each specific post-conflict 
reconstruction system emerges in response to that conflict system’s spe-
cific set of circumstances and it will thus be unique in its composition, 
prioritisation, timing and sequencing. At that same time, there are recur-
rent phases, dimensions and processes that are common to most, if not all, 
post-conflict reconstruction systems. 
For the purposes of the following remarks, post-conflict reconstruction can 
be understood as a complex system that provides for simultaneous short-, 
medium- and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, 
avoid a relapse into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustain-
able peace. 
Post-conflict reconstruction starts when hostilities end, typically in the 
form of a cease-fire agreement or peace agreement. It requires a coherent 
and coordinated multidimensional response by a broad range of internal 
and external actors, including government, civil society, the private sector 
and international agencies. These various actors undertake a range of inter-
related programmes that span the security, political, socio-economic and 
reconciliation dimensions of society and that collectively and cumulatively 
addresses both the causes and consequences of the conflict and, in the 
long-term, establishes the foundations for social-justice and sustainable 
peace and development. In the short term post-conflict reconstruction is 
                                                          
1 See: http://www.iss.org.za (June 2005). 
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designed to assist in stabilising the peace process and prevent a relapse 
into conflict, but its ultimate aim is to address the root causes of a conflict 
and to lay the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace. 
2 Post-conflict reconstruction phases 
There seems to be a general agreement that most post-conflict reconstruc-
tion systems proceed through three broad phases, namely the emergency 
phase, the transition phase and the development phase. These phases 
should not be understood as absolute, fixed, time-bound or having clear 
boundaries. Some countries that form part of a regional conflict system 
may be in different phases of post-conflict reconstruction. Similarly, dif-
ferent geographic, ethnic, language or religious regions or groups within a 
country emerging from conflict are likely to be in different phases. Any 
phased approach should also allow for considerable overlap in the periods 
of transition between phases. Planning or analysis based on these phases 
should thus take into account that these phases are not based on causal or 
chronological progression, but are determined by a wide-range of complex 
feedback and reinforcement mechanisms. 
The emergency phase is the period that follows immediately after the end 
of hostilities and has a dual focus, namely the establishment of a safe and 
secure environment and an emergency response to the immediate conse-
quences of the conflict through humanitarian relief programmes. The 
emergency phase is characterised by the influx of external actors usually 
in the form of a military intervention to ensure basic security, and by hu-
manitarian actors responding to the humanitarian consequences of the 
conflict. 
If there is still a high degree of instability, the military intervention may 
take the form of a stability operation. Such stability operations are likely to 
be undertaken by one of the sub-regional brigades of the African Standby 
Force or a coalition of the willing. Once the situation has been sufficiently 
stabilised, or if it was relatively secure from the onset of the cease-fire, the 
military force could form part of a multi-dimensional peace operation 
deployed by the African Union (AU) or the UN. 
The humanitarian actors will typically include various elements of the UN 
System, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a wide 
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range of humanitarian donor agencies and NGOs. The emergency response 
will be coordinated by UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) supported by 
the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). If a UN 
peace operation is deployed the HC is likely to be one of the Deputy Spe-
cial Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSG). 
Preparations will be underway for medium-term rehabilitation and recov-
ery and longer-term development actions and it is likely that some form of 
needs assessment process will be undertaken during the emergency phase, 
often culminating in an international donor conference. Internal actors are 
typically pre-occupied with basic survival and the re-organisation of their 
social and political systems. As a result external actors often play a promi-
nent role during the emergency phase but they should nevertheless seek 
every opportunity to involve and consult with internal actors. Depending 
on the situation the emergency phase typically ranges from 90 days to a 
year. 
The transition phase derives its name from the transition from an ap-
pointed interim government, followed by, in the shortest reasonable pe-
riod, some form of election or legitimate traditional process to (s)elect a 
transitional government, constituent assembly or some other body respon-
sible for writing a new constitution or otherwise laying the foundation for 
a future political dispensation. The transitional stage typically ends with an 
election, run according to the provisions of the new constitution, after 
which a fully sovereign and legitimately elected government is in power. 
The transitional phase focuses on developing legitimate and sustainable 
internal capacity. The focus shifts from emergency relief to recovery, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. Programmes include efforts aimed at 
rehabilitation of basic social services like health and education, rebuilding 
the economic infrastructure, short-term job creation through labour inten-
sive public works, and establishing mechanisms for governance and par-
ticipation. The security sector is likely to be engaged in transforming the 
existing police, defence and other security agencies so that they can be-
come representative of the communities they serve and so that they are re-
orientated to their appropriate roles in the post-conflict environment. 
The relationship between the internal and external players should reflect a 
growing partnership and a gradual hand-over of ever-increasing responsi-
bility to the internal actors. There should be specific programmes aimed at 
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building the capacity of the internal actors. The transitional phase typically 
ranges from one to three years. 
The development phase is aimed at supporting the newly elected gov-
ernment and the civil society with a broad range of programmes aimed at 
fostering reconciliation, boosting socio-economic reconstruction and sup-
porting ongoing development programmes across the five dimensions of 
post-conflict reconstruction highlighted in the next section. 
The peace operation, and especially the military and police components, is 
likely to draw down and withdraw during the early stages of this phase. In 
the case of a UN peace operation there will be a transition of responsibili-
ties to the UN Country Team and internal actors. The roles and responsi-
bilities of the external actors will change from a post-conflict reconstruc-
tion posture back to a more traditional development posture in the latter 
stages of the sustainable development phase, in other words, the internal 
actors develop the capacity to take full responsibility for their own plan-
ning and coordination, and the external actors provide technical assistance 
and support. 
The post-conflict sustainable development phase typically ranges from 
four to ten years, but the country is likely to continue to address conflict 
related consequences in its development programming for decades thereaf-
ter.  
The transition from one phase to the next is usually determined by the 
degree to which various conditions within each phase are met and the level 
of engagement required by the various actors at each level. However, these 
transitions are not linear and therefore programmes undertaken in one 
phase are likely to continue for a period into another phase. 
3 The dimensions of a post-conflict reconstruction  
 system 
Each post-conflict reconstruction system is determined by the interaction 
of the specific internal and external actors present, the history of the con-
flict and the processes that resulted in some form of peace agreement. 
Although the specific configuration of the post-conflict reconstruction 
system will be unique, it is possible to identify a broad framework of di-
mensions, phases and issues that appear to be common to most post-
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conflict reconstruction systems. There seems to be general agreement that 
post-conflict reconstruction systems contain the following five dimen-
sions: (1) security; (2) political transition, governance and participation; 
(3) socio-economic development; (4) human rights, justice and reconcilia-
tion; and (5) coordination, management and resource mobilisation. A 
broad range of programme areas within each dimension is provided in 
chart 1. 
The security dimension is responsible for ensuring a safe and secure envi-
ronment that will enable the civilian humanitarian actors to undertake 
emergency relief, recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration operations 
which will prepare the ground for full-fledged reconstruction programmes. 
In the transitional phase the emphasis gradually shifts to security sector 
reform aimed at the development of appropriate, credible and professional 
internal security services. Programmes include security sector review, 
reform and transformation; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR); small arms reduction strategies, and enhancing regional security 
arrangements. 
The political transition, governance and participation dimension in-
volves the development of legitimate and effective political and adminis-
trative institutions, ensuring participatory processes, and supporting politi-
cal transition. Aside from facilitating elections, programmes include 
strengthening public sector management and administration; establishing a 
representative constituting process; reviving local governance; strengthen-
ing the legislature; broadening the participation of civil society in deci-
sion-making process, and building the capacity of political parties and 
civil society for effective governance while giving former rebel groups a 
chance to turn themselves into viable political parties if they so wish. 
There is typically a focus on engendering a culture of rule of law based on 
existing or newly formulated constitutions, by supporting justice sector 
reform and related institutions. The transition phase should focus on the 
need to ensure plurality and inclusiveness, dialogue and the participation 
of all constituencies and stakeholders. During the development phase it is 
important to encourage and develop broad-based leadership at all levels; to 
build a shared purpose for the nation; to develop national capacity in terms 
of skills, mobilisation of resources and reviving national infrastructure; to 
promote good political and economic governance; develop checks and 
balances to measure progress; and finally, to institute a culture of long-
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term assessment of the impact of post-conflict reconstruction activities and 
programmes. 
The socio-economic development dimension covers the recovery, reha-
bilitation and reconstruction of basic social and economic services as well 
as the return, resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of populations 
displaced during the conflict including refugees and IDPs. This dimension 
needs to focus on an approach that ensures effective dynamic linkages 
between activities related to the provision of emergency humanitarian 
needs and longer-term measures for economic recovery, sustained growth 
and poverty reduction. It is also crucial that balance is struck on the rela-
tionship between social capital and social cohesion at all stages of the 
post-conflict reconstruction process. Programmes to be implemented in 
this dimension include emergency humanitarian assistance; rehabilitation 
and/or reconstruction of physical infrastructure; provision of social ser-
vices such as education, health, and social welfare; and enhancing eco-
nomic growth and development through employment generation, trade and 
investment, and legal and regulatory reform. 
The human rights, justice, and reconciliation dimension is concerned 
with ensuring accountable judicial systems, promoting reconciliation and 
nation building, and enshrining human rights. Programmes include justice 
sector reform and establishing the rule of law; promoting national dialogue 
and reconciliation processes such as truth and reconciliation commissions, 
and monitoring human rights. A point often raised is the need to make 
definitions of human rights, justice and reconciliation accessible to all 
through the use of local languages and include these concepts in school 
curricula. A system, which accommodates both restorative and retributive 
justice, is recommended for Africa, which focuses on African values and 
includes African traditional mechanisms for conflict prevention, manage-
ment and resolution. Post-conflict reconstruction programmes within this 
dimension should also ensure creating an environment conducive to peace, 
justice and reconciliation; increasing the involvement of women at all 
levels; reparations, and providing participatory processes which include 
vulnerable groups. There is the need to rebuild trust and cross cutting 
social relationships which span across religious, ethnic, class, geographic 
and generational cleavages in war-torn societies. This is an investment in 
social capital which underlies the ability of a society to mediate everyday 
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conflicts before they become violent conflicts, and through building state-
people relationships it advances social cohesion. 
Coordination, management and resource mobilisation are cross-cutting 
functions that are critical for the successful implementation of all the di-
mensions and the coherence of the post-conflict reconstruction system as a 
whole. All these dimensions are interlinked and interdependent. No single 
dimension can achieve the goal of the post-conflict reconstruction system 
– addressing the consequences and causes of the conflict and laying the 
foundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on its own. The suc-
cess of each individual programme in the system is a factor of the contri-
bution that this programme makes to the achievement of the overall post-
conflict reconstruction objective. It is only when the combined and sus-
tained effort proves successful in the long term that the investment made 
in each individual programme can be said to have been worthwhile. 
Coordination entails developing strategies, determining objectives, plan-
ning, sharing information, the division of roles and responsibilities, and 
mobilising resources. Coordination is concerned with synchronizing the 
mandates, roles and activities of the various stakeholders and actors in the 
post-conflict reconstruction system and achieves this through joint efforts 
aimed at prioritisation, sequencing and harmonisation of programmes to 
meet common objectives. 
4 Conclusion 
The nexus between development, peace and security have become a cen-
tral focus of post-conflict reconstruction thinking and practice over the last 
decade. The key policy tension in the post-conflict setting appears to be 
between economic efficiency and political stability. The need for, and 
benefits of, improved coherence is widely accepted today in the interna-
tional multilateral governance context. 
Although approximately twenty countries have experienced some form of 
post-conflict reconstruction intervention over the last decade, no generic 
coordination model has yet emerged that can be further developed and 
refined for future intervention. One reason why coherence has proven so 
elusive is the lack of a shared understanding of the role of coordination. 
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Some external actors see coordination as a vehicle to bring order among 
the many different agencies whilst others resist coordination because they 
associate it with losing control over their own independence. The common 
refrain is that everybody wants to coordinate but no one wants to be coor-
dinated. Whilst it is recognised, on the one hand, that coordination is cru-
cial if we want to achieve coherence in the complex multidimensional 
post-conflict reconstruction environment, on the other, there seems to be 
no consensus on who should coordinate, what should be coordinated and 
how coordination should be undertaken. 
The lack of coherence between programmes in the humanitarian relief and 
development spheres and those in the peace and security spheres have 
been highlighted by various recent evaluation reports and best practice 
studies. For example, the Joint Utstein Study of peacebuilding, that ana-
lyzed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the last decade, has identi-
fied a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what it terms a "strategic 
deficit", as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding. The 
Utstein study found that more than 55 % of the programmes it evaluated 
did not show any link to a larger country strategy. 
Thus, one of the crucial prerequisites for a coherent post-conflict recon-
struction system is a clearly articulated overall strategy against which 
individual programmes can benchmark their own plans and progress. The 
overall post-conflict reconstruction strategy is the strategic direction of the 
operation, taken as a whole, as produced by the cumulative and collective 
planning efforts of all the programmes and agencies in the system. There 
is a need to bring all the current strategic planning and funding processes 
together into one coherent overall country level strategic framework so 
that the political, security, humanitarian and development aspects of the 
overall post-conflict reconstruction system are synchronised and coordi-
nated. Such and overall strategic framework needs to be linked to a moni-
toring and evaluation system so that the various dimensions, sectors and 
programmes that make up the system can adjust their plans according to 
the feedback received from others on progress made or setbacks experi-
ences elsewhere in the system. 
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Chart 1: Goals within each element during the three phases of post- 
 conflict reconstruction 
 Emergency 
Phase 
Transition Phase Development 
Phase 
Security Establish a safe 
and secure 
environment 
Develop legiti-
mate and stable 
security institu-
tions 
Consolidate local 
capacity 
Political Transi-
tion, Govern-
ance, and Par-
ticipation 
Determine the 
governance 
structures, foun-
dations for 
participation, 
and processes 
for political 
transition 
Promote legiti-
mate political 
institutions and 
participatory 
processes 
Consolidate 
political institu-
tions and partici-
patory processes 
Socio-economic 
Development 
Provide for 
emergency 
humanitarian 
needs 
Establish foun-
dations, struc-
tures, and proc-
esses for devel-
opment 
Institutionalise 
long-term devel-
opmental pro-
gramme 
Human Rights, 
Justice and Rec-
onciliation 
Develop mecha-
nisms for ad-
dressing past 
and ongoing 
grievances 
Build the legal 
system and 
processes for 
reconciliation 
and monitoring 
human rights 
Establish a func-
tional legal sys-
tem based on 
accepted interna-
tional norms 
Coordination 
and Manage-
ment 
Develop consul-
tative and coor-
dination mecha-
nism for internal 
and external 
actors 
Develop techni-
cal bodies to 
facilitate pro-
gramme devel-
opment 
Develop internal 
sustainable pro-
cesses and capac-
ity for coordina-
tion 
Source: Self-compiled from AUSA / CSIS 2002 
  
     German Development Institute 103
    Jakkie Cilliers 
C
ha
rt
 2
: 
Ph
as
es
 a
nd
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 o
f p
os
t-c
on
fli
ct
 r
ec
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
                 
H
um
an
ita
ria
n 
re
lie
f 
an
d 
fo
od
 a
id
 
 
R
es
et
tle
m
en
t o
f 
ID
Ps
 a
nd
 re
fu
ge
es
 
 
M
in
e 
ac
tio
n 
pr
o-
gr
am
m
es
* 
 
D
em
ob
ili
sa
tio
n 
an
d 
re
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
of
 e
x-
co
m
ba
ta
nt
s*
 
 
* 
Pr
ep
ar
at
io
n 
m
ay
 
be
gi
n 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 
wh
ile
 im
pl
em
en
ta
-
tio
n 
is 
se
qu
en
ce
d 
an
d 
in
 so
m
e 
ca
se
s 
m
ay
 c
ar
ry
 o
n 
in
 a
ll 
3 
sta
ge
s 
Pe
ac
e 
an
d 
 
Se
cu
rit
y 
E
M
E
R
G
EN
C
Y
 
TR
A
N
SI
TI
O
N
 
D
EV
E
LO
PM
EN
T
N
at
io
na
l u
ni
ty
 a
nd
 
re
co
nc
ili
at
io
n 
 
R
eh
ab
ili
ta
tio
n 
of
 
ph
ys
ic
al
 in
fr
as
tru
c-
tu
re
 
 
R
eb
ui
ld
in
g 
an
d 
m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 k
ey
 
so
ci
al
 in
fr
as
tru
ct
ur
e
 
R
es
to
ra
tio
n 
of
 m
ai
n 
pr
od
uc
tiv
e 
se
ct
or
s
 
R
es
to
ra
tio
n 
of
 m
ac
-
ro
ec
on
om
ic
 st
ab
ili
ty
Es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
po
lit
ic
al
 le
gi
tim
ac
y 
 
R
ec
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
of
 
fr
am
ew
or
k 
of
  
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
 
Im
pl
em
en
t e
co
no
m
ic
 
re
fo
rm
s 
 
B
ro
ad
 b
as
ed
 p
ar
tic
ip
a-
tio
n 
an
d 
co
ns
en
su
s 
bu
ild
in
g  
Ec
on
om
ic
  
R
ec
ov
er
y 
Po
lit
ic
al
  
A
ut
ho
rit
y 
D
om
es
tic
 a
nd
 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
R
es
ou
rc
e 
M
ob
ili
sa
tio
n
G
ro
up
 
So
lid
ar
ity
/  
R
eb
ui
ld
in
g 
So
ci
al
 C
ap
ita
l
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
as
si
st
an
ce
/  
ex
te
rn
al
 a
id
 
Jakkie Cilliers 
 German Development Institute 104
Bibliography 
Adebajo, A. / C. L. Sriram (eds.) (2001): Managing Armed Conflict in the 21st 
Century, London: Frank Cass Publishers 
Ake, C. (1996): Democracy and Development in Africa, Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution 
Amoo, S.G. (1992): The OAU and African Conflicts: Past Successes, Present Pa-
ralysis and Future Perspectives, Washington, DC: Institute of Conflict Analy-
sis and Resolution, George Mason University 
AUSA (Association of the U.S. Army) / CSIS (Centre for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies) (2002): Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework, 
Washington, DC 
Borton, J. (2004): The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, in: 
Humanitarian Exchange 26/2004, London: Humanitarian Practice Network 
Chesterman, S. (2004): You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Admini-
stration, and State-Building, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Colletta, N. J. / M. L. Cullen (2000): Violent Conflict and the Transformation of 
Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia, 
Washington D.C: World  Bank 
Collier, P .et al. (2003): Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development 
Policy, Washington, DC: World Bank 
Coning, C. de (2004): Coordination is Not a Four Letter Word: Towards Coher-
ence between Peace, Security and Development Dimensions of Peacebuilding 
Operations, paper delivered at the 17th Academic Council of the United  Na-
tions Annual Meeting, Geneva (Switzerland), 30 June–2 July 2004, mimeo 
Griffin, M. / B. Jones (2001): Building Peace through Transitional Authority: New 
Directions, Major Challenges, in: A. Adebajo / C. L. Sriram (eds.), Managing 
Armed  Conflicts in the 21st Century, London: Frank Cass, 75–90 
Johnson, C. (2002): The Strategic Framework Review: lessons for post-Taliban 
Afghanistan, in: Humanitarian Exchange 20/2002, London: Humanitarian 
Practice Network 
Jones, B. (2001): The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposi-
tion  and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars, 
New York: International Peace Academy (IPA  Policy Series on Peace Im-
plementation) 
OED (Operations Evaluation Department) (1999): Aid Coordination and the Role 
of the World Bank: An OED Review, Washington, DC: World Bank 
New interfaces between security and development 
German Development Institute  105
Patrick, S. (2000): The Donor Community and the Challenge of Post-Conflict 
Recovery, in: S. Forman / S. Patrick (eds.), Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid 
for  Post-Conflict Recovery, Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner (Center on Interna-
tional Cooperation Studies in multilateralism), 35–65 
   
Addressing the security-development nexus: implications for joined-up government 
German Development Institute  107
Addressing the security-development nexus:  
implications for joined-up government1 
Ann M. Fitz-Gerald 
Summary 
The coming together of security and development forces has introduced 
new approaches supporting both the analysis and implementation of these 
programmes. Empirical evidence supported by the World Bank-
commissioned study "Voices of the Poor" confirms that the two disciplines 
are both mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing. Broader conclu-
sions have suggested that bilateral and multilateral institutions are re-
sponding to this research agenda by undergoing reforms that create a bet-
ter enabling environment supporting the "security-development" nexus. 
So too, has the greater donor community been encouraged to adopt policy, 
tools and a range of other outputs produced from this debate. Such activi-
ties have helped encourage more widespread thinking on these issues and 
have allowed for an international consensus amongst key implementing 
agents. Policy tools supporting "joined-up thinking" on security and de-
velopment include security sector reform (SSR), small arms and light 
weapons (SALW) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR), are also undergoing parallel development. This article applauds 
such initiatives, but cautions the reader on the extent to which incomplete 
"joined-upness" may actually impair the implementation of these policies 
and strategies. 
The article reflects on the recent experiences of the Dutch, Canadian, UK 
and US Governments. It unpacks areas for concern which are common to 
all donors, including the degree to which individual countries remain 
committed to Official Development Assistance (ODA) guidelines; the 
careful balance that must be struck between the more enhanced participa-
tion of international development agencies in defence and security-related 
fora, with the necessity to, at times, distance themselves and retreat to a 
                                                          
1  This is an up-dated and condensed version of an article published in: Policy Matters 5 
(5), July 2004, 2–24. 
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position of independent status; the degree to which development constitu-
encies are permitted to develop as a cabinet level function in donor coun-
tries and decisions required to disperse funds from a "joined-up" pool of 
resources.       
1 Introduction 
The provision of donor assistance to most post-conflict transitional coun-
tries repeatedly encounters problems due to conflicting approaches be-
tween external and internal actors. Recent interventions in Bosnia, Haiti, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone and other African countries have exposed 
gaps between the approaches used by western donor countries and multi-
lateral donor organisations, and the expectation, willingness and ability of 
the recipient countries to implement donor programmes in a way which 
contributes to a sustainable peace. While criticism is often pointed towards 
uninformed donor approaches that do not fully appreciate local conditions, 
and policy instruments that do not reflect local realities, a degree of blame 
must also be accepted by certain internal stakeholder groups that pose 
difficulties to the process. It is at this second level that the greatest chal-
lenge remains, as widescale intervention strategies which respond to a 
country’s security and development issues require local ownership across 
all sectors. Subscribing to this level of ownership, particularly in transi-
tions from authoritarian regimes to democratic governance, can involve a 
complete transformation in cultural mindset and indigenous norms. Clos-
ing this gap requires a more focused commitment towards tailoring exter-
nal donor instruments to local realities and identifying only the feasible 
entry strategies which, when achieved, could help encourage compliance 
and support for others. 
Pursuing this more realistic piecemeal approach to overseas assistance is 
in no way meant to encourage a bottom-up, as opposed to a top-down, 
strategy. Selected entry points must always be strategically planned 
against a more holistic national vision and endstate for the recipient coun-
try, even if initial support for all aspects of the strategy cannot be obtained. 
To this end, a number of other western donor countries have moved for-
ward in establishing more holistic policy instruments that reflect the need 
for security and development issues to be united in post-conflict peace-
building strategies. 
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"Joined-up’ government processes, however, are not without their prob-
lems. Moreover, the success of their joint intervention policies requires not 
only coalition and partner countries, but also recipient countries, to have 
the appropriate policy tools, approaches and mindsets to receive and work 
harmoniously with joined-up solutions. 
This paper will look at the centrality and the mutual inclusivity of the 
relationship between security and development in post-conflict interven-
tions. The notion of security sector reform will be explained as the new 
policy area that unites security and development in post-conflict states. 
The discussion will then review how this nexus impacts on the wider gov-
ernance agenda and describes how these ideas became the thrust behind 
the joined-up government concept. Several cases of joined-up government 
experiences will be explained to highlight the existing disparities between 
these joined-up approaches, as well as how these strategies have been 
received in-country. Lastly, the paper will identify challenges for these 
more unified donor approaches to be implemented coherently on the 
ground. Similarly, it will discuss potential strategies that could be used to 
garner more cooperation at the local level, which, if unobtainable, can 
render even the best joined-up strategy, useless. 
2 The security-development nexus 
The conceptual debate on the extent to which the international community 
requires comprehensive solutions to its intervention strategies has ad-
vanced at an astonishing rate.  The post-Cold war era saw the rise of "new 
wars" and "second dimensional peacekeeping", both of which involved 
smaller-scale conflicts which required "softer" approaches to military 
monitoring in order to sustain secure and stable environments. The debate 
then intensified in the "complex humanitarian emergency" era, during 
which the link between disaster, defence and development was loosely 
articulated. The argument was that, in this era of new wars and internal 
conflicts, any conventional man-made or natural disaster could immedi-
ately become "complex" if it occurred in a collapsed or failing state whose 
frail infrastructure could not remedy the damage or cope with the impact. 
The disaster could then become "humanitarian" in nature if it displaced a 
significant percentage of the population and rendered them homeless; 
indeed, the situation would become exacerbated if the displaced groups 
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migrated across borders or wandered into unstable areas inhabited by 
lawless gunmen, or warlords. 
Whilst the concept created a new understanding of "civil-military coopera-
tion" (CIMIC), and could be applied during a fairly tranquil environment, 
it fell short of addressing pre-conflict vulnerabilities. The debate on con-
flict prevention came to dominate overseas development agendas. The 
World Bank-commissioned study "Voices of the Poor", empirically 
proved to the western world that the number one priority for people living 
in impoverished areas was security, and ranked just as high, and in many 
cases higher, than access to both food and shelter (World Bank 1999/ 
2000). 
Thus, security was required for development and development was re-
quired for security. The discourse was coined a "circular argument" out of 
which many countries could not escape.2 However, upon further examina-
tion, two levels of analysis gave this argument more clarity. At the state 
level, the provision of state security was necessary for human development 
and at the individual level, local "grass-roots" security provisions were 
essential to promote confidence in the state structures. Without the latter, 
the former would fail to be comprehensive in its quest for human and 
national development. In some countries, this disproportionate distribution 
of security has led to regional collapse within the peripheral rural areas 
that eventually permeates the urban centres. This phenomenon has been 
observed recently in both Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
where rebel groups situated far from government capitals eventually make 
their way to these centres in a final attempt to overthrow, or be heard by, 
the central authorities (Anonymous 2004a).  
In many developing countries and failing states, security provisions are 
extended only to elitist groups, and the gap that widens between the elite 
and the masses often triggers a spiral of heightened security measures that 
favour the governing regime, its extended families and commercial inter-
ests. A completely segregated society results in pockets of dissatisfaction 
that generate demand for alternative sources of security. Having estab-
lished power in their regions, the agenda of these alternative security 
forces then becomes highly politicized. Support is sought to govern larger 
                                                          
2  Based on discussions with members of Senior Officers from the Ethiopian Ministry of 
National Defence (EMOND), 13 February 2004, Addis Ababa.  
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regions and overthrow political regimes. Such was the case in Sierra 
Leone and Haiti, and previously in Burma and Argentina. The other con-
ventional outcome is the creation of internal divisions within the state that 
informally demarcate borders dividing two or more ruling systems. 
Charles Taylor’s former rule over "Taylorland", or the northern part of 
Liberia, which contained all sources of national wealth, serves as a good 
example. 
There was no dispute over the linkages and inter-dependencies between 
security and development. Its acknowledgement encouraged official de-
velopment assistance programmes to address these two concepts in a more 
comprehensive way. Policy that shaped the way in which official devel-
opment funds would be disbursed began to formally recognize the need for 
a wider approach to addressing a development and security nexus in order 
to yield more effective and longer-lasting solutions on which these funds 
were spent. 
Over the past three years, the linkages between conflict, poverty, security 
and development became widely accepted by donors and civil society 
groups. The United Kingdom, and soon after other bilateral and multilat-
eral donor organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European 
Union (EU), and the Dutch Government, took the lead in expressing these 
inter-relationships in a more user-friendly way that gave rise to a new 
sound-bite called Security Sector Reform. Other donor countries, such as 
Canada, and the Scandinavian countries, interpreted the union between 
security and development as a step closer to understanding the wider hu-
man security debate, which served as a more expanded concept of security 
sector reform. Security within the human security context was that which 
impacted elements such as a country’s economic security and social secu-
rity and beyond measures that merely allowed people to go about their 
daily lives in a safe and secure way. 
3 Security sector reform: where security and  
 development meet 
Security sector reform (SRR) recognized that, particularly during post-
conflict transitions, states suffered from a lack of democratic and profes-
sional security forces that required re-building, transforming or reforming 
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immediately following the end of a conflict. These extended security 
forces not only included the military, but also the police and the law en-
forcement agencies, the intelligence forces, the judicial system, the legisla-
tive functions and oversight mechanisms. "Professionalism" became the 
key word, which acknowledged the dual thinking that one could not have a 
well-trained, operationally effective armed forces if it did not have control 
of them and, conversely, that a well-monitored, financially efficient de-
fence institution was futile without a combat-capable armed force that 
could serve as a key instrument of foreign policy. 
The debate on SRR forged ahead without entirely appreciating the diver-
sity of issues it embraced and the multitude of reform agendas across dif-
ferent regions.  The United Kingdom’s thinking on this concept has ad-
vanced most rapidly, due in large part to the efforts of the former Secretary 
of State for International Development, Clare Short (DFID 2003).   
Because the SRR debate spans a range of activities and issues which in-
volve practitioners, policymakers, and civil society – a range that now 
spans wider than a multi-tasked consolidated peace support operation – not 
surprisingly, evaluations and assessments that use these variables result in 
completely different findings in different countries. For example, while 
defence reform remains high on the agenda for many post-conflict and 
transitioning African countries, maritime security and policing issues su-
persede defence requirements in many Latin American and Caribbean 
regions.3 Thus, whilst different "entry points" may be identified for those 
providing external assistance, the more holistic frameworks wrapped 
around these lines of activity must also be appreciated at the earliest stage. 
Membership opportunities in Euro-Atlantic structures like NATO and the 
EU have encouraged the donor community’s recent efforts to reform the 
defence sector in Serbia and Montenegro (Judah 2001). However, until 
very recent efforts to ensure a more synchronized delivery of a security 
sector-wide approach in Belgrade, corruption and capacity problems 
                                                          
3  Based on a presentation given by a member of Trinidad and Tobago’s Office of the 
National Security Advisor at the Latin America and Caribbean Security Networking 
Symposium, held in Kingston, Jamaica, 20–23 April 2004. 
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within the police force, the interior ministry and the customs and border 
guard ran a dangerous risk of increasing exponentially.4 
Despite these failures, and many other unsuccessful efforts to tackle secu-
rity reforms in the context of a wider government agenda, lessons remain 
unlearned. Although a wider approach was taken in Sierra Leone, which 
drew on existing regional capacity to support national recovery and secu-
rity for the people, funds are still desperately required, and transitions that 
support less emphasis on a much improved security situation and more 
emphasis on developmental primacy must be provided. Elements of suc-
cessful experiences must also be used elsewhere in order to learn from the 
past. Recent efforts to tackle DDR in Liberia show very little evidence of 
importing lessons from neighbouring Sierra Leone – a DDR programme 
that, in the end, was relatively successful.   
4 Approaches used by external actors  
Undertaking forecasting and analysis, and defining feasible entry points 
for security sector reform, all refer to work carried out at the operational 
level. Policy makers and practitioners both contribute to this level of 
analysis. Beyond it, however, are the indigenous groups and local con-
stituencies who must be prepared to lead such reform and reconstruction 
programmes with a view towards sustained democratisation and profes-
sionalism. Sitting above these operational tasks, are the more macro stra-
tegic-level issues that shape the entire national framework of the benefici-
ary country and, therefore, the policies of those countries providing for-
eign assistance. 
Elevating the analysis to the strategic level provides more clarity with 
regards to the relationship between security and development, and the 
relationship both elements have with the overall governance agenda. Both 
security and development are "enablers" for a country’s foreign and do-
mestic policy agendas. These policy agendas are based on the environment 
in which a country exists and how the country prioritizes the way in which 
it responds to the given environment. Whilst strategic environments 
                                                          
4   Based on a UK-government commissioned scoping study carried out by the author in 
December 2002. 
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change, national interests and core values of a country tend not to, except 
perhaps over generations. 
This observation is important and should influence the approaches of do-
nors and other external actors seeking to provide assistance to a given 
country. Too often, templates that correspond to western national interests 
and core values underpin programmes for external assistance.   
5 Merging the disciplines: the introduction of "joined-up  
 government"  
Activities that emerge where security and development forces meet un-
doubtedly require joint and comprehensive planning, which includes all 
security relevant government departments.   
For the United Kingdom, this has primarily included the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the 
Department for International Development (DFID), all of which have 
formally come together under the Global Conflict Prevention Pool follow-
ing a government-wide review of conflict prevention work. This aimed to 
encourage different departments working in similar areas to cooperate 
more closely as part of the joined-up initiative. The review concluded that 
the UK’s contribution to conflict prevention "could be even more effective 
if it was coordinated across departmental boundaries" (DFID / FCO / 
MOD 2003, 6).  
In response to the review, the UK set up two conflict prevention "pools": 
the Africa Pool, which covers sub-Sahara Africa, and the Global Conflict 
Prevention Pool, which covers the rest of the world. The aim of the Pools 
is to integrate UK policy-making so that the three departments can develop 
shared strategies for dealing with conflict and make the practical pro-
grammes they fund as effective as possible (ibid.). The emphasis on joint 
working is reflected in the fact that the three departments now share a 
demanding Public Sector Agreement (PSA) target, which reads as follows: 
"Improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention 
and management, as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of 
people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in 
the potential sources of conflict, where the UK can make a significant 
contribution" (ibid., 7). 
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Both Pools are overseen by Cabinet committees and are managed at work-
ing level by a joint steering team made up of officials from each depart-
ment who agree on priorities, budgets and management. They comprise 
geographical (i.e. Balkans, Middle East and North Africa, India and Paki-
stan), international strategies (i.e. European Union, Organization for Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe, UN), thematic strategies (Security Sector 
Reform, Small Arms and Light Weapons), as well as an additional "quick 
response fund" that accommodates activities that fall within the Global 
Pool’s remit but which do not fit into existing strategies.  
The joined-up approach to government has also reached Canadian shores. 
A commitment to the "3-D" model comprising defence, development and 
diplomacy has been articulated as Canada's three main instruments of 
foreign policy. Such a policy implies the cross-departmental cooperation 
between National Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Trade and 
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). During the 
recent opening of the Diplomatic Forum in Toronto, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Mr. Peter Harder described the model as a "second prior-
ity in the current transition [of government] that places greater emphasis 
on horizontal thinking."  
However, many have questioned whether or not the much-needed 3-D 
approach stops at indeed that: "thinking". In practice, there is no joined-up 
pool of resources from which to manage joined-up planning. Such an 
incomplete strategy precludes strategic thinking at the highest of levels, 
which, ironically, should be the primary aim of such an exercise. Without 
any resources, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(now separate departments, Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) and Depart-
ment of International Trade (DIT)) can exert minimal influence on CIDA. 
Similarly, while posing at the more "robust" end of the foreign policy 
spectrum, the lack of resources within the Department of National Defence 
precludes any long-term operational effectiveness. This point became only 
too evident in the recent commitment of Canadian troops to Haiti, which 
initially amounted to a duration of 90 days; an operation which has since 
been extended to 6 months under the auspices of a larger UN multinational 
effort (Anonymous 2004b). Incidentally, the initial 90-day pledge of 
troops was issued at the same time as reports suggesting that all branches 
of the Canadian military say they lack the resources for major international 
expeditions (Cox / Thanh Ha 2004).   
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Thus, as far as "3-D" goes, all this begs the question of who holds the 
security-development purse strings and whether or not a more centralized 
pool of resources is needed to support a "pooled" capability. At present, 
CIDA manages a multi-billion dollar discretionary fund that is restricted 
by two things. First of all, Canada’s membership in the OECD implies a 
commitment to the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) criteria (OECD 2001). These 
criteria include a remit to deliver development aid in a secure and safe 
environment and, arguably, are in need of serious revision that reflects the 
realities of failed and post-conflict states. Similarly, the strategic mantra 
governing CIDA speaks laudably about enhancing aid effectiveness 
through poverty reduction and by contributing to a more secure environ-
ment.  However, Canada’s involvement assumes some degree of absorp-
tive capacity within the recipient country of the aid, and a reasonable de-
gree of stability and security in order for it to carry out its programmes. 
This precludes involvement in anything but secure and stable theatres of 
operations, and poses frightening limitations on the use of the discretion-
ary fund for the "Defence" and "Diplomacy" pillars of "3-D". Thus, invest-
ing in vulnerable countries seems counter to the CIDA strategic agenda 
which, again, is underscored by the modalities of Canada’s recent decision 
to intervene in Haiti.  
However, all is not lost within the 3-D approach. The idea itself is encour-
aging shared discussions and analysis which is contributing to the growing 
international consensus on the utility of "joined-up" thinking. This has 
emerged not only from a recent "joint" scoping mission by all three de-
partments in Haiti but also from a similar approach taken towards Af-
ghanistan where the funding of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs) contributes to military reconstruction projects carried out within a 
"hearts and minds" operation using civil-affairs teams scattered throughout 
the country. However, the 3-D picture is still incomplete without the joint 
planning, joint policy, joint implementation and joint endstate. 
The Dutch Government's recently forged joined-up initiative has circum-
vented the dictatorial ODA eligibility criteria. This has involved the crea-
tion of a Stability Fund, which disposes of resources from the development 
budget (ODA) and the foreign policy budget (non-ODA). The aim of the 
Fund is to provide rapid and flexible support for activities that foster 
peace, security and development in countries and regions where violent 
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conflicts are threatening to erupt or have already erupted (Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003). The fund has the flexibility of being 
used in developed, transitioning and "richer developing" countries and can 
support peace processes, military peacekeeping capacity, security sector 
reform, small arms and light weapons and crisis management.5 The Dutch 
Government has stated specifically that the "fund will not result in the 
contamination of development cooperation” and that "if certain activities 
do not meet the OECD/DAC requirements for ODA, they will simply not 
be attributable to ODA" (ibid.).    
On the surface, the problem bound to confront the Dutch is the inevitable 
interface between "support for peace missions" and the deployment of 
Dutch military troops in peace missions, the latter of which will not be 
funded by the Stability Fund – not surprising since the Ministry of De-
fence has been excluded from the initiative. Such exclusion could also 
conflict with an ethical foreign policy approach, which is prepared to mili-
tarily support bilaterally-funded development and diplomacy initiatives. 
Indeed, the UK model of joined-up government is also not without its 
problems, many of which involve the different departmental motivations 
across the joined-up partnership. For example, under the Global Conflict 
Prevention Pool’s thematic strategy of SSR, a policy brief has been pub-
lished and endorsed by all ministers across departments (DFID 2003). 
Despite this, the UK Ministry of Defence continues to view SSR through 
the lens of conflict prevention vis-à-vis defence diplomacy and defence 
relations, both of which represent its strategic mantra that embraces SSR-
related activities.   
On the other hand, DFID evaluates everything against the backdrop of 
conflict prevention vis-à-vis poverty eradication, which serves as its over-
arching mandate. As a result, strategic disconnects emerge in certain areas. 
One recent example referred to by the former Assistant Director for Policy 
and Planning within the Ministry of Defence involved the military out-
reach programme in Central and East European countries.6 Because the 
programme enhanced interoperability with UK partners and strengthened 
defence relations, the Ministry of Defence quite comfortably labelled it as 
                                                          
5  For further information on the Stability Fund see: http://www.minbuza.nl. 
6  "Whitehall Security Sector Reform Policy Seminar", Church House, Westminster, 
London, 17–18 September, 2003.  
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a "joined-up" SSR activity. However, due to the lack of linkage with pov-
erty eradication, the DFID would not place it under the same description. 
Such classification becomes important when drawing on joined-up re-
sources and policy guidelines. 
In many other respects, the UK is farther ahead of the game strategically 
than its Dutch and Canadian counterparts. Its biggest challenge is over-
coming the tendency for each department to evaluate joined-up activities 
against their own single-departmental aims and instead view them against 
a new strategic set of joined-up policy criteria. Arguably, the Public Sector 
Agreement targets take care of this, however, such transformational 
change, which affects the conventional culture of each of these separate 
departments, almost requires a separate and complementary change man-
agement strategy to underpin the joined-up process. 
In the United States, however, the situation is somewhat bleaker. Follow-
ing the 2003 publication of National Security Adviser Dr. Condolezza 
Rice’s 2003 National Security Strategy7, many Washington policymakers 
were encouraged by the multiple references made to "inter-agency" coor-
dination and activity. Like the Canadian government, the conceptual syno-
nym that underscored this idea became Development, Defence and Diplo-
macy. Strategic thinkers should have been encouraged when such an initia-
tive became immediately reflected in one of the most strategic level policy 
instruments that viewed security in its broadest sense. However, these 
hopes were soon deflated when limited efforts to implement the inter-
agency activity became apparent at the operational level. 
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is not a Cabinet 
level function, and has not been elevated to one under the new inter-
agency strategy. As a result, the significantly large and capable department 
is still viewed as the poor "stepchild" of the State Department. Moreover, 
this phenomenon does not lend itself to the creation of a larger develop-
ment constituency. Only a fraction of USAID’s budget remains discretion-
ary, with the large majority of its spending requiring Congressional over-
sight. Discussions in Washington revealed that Congress tends to take this 
oversight role one step to far, and engages in "pork barrel politics" in a 
way that undermines the development community and the whole ethos 
                                                          
7  See http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. 
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behind development assistance. For example, approval for development 
assistance funds is often contingent on the job opportunities created for 
different congressional members’ constituencies. As a result, much of the 
development assistance budget comes back into the US and does not stay 
in the recipient country. 
At the same time, the State Department has almost marginalized the role 
of USAID as it creates new units for development assistance purposes.8 
This has made some bureaucrats in Washington fear that USAID’s role 
will become scaled down to humanitarian assistance only.9 The good news 
is that, because of their close structural relationship, the State Department 
and USAID do come together for the creation of joint task groups that 
respond to crises "du jour". But even these efforts are restricted at the 
operational level. Archaic approaches to programme design and a lack of 
funds for operational expenses, precludes significant programming where 
local ownership is central. Once again, programme managers in Washing-
ton have no choice but to recruit US expatriates to lead these efforts in 
country – an exercise that proves far more expensive than using a combi-
nation of USAID people and locally engaged employees and further con-
tributes to the "pork barrel politics".      
While a degree of coordination between the State Department and USAID 
exists at the policy level, albeit not at the operational level, there is a sig-
nificant gulf between these two departments and those responsible for 
Defence. Although in the wake of post-war Iraq, significant pressure has 
been placed on Secretary for Defence Donald Rumsfeld to give more con-
sideration to immediate post-conflict security vacuums and longer-term 
stability requirements, no formal coordination exists between the other 
departments which renders the Department of Defense’s (DOD) activities 
as quite reactionary, and not visionary. The recent decision by the gov-
ernment to create an Office for Conflict, Reconstruction and Stabilization 
(an immediate post-conflict deployable team equipped with a database of 
                                                          
8  The US State Department recently created the Millennium Countries Corporation 
(MCC) to oversee the Millennium Countries Activities, the latter of which involves 
providing assistance to an annual selection of countries in accordance with the objec-
tives set out for them by the MCC. Andrew Natsios, the Administrator for USAID, sits 
as a member on the MCC. 
9  Based on discussions with numerous USAID employees (USAID main offices, Federal 
Triangle, Washington, 6 May 2004).  
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experts that can be used for immediate deployment, depending on the 
initial assessment) is good, but will require the cooperation of the DOD in 
order for the unit to develop operational viability and credibility, as well as 
foster coordination in the field.    
The final impediment to an American joined-up government is the signifi-
cant change and, in many cases, complete reversal, of priorities from one 
administration to the next. Prior to President Bush’s inauguration, the 
Clinton Administration managed its national security strategy through 
policy instruments known as "Presidential Directives on National Secu-
rity" (PDNS). Because these policy instruments only survive for the dura-
tion of the administration, unlike strategy documents or white papers that 
are more likely to survive successive transitions, developing longer-term 
joined-up solutions to international priorities becomes difficult.   
For reasons outlined in earlier sections, the inability to operationalize 
joined-up policy also remains an issue for the Canadian Government, due 
to current departmental procedural and budgetary issues. But being too 
quick to replicate the UK Government’s approach may also put Canada 
into an awkward position that would conflict with its traditionally passive 
approach to donor funding. More specifically, joined-up approaches carry 
the implication that a country’s assistance policy abroad will seek to har-
monize the defence, development and diplomatic elements of a more stra-
tegic, longer-term assistance towards a sustainable endstate. This requires 
a more "hands-on" and bilateral approach taken by the intervening country – 
an approach that Canada, during the past decade, has not been able to 
demonstrate. 
For an effective, joined-up government approach to prevail, a country 
must first evaluate its foreign policy and determine what joined-up mecha-
nisms are required to achieve foreign policy goals or elements thereof. 
Careful thought must then be put into what government departments 
would be involved, as policy imperatives stemming from defence, diplo-
macy and development initiatives are very different from region to region. 
For example, in countries like Afghanistan, agricultural issues play an 
important role in wider security and development concerns and thus, in-
cluding an agricultural ministry in a joined-up government structure meant 
to address security and development, may be very acceptable and reflect 
national realities. For a country like Canada, border control, customs and 
immigration would all be priority areas affecting a joined-up policy on 
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national security, as would the economic dimension of trade with the 
United States.  
Clearly, the donor community cannot be all things to all people at all 
times. Limited resources preclude the indiscriminate and widespread use 
of national military, development and diplomatic assets except in regions 
where national interests are clearly at stake, or where surplus capacity 
exists to assist allies. However, any firm effort by one bilateral donor 
government should be mirrored by similar efforts from its partner govern-
ments and any multilateral donor organization to which it belongs. The 
absence of these contingencies could render joined-up policy and practice 
of limited utility with potential only in single-nation interventions. 
6 Working with partners 
This paper has so far addressed the centrality of security, development, the 
wider governance agenda and how these elements should impact the poli-
cies and approaches of external actors providing overseas assistance. It 
then described how this conceptual union has encouraged donor govern-
ments to restructure to provide much more coherent and comprehensive 
approaches for operationalizing this wider agenda. Whilst these interim 
efforts should be applauded, the benefits of joined-up policy instruments 
will not be fully realized unless partner governments and recipient states 
also bring the same approach to the table. 
As far as the recipient states are concerned, much depends on the state of 
their own security infrastructure, as well as the nature of the external assis-
tance. At one end of the spectrum, the "quick fixes" in collapsed states, 
described in earlier sections, must be supported by joint strategic planning 
between the security and development communities. The 2000 interven-
tion by the British forces in Sierra Leone serves as an example of a "quick 
fix" but one which was reasonably well-supported by plans for parallel 
programmes supporting wider governance issues. Although Iraq was not a 
failed state, the 2003 US-led intervention exposed no strategic planning 
contingencies across wider Washington offices aside from those within the 
Pentagon. This has huge implications for future coalition interventions if 
close allies, such as Canada and UK, go down the joined-up route without 
the US doing the same. 
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The other area of partner cooperation is that which is required between 
western donor governments and regional and sub-regional organizations in 
the southern hemisphere – arguably the regions into which most official 
development assistance is channelled. There are currently a number of 
regional and sub-regional organizations, which serve as the key mecha-
nisms to support the peace and security agendas in different parts of the 
world.  Organisations such as the African Union (AU), the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Caribbean Com-
munity (CARICOM) have not, until recently, been equipped with an ade-
quate resource base and decision-making frameworks to sanction and 
deploy regional peacekeeping missions. However, an organization like the 
Organization of American States (OAS), whose membership straddles 
both the northern and southern hemispheres, has proven reasonably useful 
for peacebuilding purposes in Haiti where it was able to draw on the riches 
of the north and the knowledge of the south. Had the joint UN-OAS mis-
sion in Haiti not been plagued by a dominant UN, such short-term expec-
tations and, as a result, a less than adequate outcome, an acceptable re-
gional solution to a regional problem may have developed. 
Strategies used in Sierra Leone, and most recently in the war-torn Darfur 
region of Sudan, provide examples of how interventions have become 
"regionalized". The provision of the Nigerian-dominated ECOWAS Moni-
toring Group (ECOMOG), whose troops were later absorbed under the UN 
Assistance Missions in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), together with sanctions 
imposed on Liberia, close cooperation with the Guinea Government, and 
the creation of an International Contact Group on Liberia – which included 
West African countries like Senegal and Nigeria – all contributed to a 
more "regionalized" effort. Another example is provided by the recent 
support given to the deployment of military monitors under the AU-led 
Ceasefire Commission, known as the CFC, to the Darfur region of Sudan, 
to monitor the political violence leading to severe levels of humanitarian 
crises. 
Thus, along with harmonizing inter-donor approaches, bolstering regional 
and sub-regional capacity is a critical element of any expanded "joined-
up" strategy to address the global peace and security agenda and reach 
overseas development assistance goals. The response to the resurgence of 
conflict in Haiti should have provided a clear case for regional organiza-
tions like CARICOM or the OAS to be engaged as the lead agent, but with 
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assistance from others. Like Africa, many Latin American and Caribbean 
countries cannot, even collectively, fund a large-scale military deploy-
ment, much less the work of indigenous civilian agencies. However, as 
these groups do bring the local knowledge that garners trust, more effort 
must be fuelled towards developing regional and sub-regional capacity for 
groups of states with direct national security interests in these conflict 
regions. In this case, and as long as funding allowed, interest would not 
wane as quickly as the impetus driving an international intervention – 
particularly in the most remote areas in Africa, which become quickly 
forgotten about. Moreover, developing countries would view the idea of 
external assistance much more favourably if their own regional governing 
bodies had a voice in how it was implemented.     
7 Conclusion 
This paper began with the premise that international strategies for the 
provision of donor assistance in post-conflict and transitioning states re-
quire more coherency at the planning and implementation levels. It re-
viewed the linkages between security and development, and the contribu-
tion this union makes to good governance. It also emphasised that, whilst a 
wide spectrum of tools existed to address security-development issues, 
each tool must think of the wider governance issues its separate contribu-
tions seek to support. These arguments were substantiated by examples of 
where inadequate stove-piped approaches from external actors undermined 
a longer-term sustainable solution. 
Lessons learned from these interventions, and the rise of the intellectual 
discourse on the security-development nexus, have provided the impetus 
for a number of bilateral donor governments to restructure their relevant 
departments to conform to more "joined-up" strategic objectives. The 
experiences of the UK, Dutch, Canadian and US governments were criti-
cally reviewed, with the conclusion that failure to overcome incomplete 
strategies for joined-up approaches will result not only in incoherent na-
tional interventions but also in disjointed multilateral interventions. 
Improved delivery mechanisms for impact-driven international assistance 
require well-informed funders who can think strategically, and who are 
willing to draw on regional capacity in order to support a regional solution 
to a regional problem. These strategies will help to close the gap between 
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the approaches of external and internal actors, as well as provide better 
suited policy instruments to address wider governance issues. This will not 
happen overnight – and for some partner countries, policies and ap-
proaches will change only in slow time and, in some cases, perhaps not at 
all 
In order to build an international consensus to support broader thinking 
and joined-up resources, bilateral actors should develop more effective 
strategies to influence and consult with partners whose national security 
interests are broadly similar in certain parts of the world. Moreover, they 
must do more to empower the regional and sub-regional organizations 
which have specific peace and security mechanisms and agendas that serve 
the needs of each area. Where resources remain a problem, donors should 
balance their contribution of overseas aid between empowering regional 
capacity to respond to regional problems (by developing closer links with 
organisations like the AU and CARICOM), and providing a more compre-
hensive effort where no operational capacity exists. This comprehensive 
effort should support institutional development and good governance, as 
well as training and technical assistance. Moreover, it should promote 
more "staying power" and focus in future multilateral engagements. 
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Converging the role of development policy and security 
policy? New approaches in Africa1 
Stephan Klingebiel 
Summary 
The relationship between development policy and security policy has 
undergone rapid changes over a period of only a few years. In Germany, 
as well as other donor countries, there was in the past a clearly recogniz-
able distance between development actors and military actors and between 
their respective tasks. This distance is shrinking. The new debate is impor-
tant for many developing countries and regions (e.g. Afghanistan), but is 
especially relevant to sub-Saharan Africa. 
Peace and security are at the top of the agenda for Africa. While they have 
been recognized in the past as among the most urgent challenges facing 
the continent, they have not previously gained the marked profile they are 
now assuming as a political priority for practical policy approaches and 
efforts both in and outside Africa. The basic parameters involved have 
shifted in the direction of greater visibility and a heightened political will 
to act. The African Union (AU), created in 2002, is most important for this 
new situation. However, the new peace and security architecture faces a 
number of challenges. Although the AU's ownership approach to peace 
and security is fundamentally correct, it contrasts sharply with African 
funding and implementation capacities. Ultimately, the AU will prove to 
be effective only if the relevant donors are prepared to support, and above 
all to fund, its policies. 
Interfaces between development policy and security policy are not a phe-
nomenon confined to Germany. The UN, for example, is increasingly 
interested in conducting comprehensive peace missions in Africa. Inte-
grated missions with civil and military components were first undertaken 
in Sierra Leone. Another important example is Britain, which established 
                                                          
1  A similar version of the article will be published in: Ulf Engel / Robert Kappel (eds.): 
Germany's Africa policy revisited: Interests, images and incrementalism, 2nd print,  
Münster: LIT 
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an Africa Conflict Prevention Pool in 2001. The British development, 
foreign and defence policies are contributing to this fund. 
Germany’s cross-policy approaches in Africa’s case cover different cate-
gories, such as strategic planning, funding and operational activities. It is 
important to stress that many of these efforts are made within a broader 
context of international approaches of the G8 and the European Union.  
An important effort as regards a German "whole-of-government" approach 
began with an action plan for "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolu-
tion and Post-Conflict Peace-Building". The action plan is an interminis-
terial exercise and was approved by the Cabinet in May 2004. Its objective 
is to develop the Federal Government’s capabilities and to make greater 
use of the foreign, security and development policies in civil crisis preven-
tion. One of its main aims is therefore coherent and coordinated action on 
the part of all state and non-state actors. Several parts of the plan are de-
voted to Africa. 
The new tendencies in Germany have led not to a merging of development 
and security concepts, but to a new relationship between the actors con-
cerned. This closer relationship also entails differences of view on a num-
ber of issues. 
1 Background to the ongoing discussion 
The context: Africa’s new peace and security architecture2 
The relationship between development policy and security policy has 
undergone rapid changes over a period of only a few years.3 In Germany, 
as well as in other donor countries, there was in the past a clearly recog-
nizable distance between development actors and military actors and their 
tasks. This distance is shrinking. In particular, the broad mandates of 
peacekeeping missions have led to numerous points of contact between 
civil and military tasks. Nowadays, peace missions face a range of more 
complex tasks related to the stabilization of state structures and reconstruc-
tion. In this context, development policy frequently, and increasingly, 
                                                          
2  For this chapter see Klingebiel 2005a. 
3  For an overview see Weiss 2005. 
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plays a crucial role and so finds itself in a growing number of situations 
where interfaces with military actors need to be developed and structured. 
Besides peace missions, development policy and military actors are 
achieving closer convergence and adopting a more complementary ap-
proach at several levels. This is true not only of the operational approach 
adopted "on site", but also of the headquarter and capital city levels, thus 
opening the way for joint planning (country-wide strategies, etc.) and 
agreement on common aims and providing a clear picture of where com-
plementary processes are feasible and viable in the achievement of shared 
goals in the operative area. 
The new debate is important for many developing countries and regions 
(e.g. Afghanistan), but is especially relevant to sub-Saharan Africa. There 
is a regional focus for several reasons. Despite some positive tendencies (a 
declining number of armed conflicts since the end of the 1990s, etc.), sub-
Saharan Africa continues to be the world region hardest hit by violent 
conflict and war. In addition, development assistance is generally an im-
portant resource basis for the countries of the region. Official development 
assistance (ODA) accounts for 55 % of all external resource flows into the 
region (Klingebiel 2005b). Consequently, the potential influence of the 
donor community is fairly high. A weak financial resource basis for peace 
and security policies also leads to heavy dependence on external actors in 
this field. Further reasons are a change in the outside perception of Africa's 
significance for international politics and the new dynamics with regard to 
the emerging peace and security architecture in Africa. Today relatively 
more attention is being paid to Africa's role in international relations than 
in the late 1980s, following the end of the Cold War and the onset of the 
mono-polar world.4 This increased interest is only partly due to ongoing 
efforts to reduce poverty (e.g. Millennium Development Goals – MDGs) 
and to redress structural shortcomings, especially in sub-Saharan Africa: it 
has far more to do with new political priorities in international relations. In 
the context of the new international security agenda, Africa has come to be 
seen as a continent that is relevant in security policy terms. Political struc-
                                                          
4  The 1998 bomb attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam served, for a 
time, to focus world attention on this dimension. Compared to other donor countries 
(such as Britain and France), German policy takes little interest in Africa. The reasons 
are discussed by Engel (2005). 
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tures and dynamics, factors bound up with stability and instability, have 
become a key issue for both political and research approaches to the conti-
nent. Against this background, Africa must be seen as developing into a 
continent on which increasing international capacities and financial contri-
butions for peace missions are concentrated. Around 75 % or almost 
2.9 billion US $ (annual budget 2004/2005) of United Nations peacekeep-
ing mission funding is spent on Africa. 
Peace and security are, moreover, at the top of the agenda for Africa. 
While they have been recognized in the past as among the most urgent 
challenges facing the continent, they did not gain the marked profile they 
are now assuming as a political priority for practical political approaches 
and efforts both in and outside Africa. The basic parameters involved have 
shifted in the direction of greater visibility and a heightened political will 
to act. However, the new architecture faces a number of challenges if it is 
to fulfil its peace and security mandate. They include question of legiti-
macy, conflicting agendas and resource and capacity constraints (see 
Powell 2005). 
The dynamics that Africa has developed on its own and the dynamics 
currently involved in external assistance for Africa are largely related to 
military capabilities. In the past there have been all too many indications 
that mechanisms put in place by African institutions themselves (e.g. the 
Organization of African Unity) or by the international community (e.g. 
United Nations, key states) are unwilling or unable to intervene militarily 
in extreme emergency situations to protect civilian populations. Further-
more, much serious doubt has been expressed about the raison d’être of 
military actions undertaken by African and external actors. 
The immediate significance of the new peace and security architecture is 
due to a number of factors. The creation of the African Union (AU) in 
2002 must be seen as a crucially important step in the development of a 
new peace and security architecture. In structural terms, the AU offers a 
set of new proactive conditions, whereas the Organization of African 
Unity, its predecessor, had a largely unsatisfactory record in the field of 
peace and security, owing to its inhibiting principles of sovereign equality 
and non-interference in the affairs of its member states. In connection with 
some positive developments at regional level and in conjunction with the 
NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) initiative, the AU is 
now seen as presenting a realistic "African reform programme" designed 
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to set new African political accents, while at the same time consciously 
seeking support from abroad. 
The new relationship between development and security policy 
The modern notion of security has helped to align the goals set in foreign, 
security and development policy. This convergence is reflected in such 
concepts as "expanded security", "human security" and "new security 
consensus" (see, for example, UN High-level Panel), which clearly break 
with the traditional and short-term image of security and stability. These 
new trends and the growing convergence of security and development are 
criticized in a number of cases. The "securitization" of development policy 
and the militarization of crisis prevention and conflict management strate-
gies are seen as one of the main threats in the ongoing debate.5 
The need for overarching strategies and measures in the areas of develop-
ment, foreign and security policy has grown for two reasons. First, devel-
opment policy has in recent years increasingly indicated that "development 
and security" are mutually dependent and that success in the development 
policy sector is not possible without "security" (in its multiple dimen-
sions). Consequently, security has become a key issue in development 
policy. In connection with both the AU and NEPAD, there is also a new 
consensus on the close interrelationship between security and develop-
ment. Security is generally acknowledged as being the main precondition 
for development (while development is a precondition for security). In 
some quarters the security dimension is given priority6 or armed conflict is 
expressly seen as one of the principal obstacles to the achievement of the 
MDGs in Africa.7 And the Africa strategy proposed by the Commission of 
the European Union (2005) has identified peace and security as the first 
prerequisite for achieving the MDGs (see Commission of the EU 2005). 
This will entail an increase in the responsibility for progress in develop-
ment that Africa itself is prepared to assume. 
                                                          
5  See, for example, Brock (2004) and Duffield in the present volume. 
6  The Chairperson of the AU Commission, Konaré, for instance, notes that "[s]ecurity is 
the African Union’s priority"; online: http://www.african-geopolitics.org/show.aspx?  
articleid=3669). 
7  For example, by Tidjane Thiam, Commissioner for Peace and Security on the UK-led 
Commission for Africa; online: http://www.odi.org.uk/speeches/africa2004/meeting_ 
9nov/print-friendly.html. 
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Second, the new international security agenda – as contained, for example, 
in the European Security Strategy (December 2003) – is based on current 
threats, suggesting that they can be effectively countered only if all exter-
nally oriented policies are closely coordinated and allotting to develop-
ment policy, among other measures, a central role in the establishment of 
viable civil structures. Viewed against the background of new threat sce-
narios, in the face of which the classic concepts of self-defence have lost 
much of their meaning, sub-Saharan Africa's crisis vulnerability is coming 
to play an increasingly important role here. The ESS points in particular to 
the interdependence of the problems involved:  
"Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many 
cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent con-
flict." (Council of the EU 2003,3) 
In Germany the debate likewise indicates a clear increase in the attention 
paid by overall German policy to Africa. Newly defined security parame-
ters form one of the leitmotivs of the German debate. Germany's increased 
interest in Africa has also found expression – among other things – in 
official high-level visits to Africa (as in 2004 by German Presidents Rau 
and Köhler, former German Chancellor Schröder and other members of 
the German government), during which the issues of peace and security 
have been high on the agenda. Stability and security have ranked high in 
recent German government documents dealing with Africa.8 The German 
Foreign Office notes that both Germany and the other European nations 
have an immediate interest in security-related stability in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Accordingly, military and civil conflict prevention are playing a 
growing role in cooperation with Africa. 
"As far as security policy is concerned, while sub-Saharan Africa is free 
of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and carrier systems, 
light and small arms […] continue to be widespread in African crisis 
regions. Every year they are used to kill a large number of people. For 
international terrorism, sub-Saharan Africa is both a target area for at-
tacks (e.g. Kenya and Tanzania), a base of operations, and, at least 
temporarily, a retreat area and training grounds for Islamist terrorists. 
                                                          
8  See, for example, the German Report on the Implementation of the G8 Africa Action 
Plan (Bundesregierung 2003), the German Foreign Office's Africa Strategy (Auswär-
tiges Amt 2003) and the Africa position paper issued by the Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (BMZ 2004a). 
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There is a great risk that African raw materials, from diamonds to gold 
to coltan, may fall into the hands of terrorists. Europe is furthermore 
faced with security problems resulting from state failure. The break-
down of the state's monopoly on the use of force goes hand in hand with 
the exercise of criminal power and the unobstructed use of force. The 
resulting migration flows are mainly directed toward Europe. Germany 
and the other European nations therefore have an immediate interest in 
security-related stability in sub-Saharan Africa. Military and civil con-
flict prevention are assuming more and more importance in cooperation 
with Africa. Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a 
joint effort of European Security and Defense policy, must be viewed in 
this context." (Auswärtiges Amt 2004,199 f.) 
2 Cross-policy-field and development-policy approaches  
 to providing support for African capacities  
Interfaces between development policy and security policy 
Interfaces between development policy and security policy are not a phe-
nomenon confined to Germany.9 The UN, for example, is increasingly 
interested in conducting comprehensive peace missions in Africa. Inte-
grated missions with civil and military components were first conducted in 
Sierra Leone; others have since been carried out in Angola, Burundi, Côte 
d'Ivoire and Liberia. The principal aim of these missions has been to pro-
vide targeted mutual support for development-related approaches (recon-
struction efforts, transformation of Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United 
Front into a political party, etc.) and coordinated peace missions with 
stabilization as their aim (see UN Secretary-General 2004, 8 f.; Weiss 
2005). Another important example is Britain, where an Africa Conflict 
Prevention Pool was established in 2001. By pooling resources of the 
Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) are 
able to act more coherently, and more effective policy is envisaged. The 
Canadian government uses the Canada Fund for Africa (established in 
2002) to support peace and security efforts in Africa (with the focus on 
West Africa and the African Union). At conceptual level, the OECD’s 
                                                          
9  For an overview of G8 activities see, for example, Ramsbotham / Bah / Calder 2005. 
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Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is increasingly discussing 
"whole-of-government" approaches. 
In general, interfaces between development policy and security policy can 
be placed in various categories (see Klingebiel / Roehder 2004). First, 
security and stability are required conditions for development policy. In 
most situations they are needed by development actors for their opera-
tional work. In many situations, they are dependent on military actors (e.g. 
peace missions). Second, strategic planning and conception is an important 
category for existing interfaces. It is relevant, for example, to interminis-
terial cooperation and mechanisms. Third, development policy and secu-
rity policy intersect where various funding dimensions are concerned. This 
category covers, for example, the funding of non-civil measures and mis-
sions and the pooling of external actors’ resources. Fourth, a number of 
interfaces exist at operational level (e.g. interministerial projects, coopera-
tion in training and capacity-building). 
Germany’s cross-policy approaches in Africa’s case cover all four catego-
ries. It is important to stress that many of these efforts are made within a 
broader context of international approaches. This is true of efforts within 
the G8 and the European Union (EU). During its 2002 summit at Kananas-
kis, Canada, the G8 adopted its Africa Action Plan, which provides, as one 
of the main priorities of its partnership with Africa, for support for African 
capacities to prevent and resolve armed conflict in Africa. In the Action 
Plan, the G8 commits itself to: 
"providing technical and financial assistance so that, by 2010, African 
countries and regional and sub-regional organizations are able to en-
gage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the con-
tinent, and undertake peace support operations in accordance with the 
United Nations Charter." 
At its summits in Evian, France, in 2003 and Sea Island, USA, in 2004, the 
G8 worked out new plans for implementing this objective. The G8 thus 
sees itself as a major driving force and supporter of the efforts currently 
being undertaken on the African continent. All in all, the G8 Africa Action 
Plan provides an important framework for Germany’s activities in the 
field. "Peace and security" is one of the key chapters of the German im-
plementation reports (Bundesregierung 2005) on the G8 Africa Action 
Plan. A number of aspects covered by the chapter feature joint develop-
ment and security policy approaches. 
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Joint German development and security policy approaches were uncom-
mon until the late 1990s, and this for several reasons. Historically, the two 
policies had overlapped conceptually in very few instances. Germany’s 
international military role was limited until the early 1990s. The rapid 
changes in its international role since the end of the Cold War and its re-
unification have led to a growing number of German military missions 
overseas. The former approach of defending Germany at its borders has 
changed dramatically. The new international security agenda and the new 
threats, identified, for example, by the European Security Strategy (2003), 
are endorsed by German defence policy. As former German Defence Min-
ister Peter Struck (Struck 2004, 22) has said: 
"If we fail to invest today in development and stability outside NATO 
and the European Union, in the Near and Middle East, the Caspian re-
gion, southern Asia, and parts of Africa, it will bounce back on us as a 
security problem in Europe and the U.S."  
At the same time, German development policy and its international con-
text have undergone a process of rapid change. Crisis prevention and con-
flict management were already established as new tasks for development 
policy in the mid- and later 1990s. However, there was always a strict 
conceptual and operational divide between developmental and other (in-
cluding non-civil) approaches. Development actors always saw develop-
ment cooperation as having a strong civil identity at some remove from 
military approaches. Traditionally, the majority of civil society in Ger-
many has considerable doubts about military approaches and strategies 
embracing both development and military actors.10 
Generally speaking, at least four main factors have been responsible for a 
change in the relationship between development policy and the military 
since the 1990s (Klingebiel / Roehder 2004). First, the number of pro-
tracted crises characterized de facto by trusteeship rules has increased (e.g. 
Afghanistan, Kosovo). Nation-building tasks are a major element of these 
peace missions. Second, development policy, interested in gaining more 
constructive influence in post-conflict situations, even expects contribu-
tions from security policy in some cases and advocates or calls for military 
intervention (e.g. Liberia in 2003). For example, the former Parliamentary 
State Secretary at the BMZ (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche 
                                                          
10  See, for example, the policy paper of the German NGO association VENRO (2003). 
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Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung / Federal Ministry for Economic Coop-
eration and Development), Uschi Eid,11 has proposed closer cooperation 
between security policy and development policy, calling, from the devel-
opment policy angle, for a stronger German commitment to peace mis-
sions in Africa. Third, foreign and security policy are increasingly coming 
to expect the active involvement of development policy in post-conflict 
situations. Fourth, the growing number of overseas missions directly in-
volving the German military has helped to draw public attention to the 
whole spectrum of German policies and the areas in which they might take 
joint action. 
Concrete new measures and approaches 
These new tendencies have led not to a merging of development and secu-
rity concepts, but to a new relationship between the actors concerned. This 
closer relationship also entails differences of view on a number of issues. 
For example, the BMZ was initially opposed to the EU’s European Devel-
opment Fund being used to finance the African Peace Facility (APF). The 
BMZ emphasized that no development funds should be used to finance 
non-civil missions, which, though important and necessary, should be the 
task for the foreign and security policies (see Wieczorek-Zeul 2003). In 
addition, the African Peace Facility (APF) is not eligible for ODA. In 
general, the EU's APF has a major role to play. Based on a proposal by EU 
Commissioner Poul Nielson, it was requested by the AU and has been 
available since May 2004. It is endowed with 250 million € from the 9th 
European Development Fund (EDF). Its purpose is to fund peacekeeping 
operations carried out by Africans in Africa. At the AU’s request, the EU 
first made 12 million € available in June 2004 and then, in October 2004, 
provided an additional 80 million € for the AU mission in the Darfur.12 
The support13 Germany is providing for the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)14 is innovative in nature in that 
                                                          
11  Published in an article with co-author Helmut Asche (Eid / Asche 2003). 
12  See EU 2004 and EU press releases EU IP/04/727 of 10 June 2004 and IP/04/1306 of 26 
October 2004. 
13  Other donors similarly regard the KAIPTC as an important project worthy of support. 
14  See Klingebiel / Roehder 2004, 18; Bundesregierung 2003, 15 f.; Bundesregierung 
2004, 46 f. 
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three ministries are contributing to the efforts. The KAIPTC was set up in 
Accra in 1998 as a regional training centre, one of the main aims being to 
tap Ghana's experience of peace missions and make it available to other 
African countries. It is one of three regional centres in the ECOWAS 
(Economic Community of West African States) region. The training pro-
gramme includes courses on military-police tasks as well as preparatory 
training for military observers. In the framework of the G8 Africa Action 
Plan, Germany is using various foreign, development and defence ministry 
instruments to support the development of the KAIPTC. The components 
involved include:  
(i) Development of a model course on the use of civil forces for peace-
keeping, funded by the BMZ and implemented by the Centre for In-
ternational Peace Missions / CIPM (Zentrum für Internationale 
Friedenseinsätze / ZIF); the implementing agency for technical coop-
eration (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit / 
GTZ) is responsible for carrying out the project. 
(ii) Funds from the Federal Foreign Office are being used to build/equip 
the centre; the Federal Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der 
Verteidigung / BMVg) is in charge of implementation. 
(iii) A German military instructor specializing in civil-military coopera-
tion provides support for training operations. In Germany the BMVg 
and the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt / AA) 
train African training personnel. 
The Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Nairobi also receives sup-
port from the German government (mainly through the BMZ). The PSTC 
is to be developed into a centre of excellence of the East African region. 
Like other donors (e.g. Canada), Germany is providing capacity-building 
support for the AU's Peace and Security Directorate, with the UN Devel-
opment Programme playing a catalytic role (see UN Secretary-General 
2004, 12). The German government has announced it is to help the AU 
and the African sub-regional organizations to create and develop efficient 
institutions and to deploy different instruments such as development and 
equipment aid (Bundesregierung 2004, 47). 
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The action plan and its impact on joint approaches 
The most important effort as regards a German "whole-of-government" 
approach began with an action plan for "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Con-
flict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building" (Aktionsplan "Zivile 
Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung") (Bundes-
regierung 2004).15 The action plan was originally launched by the Red-
Green Coalition, which held power from 1998 to 2005. However, the 
agreement on which the Grand Coalition (November 2005) is based argues 
very clearly for the action plan to be continued by the new government. 
The action plan is an interministerial exercise and was approved by the 
Cabinet in May 2004. Its objective is to develop the Federal Government’s 
capabilities and to make greater use of the foreign, security and develop-
ment policies in civil crisis prevention. One of its main aims is therefore 
coherent and coordinated action on the part of all state and non-state ac-
tors. Many examples and a sub-chapter ("Enhancing the peace-building 
capacities of regional and sub-regional organizations, especially Africa") 
are devoted to Africa. The plan concludes that the Federal Government’s 
activities in Africa focus on the promotion of regional cooperation in the 
field of security policy, civil-military cooperation, post-conflict rehabilita-
tion and support for peace processes (Bundesregierung 2004, 46). Sup-
porting African regional and sub-regional organizations is one of the key 
elements of the action plan: 
"Targeted assistance for the African Union (AU) and African sub-
regional organizations in establishing and developing efficient institu-
tions for crisis prevention and conflict management. To this end, the 
Federal Government relies on various complementary instruments (e.g. 
development policy and equipment aid)."16 (Bundesregierung 2004, 5) 
The plan covers a large number of approaches and conclusions for German 
policy and includes 161 practical steps. Against the background of the 
action plan a new Interministerial Steering Committee (ISC) (Ressortkreis) 
was established in September 2004. Most important is the identification of 
four priority tasks for the first phase (see Auswärtiges Amt 2005). These 
                                                          
15  The action plan builds on the three-page "Comprehensive Concept of the Federal Gov-
ernment on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-
Building" (2000). 
16 Equipment aid is provided by the Federal Foreign Office. 
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priority tasks have a number of clear links to sub-Saharan Africa. The first 
concerns the establishment of a whole-of-government team for a specific 
country (Ländergesprächskreis). Nigeria was chosen as a pilot country. 
The aim of this effort is to develop a new format in order to improve 
communication among different ministries on crisis issues. The second 
priority task concerns security sector reforms. As the German government 
has no concept for failing or failed states, this project seeks closer coop-
eration among German ministries in this field. The third priority task is to 
decide on the details of a possible law (Entsendegesetz) aimed at providing 
civilians for international peace missions. The fourth priority task is to 
pool financial resources. Given the experience gained by Britain in par-
ticular, the ISC will consider the possibility of establishing a jointly ad-
ministered crisis prevention pool funded from the budgets of the Federal 
Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
3 Conclusions and perspectives 
Conceptual cornerstones  
The ongoing African efforts and measures to install a new peace and secu-
rity architecture must, on the whole, be viewed positively. There is no 
denying, however, that many capacities have yet to be developed (e.g. in 
the field of transport infrastructure, as has been noted in connection with 
the Darfur mission). Some of the goals set are likely to prove unrealistic 
when it comes to practical implementation (e.g. the creation of all five 
projected regional standby forces). Another positive factor is that external 
actors have an interest in the emerging peace and security regime. In some 
respects, the new interest in Africa is prompted by a variety of motives 
(access to energy resources, influence on migration, etc.). 
In this context, external donors are developing new approaches in the 
support they provide. Joint concepts and measures are new especially for 
the German government. These new interfaces are important for Ger-
many’s approaches in all developing regions and post-conflict settings 
(like the Balkans and Afghanistan), but particularly relevant in Africa’s 
case.  
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At a strategic and conceptual level, a number of cornerstones are important 
for the German approach in Africa. At national level the action plan 
(2004) is the most important document. It is clear from the plan that joint 
development and security policy approaches will increase in the future and 
that Africa is an important region for Germany’s efforts. 
As in other fields, the German government is trying to integrate national 
efforts into international approaches. The G8 Africa Action Plan is one of 
the main reference points for Germany’s activities in this area. It is also a 
sign of its growing ambition to become a global player. The European 
Union also plays an important role, not least because decisions on new 
instruments and funding mechanisms (e.g. the African Peace Facility) are 
giving rise to major debates within the German government. In addition, 
the European Security Strategy provides a framework for the role of de-
velopment policy against the background of the new international security 
agenda. Less recognition has so far been given to the ongoing efforts of 
the United Nations in Africa (developmental peace missions in Africa, 
etc.).  
Ownership vs dependence on external actors 
One general question that will inevitably arise if the AU proves willing to 
act will have to be answered in the future: how is the funding of the Afri-
can peace and security architecture, with particular reference to peace 
missions, to be secured? There is no doubt that a large share of the costs 
will have to be borne by external actors, even if the AU member states 
take steps to intensify their efforts in this regard. This has turned out to be 
the case, for example, with the AU mission in the Darfur region of Sudan, 
where the lion's share of the costs has been borne by the EU, the US and 
other donors. Even the EU's African Peace Facility, with its endowment of 
250 million €, is unlikely, in view of the funding requirements involved, to 
be able to provide more than intermittent solutions, and theoretically, the 
facility could be entirely exhausted in roughly two years by the limited 
mission being undertaken in Burundi alone. The question must be ad-
dressed with regard both to donor budgetary logic (should development 
policy really be funding military peace missions?) and to the general will-
ingness of the international community to provide additional resources to 
fund these tasks on a continuous basis (are donors prepared to contribute 
more resources – in absolute terms – to fund AU missions?). 
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Although the AU's ownership approach to peace and security on the Afri-
can continent is fundamentally correct, it contrasts sharply with African 
funding and implementation capacities. Ultimately, the AU will prove to 
be effective only if the relevant donors are prepared to support, and above 
all to fund, its policies. 
Challenges and starting points for cross-policy approaches 
The action principles and implementation procedures adopted by devel-
opment policy actors on the one hand and military actors on the other 
differ in their underlying logic, which may lead to areas of friction. For 
this reason, the debate on the relationship between development and secu-
rity cannot have the convergence of the two tasks as its aim. Rather than 
the effects of each policy being viewed and assessed in its own narrow 
terms, the goal should be to strive for common priorities and strategies for 
the countries or regions in question. It should be noted, however, that 
closer alignment and cooperation between development actors and armed 
forces does not automatically lead to a resolution of potential conflicts of 
interest in the goals set or preclude diverging perspectives. The allocation 
of ODA resources varies (by country and region, for example) depending 
on whether the assistance is targeted at the MDGs (poverty reduction, 
absorptive capacity, performance, etc.) or the reduction of threats to secu-
rity and stability (the actions of those in power, the fragility of the state, 
the limited monopoly on the use of force, etc.). 
It is absolutely vital to decide whose security a peacekeeping mission is 
intended to ensure. The credibility of peacekeeping troops or missions 
largely depends – irrespective of the need to protect one’s own troops and 
civilian personnel on assignments – on whether they contribute to the 
security and protection of the local population. 
Today’s multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions have to perform com-
prehensive civil and military tasks. Since the Brahimi Report (2000), close 
cooperation and alignment have been recognized as core tasks, although 
this has not in itself resolved the issue. Without adequate interfaces, tack-
ling military and civil tasks simultaneously in peacekeeping missions 
remains unsatisfactory. However, simply merging development policy and 
military approaches and activities is neither meaningful nor desirable. It is 
important, however, to identify those situations and areas where better 
aligned or even, to some extent, joint planning, action and monitoring are 
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meaningful and more effective (for example, in the area of security sector 
reforms). 
In the context of military operations, development policy should play a 
role only in mandated, and therefore legitimized, missions; otherwise, its 
credibility will be fundamentally open to question, and there will be a 
serious danger of development policy being used for short-sighted military 
purposes. Furthermore, the question of which tasks to assign to the mili-
tary components of a mission is crucial for development policy. Combat 
operations offer few, if any, linkage points for development policy in-
volvement, while stabilization operations provide meaningful interfaces 
far sooner and far more frequently. 
Peacekeeping missions necessarily incorporate both civil and military 
components. Even though, from the development policy perspective, the 
military components are frequently more important and often indispensa-
ble, development policy should not be required to fund them. In view of 
the goals to be achieved, watering down the civil components in peace-
keeping missions may well prove counterproductive. 
Peacekeeping missions are experiencing a trend towards "regionalization". 
Increasingly, regional mechanisms are being allotted a more significant 
role in resolving security and stability problems. This can be seen in the 
efforts of the African Union, for example, in the Darfur region of Sudan, 
the creation of the African Standby Forces and the current role of 
ECOWAS / ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group) in West Africa. 
Over the coming years, one of the main tasks will be to create the requisite 
capacities for regions with fewer capabilities in the planning and imple-
menting of peacekeeping missions. This area will be increasingly impor-
tant as a field of action for external actors, and it is precisely here that it is 
crucial to develop action across policy sector lines. 
The number and proportion of peacekeeping missions on the African con-
tinent is increasing. For this reason, too, particularly intensive efforts are 
being made (above all in the G8 context) to create African conflict resolu-
tion and crisis intervention capabilities (and hence the ability to conduct 
peacekeeping missions). In this context, it will be especially important to 
ensure that the civil components and capabilities of peacekeeping mis-
sions, including interfaces with the military, are also given sufficient 
weight. 
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The move to establish the African Peace Facility, financed from the Euro-
pean Development Fund, is to be welcomed for the concerns it addresses, 
since it facilitates and reinforces regional action; however, the funding 
structure, i.e. the redistribution of development resources (ODA), does not 
offer a true perspective, since it weakens the contribution made by devel-
opment policy. Reliable funding and sufficient equipment are crucial fac-
tors in successful multidimensional peacekeeping missions – and this 
applies equally to ODA resources and the agreed provision of aid from 
defence budgets. What needs to be taken into account in this respect is that 
an adequate supply of resources is also required specifically when the goal 
is to achieve "soft security".  
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